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ABSTRACT 
 This dissertation aims to examine the effectiveness of “good” governance 
principles that are commonly benchmarked in shaping the Corporate Governance (CG) 
policies. Specifically, I examine the firm level internal mechanisms of Monitoring CG 
and Incentive CG and the country level external mechanisms of legal rules and disclosure 
provisions. The origin of these CG policies is rooted in the Anglo-Saxon countries, where 
stand-alone firms are mostly owned by the dispersed shareholders, and Type I agency 
problem is common between company owners and top managers. For precisely 
examining the generalizability of “good” CG principles, I have conducted my 
investigation in an empirical setting, where organizational form, governance concern, and 
institutional context are different compared to those common in the Anglo-Saxon 
environment. I have focused on the closely-held firms with ultimate controlling owners 
(UCOs) from Europe, Asia, and Latin America and analyzed how the suggested CG 
policies address potential agency problems evident in these firms.  
 There is a longstanding debate among the governance scholars in regard to the 
generalizability of “good” CG principles. While some scholars recommend/promote a set 
of standardized CG mechanisms, others question the effectiveness of such uniform means 
in diverse settings. I define these perspectives as the Universal View of CG and 
Embedded View of CG, respectively. Theoretically, I hypothesize that UCOs’ excessive 
control negatively affects minority shareholders’ wealth – a conflict that manifests in 
Type II agency problem in the closely-held firms. Based on the Universal View vs.
vii	
	
Embedded View, I then develop a set of alternative hypotheses for examining whether 
commonly recommended “good” CG policies prevent the UCOs from expropriating the 
minority shareholders. Both the views present their arguments on the basis of two core 
issues – first, the issue of policy-goal alignment of the firm level CG mechanisms in 
addressing Type II agency problem and second, the role of country level CG institutions 
in implementing firms’ internal mechanisms. Inferences of the two views, however, differ 
substantially.  
For conducting the empirical analyses, I have collected data on 1109 publicly 
traded nonfinancial firms from 40 European, Asian, and Latin American economies. The 
cross-sectional dataset is developed for the year 2016 (the data period of company 
ownership structure ranges in between 2015 to 2017). Since information availability is 
limited on the closely-held firms, I have collected/calculated data on majority of the 
measures manually from the sources of Bureau van Dijk-Orbis, Capital-IQ, and company 
annual reports. Empirical findings of the analyses consistently indicate that Type II 
agency problem is present in the concentrated firms. Results are also consistent in 
supporting the Embedded View based policy analysis. In particular, the study postulates 
that the firm and country level CG mechanisms significantly improve firms’ valuation; 
however, the internal mechanisms cannot attenuate the negative effect of excessive 
control even in the contexts with advanced external institutions. That is, in the closely-
held firms, commonly recommended “good” CG policies cannot safeguard their value 
creation from being expropriated by the UCOs. These findings are robust across the tests 
conducted with alternative model and measures and a series of ad-hoc analyses.   
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This dissertation provides critical insights into the literature on International CG. 
Ownership concentration is one of the dominant forms of organizational structure in 
many countries around the world. A thorough investigation of these firms’ complex 
agency concern is crucial in advancing the CG research agenda. This dissertation also 
generates important managerial and policy implications. Institutional actors should utilize 
the existing CG policies in accordance with their functionality or even substitute them 
given the problem specificities. For example, the current study indicates that the 
institutionally contested mechanisms of CEO-Duality and Multiple Blockholders 
Presence in fact are effective ‘niche’ mechanisms to check on the UCOs. Future research 
should focus on developing additional goal-aligned targeted means.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Corporate Governance (CG) is crucial for ensuring accountability and 
transparency in modern corporations; it refers to a system of governance mechanisms by 
which corporations are directed, disciplined, and ruled. Following the OECD guidelines 
of 1999/2004, governments and policy-makers actors nations commonly define a set of 
internal and external mechanisms as “good” CG principles (Code of Corporate 
Governance for Listed Companies in China, 2002; German Corporate Governance Code, 
2015; Japan’s Corporate Governance Code, 2015; Mexico’s Code of Corporate Practices, 
2010; Russian Code of Corporate Governance, 2014).1 In particular, the firm level 
measures of monitoring procedures (Board Independence and CEO-Separation) and 
incentive plans (Managerial Ownership and Performance based Pay) are defined as the 
key internal mechanisms (Denis, 2001; Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and the country level 
measures of legal rules (shareholder protection laws) and disclosure standards (periodic 
reporting requirements) are define as the key external mechanisms (Coffee 1999; La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998). Originating from the Anglo-Saxon 
context, these commonly recommended “good” CG policies mostly were designed to 
govern the stand-alone firm with dispersed owners and protect company shareholders 
from managerial opportunism (Coffee, 1999). It is, however, critical to recognize that 
organizational form, governance concern, and institutional context where organizations 
are embedded in differ considerably across nations (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; 
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Bebchuk & Hamdani, 2009; Chua, Morris, & Ingram, 2009). Hence, comprehensive 
research is necessary to investigate the effectiveness of universal CG policies in firms 
from diverse settings.  
In the International CG literature, a large number of scholars have assessed the 
value of suggested CG policies in firms from various countries (Abdullah, 2004; 
Edwards, Eggert, & Weichenrieder, 2009; 2008; Li, Guo, Liu, & Li, 2008; Schmid & 
Zimmermann, 2007). While providing valuable insights, empirical findings of this 
literature have been ambiguous and inconclusive. A potential source of the opacity is that 
there has been a lack in actor, problem, and context specificities in conducting CG policy 
research. In my dissertation, I intend to address these concerns by taking a more focused 
approach. I examine the closely-held firms with ultimate controlling owners (UCOs) 
from Europe (Faccio & Lang, 2002), Asia (Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000), and 
Latin America (Cueto, 2013) and investigate how commonly recommended “good” CG 
policies address potential agency problems evident in these firms (Young, Peng, 
Ahlstrom, Bruton, & Jiang, 2008).  
Theoretically, this approach allows me to perform a relatively precise 
investigation as I am specifying the ‘organizational form’ (concentrated firms), 
‘governance concern’ (expropriation of minority shareholders by UCOs), and 
‘institutional context’ (Non-Anglo-Saxon countries) of the focal firms. My research also 
has practical value. According to Bureau van Dijk, during the periods of 2015-2017, there 
were 6,515 publicly listed concentrated firms in Europe, 5,273 in Asia, and 1,567 in Latin 
America. Historically, ownership concentration has been a predominant organizational 
structure in many countries around the world. Through analyzing policy effectiveness of 
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the suggested CG mechanisms in governing UCOs and protecting minority shareholders, 
this dissertation aims to contribute to the policy dialogue concerning the concentrated 
firms. In the subsequent sections of this introductory chapter, I present my research 
question followed by a brief description of the theoretical framework, research design, 
methodology, empirical results, implications, and future research. 
1.1 Research Question 
In today’s world, corporations play crucial roles in economic and social growth. 
For sustaining a well-functioned corporate sector, it is necessary to ensure that 
corporations are governed credibly through the means of firm and country level CG 
mechanisms. In the foreword of World Bank report on governance, Sir Adrian Cadbury 
states – “Corporations, whether they be family firms, the dominant form of economic 
organization, or state enterprises, work within boundaries set by law, by regulations, by 
those who own and fund them and by the expectations of those they serve. … … … … 
… Corporate governance is concerned with holding the balance between economic and 
social goals and between individual and communal goals. The governance framework is 
there to encourage the efficient use of resources and equally to require accountability for 
the stewardship of those resources.” (Iskander & Chamlou, 2000: VI). 
CG failure can be so catastrophic that scholars and policy experts have faulted it 
as one of the major reasons of detestable corporate scandals and decade long financial 
downturns (Ahmadjian & Song, 2004; Cioffi, 2006). Since the aftermaths of 1990s global 
crisis, transnational organizations such as the World Bank, IMF, and OECD actively have 
been advocating for CG reforms across both – developed and emerging economies 
(Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Bratton & McCahery, 1999; Chen, Li, & Shapiro, 
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2011; Soederberg, 2003). As the requirement of cross-border collaborations and 
international business transactions, forces of globalization such as the international 
financial markets, foreign investors, and multinational corporations routinely have been 
demanding the adoption of “good” CG principles by the host/local actors (Coffee, 2002; 
2014; Useem, 1998). Studies have shown that in order to achieve legitimacy and/or 
survive in global competition, countries are increasingly reforming their CG policies. At 
the national level, governments are improving their external CG institutions by 
developing legal rules (Guillén & Capron, 2015) and disclosure provisions (Hellman, 
Carenys, & Gutierrez, 2018). At the organizational level, firms are modernizing their 
internal governance by ensuring Board Independence (Kaplan & Minton, 1994), CEO-
Separation (2008), Managerial Ownership (Sanders & Tuschke, 2007), Performance 
based Pay (Buck, Liu, & Skovoroda, 2008), and similar recommended measures.  
These suggested CG policies primarily are developed in the Anglo-Saxon context, 
where stand-alone firms are mostly owned by the dispersed shareholders (Bratton & 
McCahery, 1999; Roberts, 2004; Soederberg, 2003). Consequently, majority of the 
governance mechanisms are designed towards addressing agency conflict between 
company owners (principal) and top managers (agent); – an agency conflict commonly 
known as Principal-Agent (P-A) problem or Type I agency problem (Berle & Means, 
1932). The collapse of the US energy giant Enron in 2001 is a result of Type I agency 
problem, whereby Enron shareholders lost their wealth due to corporate misconducts 
committed by top management. CEO Jeffrey Skilling, CFO Andy Fastow, and Chairman 
Kenneth Lay were selling their stocks at higher prices when false accounting reports 
made the Enron stock look more valuable than it truly was. Thousands of shareholders 
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lost millions of dollars as the scandalous news got uncovered and caused significant drop 
in Enron share value (The New York Times, 2006).  
Berle & Means (1932) expressed serious concerns about the separation of 
ownership and control and its consequences in large corporations in their classic work 
‘The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1932)’. To protect the dispersed owners 
from managerial opportunism, Jensen & Meckling (1976) and Fama & Jensen (1983) 
employed classical Agency Theory in recommending Monitoring CG and Incentive CG 
as the firm level internal mechanisms. CG scholars also emphasize the importance of 
national laws and disclosure regulations in implementing the arm’s-length agency 
contracts (Barney & Ouchi, 1986; La Porta et al., 1998; Mahoney, 1995). It is important 
to mention that classical Agency Theory based analysis of modern corporations and their 
governance policies have been criticized for holding a sinister view of corporate agents 
(Ghoshal, 2005; Lubatkin, Lane, Collin, & Very, 2007). Recently, CG scholars have 
addressed this critique by arguing – because of circumstantial uncertainty and bounded 
rationality of human behavior – that agency problems are real in most separation and 
delegation relations even in the absence of all parties’ negative intensions (Hendry, 2002; 
Kostova, Nell, & Hoenen, 2016; Wiseman, Cuevas-Rodríguez, & Gomez-Mejia, 2012). 
Hence, credible CG has to be ensured. But whether commonly recommended “good” 
policies are really good in various firms from various contexts – is a question that has 
generated a whole new line of debate and investigation.   
Recent studies show that besides the stand-alone firms with dispersed owners, a 
large number of corporations in many Non-Anglo-Saxon economies are closely-held 
within the control of concentrated owners (Claessens et al., 2000; Cueto, 2013; Faccio & 
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Lang, 2002; Lins, 2003). A firm is defined to be closely-held when a single entity 
(family, state, financial institution, corporation, or so forth) owns the majority of its 
voting rights as the UCO and maintains the voting control through a complex ownership 
structure (Guedhami & Mishra, 2009). From the institutional perspective, scholars argue 
that closely-held firms with UCOs emerge as a natural response to the absence/weakness 
of supporting external institutions (Leff, 1979) in regard to providing sufficient legal 
protections for minority shareholders (La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999) and 
warranting lower transaction costs for firms’ market operations (Khanna & Palepu, 
2000). Prevalence of controlling owners combined with the institutional voids generate a 
different and more complex form of agency problem commonly known as Principal-
Principal (P-P) problem or Type II agency problem; a conflict often evident between 
closely-held firms’ minority shareholders and UCOs (Young et al., 2008). Accounting 
calamity at the Italian dairy-foods giant Parmalat in 2003 is an example of Type II 
agency problem. Tanzi family was the controlling shareholder who ultimately owned 
51% of the company through a complex chain of multiple holdings. The founder and 
former CEO Calisto Tanzi, his son Stefano Tanzi, brother Giovanni Tanzi, and some 16 
other individuals went under investigation when Parmalat miserably defaulted on its debt 
payments and eventually collapsed amidst billions of dollars of vanished assets. In midst 
of the corporate misconduct, minority shareholders of Parmalat Finanziaria were the 
ultimate victims whose wealth had been expropriated by the controlling family via 
internal mechanisms of self-dealing (The New York Times, 2003). More recently in 
South Korea, when Samsung C&T announced a deal to merge with its sister company 
Cheil Industries, it faced stern criticisms as the deal was not in the best interest of the 
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Samsung C&T minority shareholders. Lee Jae-yong – the son and heir apparent of 
Samsung group patriarch Lee Kun-hee – is the biggest shareholder of Cheil Industries. 
Legal investigators stated that there was no economic reason for merging the two 
companies other than serving the interest of the controlling shareholder (the Lee family). 
The proposed merger significantly undervalued Samsung C&T and would allow the Lee 
family to transfer wealth to Cheil Industries. Lee Jae-yong faced prosecution due to his 
alleged crime of bribing politicians and getting the merger approved illegally (Financial 
Times, 2017).  
The world had to contend a series of such corporate misconducts which resulted 
due to CG failure in the concentrated firms. Aimed at preventing corporate corruption 
and financial devastation, institutional actors have been conducting rigorous policy 
reforms so as to improve firm and country level governance mechanisms. Even though 
the world-wide initiatives to improve CG policies have been appreciated as worthwhile 
and timely efforts, series of concerns have arisen due to the assumption of a universal 
governance system. Analyses by Soederberg (2003), Bratton & McCahery (1999), and 
Chen, Li, & Shapiro (2011) suggest that CG reforms solely based on a single model – 
designed for a particular dyad of actors and embedded in a particular institutional context 
– run the risk of actor, problem, and context specificity. As discussed above, the type of 
agency problem that minority shareholders experience in the concentrated firms and the 
state of institutional environment where these firms are embedded in differ substantially 
from those common in the Anglo-Saxon environment (Bebchuk & Hamdani, 2009; 
Klapper & Love, 2004; Young et al., 2008). Consequently, there arises an important 
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policy question – Are the standardized set of “good” CG policies effective in mitigating 
Type II agency problem in closely-held firms from Non-Anglo-Saxon nations?  
The overarching research objective of my dissertation is to address this question 
by extending the policy analysis of “good” CG principles at two levels. At the 
organizational level, I focus on the concentrated firms whose actors, power structure, and 
agency problem are unique in nature. It is important to investigate the value of internal 
mechanisms in governing the closely-held firms with UCOs since such mechanisms 
mostly have been designed to govern the stand-alone firms with dispersed owners (Fama 
& Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Next, I incorporate the country level 
institutions by examining the combined effect of internal and external mechanisms. For 
conducting these extended analyses, I select European, Asian, and Latin American 
economies as my empirical setting. As discussed previously, most of the CG policies are 
originated from the Anglo-Saxon nations, where institutional environment is supportive 
of the shareholder oriented model (Fama, 1980; La Porta et al., 1998). Therefore, it is 
critical to conduct the policy analysis in a different (i.e. Non-Anglo-Saxon) setting. 
Essentially, I address my research question on the basis of two core issues. First, at the 
organizational level, the issue of policy-goal alignment; i.e. whether the internal CG 
mechanisms are aligned with the intended goal of addressing Type II agency problem. 
Second, at the country level, the supporting role of external institutions; i.e. whether the 
availability of developed CG institutions is instrumental in implementing the firm level 
CG mechanisms.  
There is a longstanding debate among the CG scholars in regard to the 
standardization of “good” CG principles. The main arguments of their debate revolve 
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around the above mentioned two core issues (policy-goal alignment of internal 
mechanisms and supporting role of external institutions). One group of scholars argue 
that the internal CG mechanisms are aligned with the intended goal of reducing Type II 
agency problem (Lam & Lee, 2008; Sanders & Tuschke, 2007) and countries are 
universally developing external CG institutions which consequently are strengthening the 
effectiveness of firm level governance (Hansmann & Kraakman, 2001; van Essen, 
Heugens, Otten, & van Oosterhout, 2012a). I refer to this perspective as the Universal 
View of CG. For an in depth analysis of the Universal View, I develop the ideas of 
Generalizability of Internal CG and Complementarity of External CG (which will be 
discussed in the following section). In contrast to the Universal View, the other group of 
scholars express concern about the availability of developed CG institutions in the Non-
Anglo-Saxon nations (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Peng, 2004) and question the policy-
goal alignment of internal mechanisms in addressing Type II agency problem (Chen et 
al., 2011; Young et al., 2008); I refer to this perspective as the Embedded View of CG. 
For systematically describing the Embedded View, I incorporate the Neo-Institutional 
constructs of Policy-Practice Decoupling and Means-Ends Decoupling (which will be 
discussed in the following section). Both the views provide convincing arguments in 
order to justify (by Universal View) or refute (by Embedded View) the standardization of 
“good” CG principles. I start with hypothesizing that Type II agency problem is present 
in the closely-held firms with UCOs. Next, I develop the Universal View based 
hypotheses by incorporating the ideas of Generalizability of Internal CG and 
Complementarity of External CG. Finally, I derive the Embedded View based hypotheses 
by incorporating the ideas of Policy-Practice Decoupling of CG and Means-Ends 
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Decoupling of CG. I integrate both the views to generate a set of alternative hypotheses 
for examining the generalizability of “good” CG principles. 
1.2 Research Framework 
For analyzing the governance effectiveness of suggested CG policies, researchers 
often study the direct impact of internal mechanisms on the firm level various outcomes 
(such as accounting performance and market performance). There is confusion associated 
with such approach. Even though ‘significant positive’ impact is often interpreted as 
governance effectiveness (Bonn, 2004; Jackling & Johl, 2009), it is not certain that the 
increased value is rightfully distributed among the shareholders. Confusion is also 
associated with interpreting ‘insignificant/negative’ results. Peng (2004) explains that the 
‘insignificant/negative’ impacts are the result of lack in policy implementation, whereas 
Dalton, Hitt, Certo, & Dalton (2007) argue such results are due to lack in policy-goal 
alignment. The Stewardship view, on the contrary, explains ‘insignificant/negative’ 
results through an analysis with a different perspective. According to the arguments of 
Stewardship view, controlling owners are the ‘stewards’ of concentrated firms; their 
presence creates substitution effect and thereby, nullifies the benefit of “good” CG 
mechanisms (Donaldson & Davis, 1994; Tian & Lau, 2001). In order to avoid such 
ambiguities, I start with examining presence of P-P problem in the closely-held firms. 
Then I develop a set of policy-related hypotheses for investigating whether the firm and 
country level governance mechanisms mitigate closely-held firms’ P-P problem. 
Thereby, I address the ‘substitution effect’ logic raised by the Stewardship view. 
Furthermore, I aim to examine whether the impact of CG mechanisms are the 
consequences of policy implementation (or non-implementation) or the consequences of 
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policy-goal alignment (or non-alignment). Theoretically, I argue that in the concentrated 
firms, as voting control by the UCOs exceeds their cash-flow rights, the extent of 
minority shareholder wealth expropriation increases. Excess Control provides UCOs with 
the incentives and opportunities to direct closely-held firms in serving their private 
benefit acquisition (Khanna & Rivkin, 2000) and/or attaining their collective benefit 
motivation (Burkart & Lee, 2008). Consistent with the conclusion of a number of CG 
scholars, I argue that the negative impact of Excess Control on Minority Shareholder 
Wealth indicates presence of P-P problem (Ghoul, Guedhami, Wang, & Kwok, 2016; 
Hale, 2006; Morck, Wolfenzon, & Yeung, 2005; Saggese & Sarto, 2016). 
Next, I proceed to develop a set of alternative hypotheses for examining to what 
extent recommended CG mechanisms (internal and external) influence the negative 
relationship between Excess Control and Minority Shareholder Wealth. I start with 
deriving the Universal View based hypotheses which believe in the standardization of 
“good” CG principles. The proponents of Generalizability of Internal CG argue that as 
long as there are delegation situations, agency problems can arise in all sorts of 
separation relationships (Hendry, 2002; Hoenen & Kostova, 2015; Kostova et al., 2016). 
Therefore, various firms embedded in various contexts are adopting “good” internal 
mechanisms to mitigate their agency problems (Cerbioni & Parbonetti, 2007; Kang & 
Shivdasani, 1995; Kaplan, 1994a; Mitton, 2002; Sanders & Tuschke, 2007). As in the 
case of Type II agency problem, minority shareholders invest the in closely-held firms 
and UCOs strategize/manage minority shareholders’ investments either being both the 
managers and controlling owners (closely-held firms with family owners and managers) 
or mainly being the controlling owners (closely-held firms with professional managers) 
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(Ma, Yao, & Xi, 2006; Young & Tsai, 2008). Information asymmetry, divergence in self-
interests, and opportunistic behavior are evident in this type of agency relationship as 
well (Wiseman et al., 2012). Since suggested internal mechanisms are inherently 
designed to address these concerns, it is also possible for them to mitigate the 
expropriation of minority shareholders.  
The proponents of Complementarity of External CG not only propose that internal 
CG mechanisms are capable of addressing P-P conflict, but also assert that countries are 
universally developing external CG institutions mainly because of relative efficiency of 
these instruments and rapid globalization of business transactions (Coffee, 1999, 2001; 
Hansmann & Kraakman, 2000, 2001; Yoshikawa & Rasheed, 2009). And as the CG 
scholars suggest, the more the external environment provides developed supporting 
institutions, the higher will be the positive impact of firm level mechanisms (Doidge, 
Karolyi, & Stulz, 2007; Hope, 2003; van Essen et al., 2012a). In essence, scholars 
believing in Complementarity of External CG define country level governance 
institutions as the ‘complementary factor’. In their absence, organizations rely on the firm 
level CG mechanisms for attaining good governance. External institutions function as an 
additional force to enhance the positive impact of internal mechanisms. (Bonetti, 
Magnan, & Parbonetti, 2016; Chen, Chen, & Wei, 2009; Dahyaa, Dimitrov, & 
McConnell, 2008).   
In contrast to the Universal View, Embedded View questions the universality of 
“good” governance principles. I utilize the Neo-Institutional constructs of Policy-Practice 
Decoupling and Means-Ends Decoupling for systematically defining Embedded View of 
CG. Policy-Practice Decoupling occurs when policies are aligned with the intended 
13	
	
outcome but there is no success in achieving the goal as firms conduct ceremonial policy 
adoption just to secure legitimacy (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Such instances are prominent 
in weak institutional contexts as under developed external institutions cannot ensure firm 
level policy implementation (Dharwadkar, George, & Brandes, 2000; Lim & Tsutsui, 
2012; Schøtt & Jensen, 2008). In strong institutional contexts, developed external 
institutions nullify the act of ceremonial policy adoption as a means to achieve legitimacy 
and enforce firm level implementation of the formal policies; consequently, prevalence of 
positive outcomes increases (Bromley & Powell, 2012; Guillén & Capron, 2015). Many 
CG scholars refer to the idea of Policy-Practice Decoupling in analyzing the applicability 
of universal mechanisms in firms from various nations (Fiss & Zajac, 2004; Gallego & 
Larrain, 2012; Heugens, van Essen, & van Oosterhout, 2009; Peng, Buck, & Filatotchev, 
2003; Veliyath & Ramaswamy, 2000). Their analyses suggest that recommended internal 
mechanisms may have the potential to address P-P conflict; however, success of such CG 
policies is contingent on the presence of country level supporting institutions. Not all the 
countries are universally developing external CG institutions (Hall & Soskice, 2001; 
Khanna & Palepu, 2000; Kogut & Spicer, 2002). In weak contexts, firms can get away 
with the act of ceremonial policy adoption due to institutional voids in the external 
environment; as a result there is no significant attenuation of P-P conflict. In strong 
contexts, developed CG institutions enforce firm level implementation of the internal 
mechanisms which in turn successfully attenuates P-P conflict. That is, scholars believing 
in Policy-Practice Decoupling of CG view country level governance institutions as the 
‘necessary factor’ in presence of which firms implement the internal mechanisms and 
consequently attain good governance; and in absence of which firms conduct ceremonial 
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policy adoption and the formal structure of internal mechanisms cannot attain good 
governance (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Aguilera & Jackson, 2010; Klapper & Love, 
2004; Peng, 2004).  
Means-Ends Decoupling occurs when suggested policies (means) are not aligned 
with the intended outcomes (ends) but firms still adopt the misaligned policies 
(Abrahamson, 1991; Bromley & Powell, 2012) due to legitimacy pressure from the 
external sources (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Persistent 
complexity in Means-Ends Decoupling indicates that the availability of developed 
external institutions cannot support the firm level policies to generate positive results as 
the core problem here is not lack in policy implementation but rather lack in policy 
alignment (Wijen, 2014, 2015). In International CG literature, a large number of scholars 
imply the idea of Means-Ends Decoupling in reviewing the Anglo-Saxon based CG 
reforms (Attig, Boubakri, Ghoul, & Guedhami, 2016; Bruce, Buck, & Main, 2005; 
Lubatkin et al., 2007). They argue that recommended internal mechanisms cannot reduce 
P-P problem in the closely-held firms with UCOs as these mechanisms essentially are 
designed to address P-A problem in the stand-alone firms with dispersed owners 
(Bebchuk & Hamdani, 2009; Chen et al., 2011; Young et al., 2008). Organizational 
culture, power structure, and actors involved in the agency relations vary significantly 
between these two types of firms (Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997; Fiss, 2008; 
Heracleous & Lan, 2012). External CG institutions cannot moderate organizational 
governance improvement since such institutions are enforcing a set of misaligned policies 
(Bromley & Powell, 2012; Wijen, 2014). In short, the proponents of Policy-Practice 
Decoupling of CG question the generalizability of governance mechanisms from the 
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perspective of country-institutional embeddedness; whereas the proponents of Means-
Ends Decoupling of CG question the generalizability of governance mechanisms from the 
perspective of firm-structural embeddedness. 
1.3 Research Design & Methodology 
The sample of this investigation consists of the publicly traded non-finance 
companies from 40 European, Asian, and Latin American countries. The criterion of the 
sample selection has been to confirm that all the companies are closely-held within the 
control of UCOs. In many instances, data on the concentrated firms were not readily 
available. Therefore, data on the key measures have been manually collected/calculated 
from Bureau van Dijk-Orbis, Capital-IQ, and company annual reports. At the end, I have 
built a cross-sectional dataset of 1109 concentrated firms for the year 2016; data on 
company ownership structure has been manually collected from the periods between 
2015 and 2017.  
In the base hypothesis (where it is hypothesized that Excess Control negatively 
affects Minority Shareholder Wealth), ‘Minority Shareholder Wealth’ is the dependent 
variable and UCOs’ ‘Excess Control’ is the independent variable. The core objective of 
my dissertation is to examine the policy effectiveness of “good” governance principles in 
addressing Type II agency problem. I develop a set of alternative hypotheses to analyze 
the moderating effects of internal CG and external CG on the negative relation between 
Excess Control and Minority Shareholder Wealth. It is, therefore, important to recognize 
that even though the CG mechanisms appear as the moderating variables – these 
mechanisms are my main variables of interest. 
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Following the existing CG research, I apply Firm Value related measure as the 
proxy of Minority Shareholder Wealth. As suggested by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, & Vishny (2002) and Claessens, Djankov, Fan, & Lang (2002), Excess Control 
by UCOs  lowers market valuation of concentrated firms, which indicates expropriation 
of minority shareholders. In particular, I employ the Firm Value measures of Tobin’s Q 
for assessing Minority Shareholder Wealth. Excess Control is defined as the difference 
between UCOs’ voting control and cash-flow right in the concentrated firms. Voting 
control differs from cash-flow right because of the mechanisms of pyramiding, multiple 
control chains, cross-shareholding, and dual class share (Bebchuk, Kraakman, & Triantis, 
2000; Morck et al., 2005).  
At the firm level, I am focusing on two major governance policies – Monitoring 
CG and Incentive CG. Monitoring CG consists of Board Independence (measured by the 
ratio of total number of independent board members to total number of overall board 
members) (Dahyaa et al., 2008) and CEO-Separation (measured by a dummy variable 
which takes the value of 1 if CEO and Board Chair are two different individuals or zero if 
CEO and Board Chair is the same person) (Zajac & Westphal, 1996). Incentive CG 
consists of Managerial Ownership (measured by the voting control percentage directly 
and indirectly owned by the CEO) (Mueller & Spitz-Oener, 2006) and Performance 
based Pay (measured by the ratio of CEO’s variable pay to CEO’s total pay) (Gao & Li, 
2015). At the country level, I am examining the role of legal rules and market provisions 
in implementing the firm level governance mechanisms. The quality of legal institution is 
measured by the product of Minority Shareholder Protection index and Rule of Law 
index; whereas the country level disclosure standard is measured by the product of 
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Transparency-Disclosure index and Rule of Law index (Bell, Filatotchev, & Aguilera, 
2014; International Country Risk Guide, 2016; World Bank, 2016).  The empirical 
analyses have been controlled by including a number of firm, industry, and country level 
control variables. The firm level control variables include Firm Age, Firm Size, Firm 
Profitability, Firm Growth, Cross-Listing, Foreign UCOs, and identity of different types 
UCOs (family, state, financial institution, corporation, and other). Indicators for industry 
affiliation and countries’ GDP growth percentage for country effect have also been 
incorporated in the analyses.   
For testing the hypotheses, I conduct multiple regression analyses with 
interactions. For examining the moderating effect of internal mechanisms, I analyze two 
way interactions. For capturing the moderating effect of external mechanisms, I split the 
full sample between a sub-sample with firms from weak institutional context versus a 
sub-sample with firms from strong institutional context. The issue of multicollinearity has 
been addressed by mean-centering the measures of Excess Control and CG mechanisms 
that are continuous in nature. I employ the ordinary least squares (OLS) technique with 
Huber-White robust standard error and two stage least squares (2SLS) technique of 
endogeneity control. For robustness tests, I have run a series of statistical analyses with 
different measures for Minority Shareholder Wealth, Monitoring CG, Incentive CG, and 
external institutions. I supplement the hypotheses test with extended ad-hoc analyses 
integrating other important and relevant aspects of the CG literature.  
1.4 Results & Discussion 
The empirical findings of the dissertation provide support for H1 and policy 
analysis built on the idea of Means-Ends Decoupling of CG. Results are consistent in 
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indicating presence of P-P conflict in the concentrated firms and that the recommended 
CG mechanisms cannot mitigate this governance concern. The internal mechanisms of 
Board Independence, CEO-Separation, and Performance based Pay are proven to be 
beneficial in improving concentrated firms’ technical efficiency; however, the benefit is 
not rightfully distributed among the minority shareholders. That is, the internal 
mechanisms of Monitoring CG and Incentive CG cannot attenuate the negative effect of 
excessive control and the country level external mechanisms of legal institution and 
disclosure standard cannot generate any positive moderating impact. These findings are 
robust across the analyses with alternative measures of Minority Shareholder Wealth, 
Monitoring CG, Incentive CG, and external institutions.   
For further investigation of the research findings, I added an ad-hoc analysis 
section to the empirical chapter. I re-examined the policy-related hypotheses in family vs. 
non-family firms, locally-listed vs. cross-listed firms, and domestic vs. foreign firms. 
Country level external mechanisms of market institutions and informal institutions were 
also incorporated to the ad-hoc analyses. Results remain consistent in supporting the 
analyses of Means-Ends Decoupling of CG. In addition to the internal mechanisms of 
Board Independence, CEO-Separation, and Performance based Pay, country level 
external mechanisms of legal institution and disclosure standard also depicted positive 
and significant effect on improving firms’ valuation. Similar results were found for 
Crosslisting in the foreign stock market and presence of Foreign UCOs. However, these 
mechanisms remain insignificant in preventing the expropriation by UCOs. It is to be 
noted that the current study found positive and significant effect of CEO-Duality and 
Multiple Blockholders in attenuating the negative effect of excessive control. CEO-
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Duality is the opposite of CEO-Separation; it refers to the board leadership structure 
where CEO and Board Chair positions are held by the same individual. Firms with 
Multiple Blockholders are those concentrated firms where in addition to the UCO, 
multiple shareholders own more than 10% of the control right.   
1.5 Contributions, Limitations, & Future Research 
By analyzing the hand-collected dataset on the recent ownership and governance 
structure, this dissertation evaluates the value of common CG policies in the concentrated 
firms and thereby, contributes to the literature on comparative CG research. It emphasizes 
the importance of adopting a comprehensive approach and designing a CG policy scheme 
with more targeted means. It calls for clearer specifications of the connection between 
policies and their intended goals and between organizations and their external 
institutions. There can be a set of ‘master’ institutions; in addition to that there should be 
flexibility in complementing or even substituting the ‘master’ institutions with ‘niche’ 
institutions which are tailored towards attaining specific goals.  
There are several limitations associated with this research. As data availability is 
limited for the concentrated firms, empirical analyses were conducted for a single year. 
Current study could not employ a more sophisticated proxy for Minority Shareholder 
Wealth since UCOs tend not to disclose data on the relevant measures. This dissertation 
examined the CG policies in the concentrated firms from Non-Anglo-Saxon context. 
Future research can focus on the concentrated firms from Anglo-Saxon context and 
evaluate how the CG policies govern UCOs of the Anglo-Saxon firms. Future research 
can also focus on developing the ‘niche’ institutions that will be effective in addressing 
the P-P conflict. 
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1.6 Organization of the Thesis 
This dissertation is organized in six chapters. Following the introductory chapter, 
the second chapter provides a literature review on the relevant research. Chapter 3 
describes the development of theoretical framework along with the key hypotheses. 
Chapter 4 explains the research design and methodology. Chapter 5 presents the 
empirical findings, robustness tests, and ad-hoc analyses. Finally, Chapter 6 provides 
conclusion of the dissertation discussing the empirical findings and highlighting the 
theoretical contributions, policy/managerial implications, limitations, and directions for 
future research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW: 
 FOUNDATION OF THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
In this chapter, I will review the relevant literature important for developing the 
theoretical framework and hypotheses of my research. This section will provide details 
on – (i) definition of CG, (ii) mechanisms of Internal CG and External CG, (iii) closely-
held firm structure along with Excess Control and Minority Shareholder Wealth (iv) 
cross-country trend in governance policy reform, (v) Universal View of CG, and (vi) 
Embedded View of CG. 
2.1 What is Corporate Governance? 
There are different versions of CG definition. The most widely accepted 
definition refers to the idea of protecting shareholders from managerial opportunism. As 
Donaldson (1990) suggests, – “Corporate governance is the structure whereby managers 
at the organizational apex are controlled through the board of directors, its associated 
structures, executive incentive, and other schemes of monitoring and bonding.” 
(Donaldson, 1990: 376). Similarly, Sternberg (1998) states, “Corporate governance refers 
to ways of ensuring that corporate actions, agents, and assets are directed at achieving the 
corporate objectives established by the corporation’s shareholders.” (Sternberg, 1998: 14) 
In their version of CG definition, Denis & McConnell (2003) broaden the concept of 
‘agent’ by referring to both managers and controlling owners and emphasize the 
22	
	
importance of external institutions, – “We define corporate governance as the set of 
mechanisms – both institutional and market-based – that induce the self-interested 
controllers of a company (those that make decisions regarding how the company will be 
operated) to make decisions that maximize the value of the company to its owners (the 
suppliers of capital).” (Denis & McConnell, 2003: 2) 
In contrast with scholars who define CG from the perspective of ‘shareholder 
value’, proponents of ‘stakeholder value’ believe in the idea of extending corporate 
responsibilities towards serving the interests of additional actors (employees, customers, 
creditors, suppliers, and so forth). Claessens & Yurtoglu (2013) present a detail definition 
of CG from the perspective of stakeholder value, – “The first set of definitions concerns 
itself with a set of behavioral patterns: that is, the actual behavior of corporations, in 
terms of such measures as performance, efficiency, growth, financial structure, and 
treatment of shareholders and other stakeholders. The second set concerns itself with the 
normative framework: that is, the rules under which firms are operating – with the rules 
coming from such sources as the legal system, the judicial system, financial markets, and 
factor (labor) markets.” (Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013: 3). CG definition provided by 
Bosch & Lannoo (1995) suggests, – “Corporate governance is the whole system of rights, 
processes and controls established internally and externally over the management of a 
business entity with the objective of protecting the interests of all stakeholders.” (Bosch 
& Lannoo, 1995: 5). 
The conceptualization of CG varies across societies as cultural differences are 
prominent in defining the role of corporations (Sternberg, 1998; Tirole, 2001). But it is 
critical to recognize that even though the core meaning of CG may vary, there are striking 
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similarities in the national CG policies in incorporating commonly recommended “good” 
governance principles. In the formal documents of Codes of Good Governance across 
nations, definitions of CG in many instances may uphold the idea of serving all the 
‘stakeholders’; however, these documents focus predominantly on the key policies 
designed for serving the ‘shareholders’ (German Corporate Governance Code, 2015; 
Japan’s Corporate Governance Code, 2015; Russian Code of Corporate Governance, 
2014; Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China, 2002; Mexico’s 
Code of Corporate Practices, 2010). To survive in intense competition and/or ensure 
legitimacy in the global community, local actors are required and expected to adopt the 
core CG policies (Soederberg, 2003). In fact, a number of standardized indices have been 
developed based on the common CG mechanisms that are widely utilized in measuring 
the quality of firm and country level CG institutions (Bebchuk & Hamdani, 2009).  
2.2 Mechanisms of Internal CG & External CG 
The standardized CG policies mainly were developed to govern the stand-alone 
firms with dispersed owners that are dominant in the U.S., U.K., Canada, Australia, and 
other Anglo-Saxon economies (Denis & McConnell, 2003). The basic premise of this 
model implies that modern corporations are owned by widely dispersed shareholders, 
where every day strategic and operational decision making is done by professional 
managers. That is, managers as the agent conduct important actions on behalf of the 
shareholders who by definition are the principals. Berle & Means (1932) had been 
pessimistic about the socioeconomic effects of separation between ownership and 
control. They expressed concerns as top managers’ interests may not always be in line 
with those of the investors. Owners expect that profits be returned to them in a rightful 
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manner; but managers may prefer to reinvest profits or, in more sinister sense, further 
their own benefits in the form of higher salaries and perks. Thus separation between 
ownership and control generates P-A or Type I agency problem. To address such agency 
problem, CG scholars and policy-makers strictly advocate for adopting a series of 
governance mechanisms such as the firm level internal mechanisms of Monitoring CG 
and Incentive CG and the country level external mechanisms of legal rules and disclosure 
standards (Denis & McConnell, 2003; Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; La Porta et al., 1998; Mahoney, 1995). CG scholars also emphasize the 
importance of company debt structure (Harvey, Lins, & Roper, 2004) and transparent 
auditing (Guedhami, Pittman, & Saffar, 2009) as critical CG mechanisms; the debt 
providers (creditors) and external auditors discipline the corporate agent mainly as the ex-
ante and ex-post actors of governance, respectively. Additionally, CG scholars highlight 
the importance of country level market institutions (Rossi & Volpin, 2004) and informal 
institutions (Dyck & Zingales, 2004) in implementing the firm level CG mechanisms. 
Following the OECD guidelines of “good” CG principles, this dissertation confines its 
investigation within the internal mechanisms of Monitoring CG and Incentive CG and the 
external mechanisms of legal and disclosure institutions. 
The classical Agency Theory has been at the core in shaping commonly 
recommended “good” CG policies. In P-A relationship, the principals delegate decision-
making authority and relinquish control to the agent to perform critical services on their 
behalf (Mitnick, 1992; Pratt & Zeckhauser, 1985). In the case of dispersed owners 
appointing professional managers to run the stand-alone firms, the delegation of decision-
making authority and loss of control create potential ‘goal conflict’ and ‘information 
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asymmetry’ between the two actors (Arrow, 1985; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). Potential ‘goal conflict’ occurs because the interests of risk-averse 
managers and risk-neutral shareholders often do not converge. ‘Information asymmetry’ 
occurs because the managers invariably possess more information on the day to day 
tasks, strategies, and outcomes than do the owners. Agency Theory assumes that the 
principals and agents are utility maximizers who pursue their own interests “with guile” 
(Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Williamson, 1975). Corporate managers can engage in 
opportunistic behavior and act towards maximizing their self-interest at the expense of 
the shareholders (Holmström, 1982). Adverse selection by the principal implies that ex-
ante or ex-post of hiring, owners cannot perfectly judge the competence and skill of the 
professional manager  as such information is hidden and/or may be misrepresented 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). To address such agency problems, principals need governance 
measures for watching and bonding the agents’ behavior. Monitoring mechanisms are 
designed to reduce the problem of ‘information asymmetry’ and monitor top management 
so that they act in the interest of the shareholders. Incentive mechanisms are prescribed to 
reduce the problem of ‘goal conflict’ and provide top management with the incentive 
packages to align their interests with those of the shareholders (Alchian & Demsetz, 
1972; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Additionally, governance scholars have emphasized the 
importance of countries’ legal and market institutions in enforcing and supporting the 
firm level CG mechanisms (Denis & McConnell, 2003; Fama, 1980; Sun et al., 2016).       
CG recommendations based on classical Agency Theoretical assumptions, 
however, have been criticized for being pessimistic and holding negative views 
particularly about corporate managers (Ghoshal, 2005; Lubatkin et al., 2007; Perrow, 
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1986). The egocentric agents are assumed to be self-interest maximizers who engage in 
opportunistic behavior “with guile” and ignore the interest of principals (Williamson, 
1975). In recent works, CG scholars have addressed this critique by relaxing the sinister 
assumption of classical Agency Theory. They have updated its application to be more 
pragmatic in justifying the importance of good governance (Eisenhardt, 1989; Hendry, 
2002; Hoenen & Kostova, 2015; Kostova et al., 2016). According to their analysis, 
agents’ undesirable behavior may not necessarily be caused by the intension of self-utility 
maximization. As Hoenen & Kostova (2015) state, “… … agency problem is 
fundamentally rooted in the delegation of decision authority and inability to observe the 
agent exercising such authority. Due to imperfect rationality, principals may fail to 
specify objectives correctly and agents may fail to perform to expectations … …” 
(Hoenen & Kostova, 2015: 4). Similarly, Hendry (2002) defines agents’ bounded 
rationality as ‘honest incompetence’ where agents’ undesirable behavior is the result of 
“limited competence to interpret objectives, judge situations, and take appropriate 
actions” (Hendry, 2002: 102). Moreover, top managers’ interests often may include 
maintaining high employment, distributing wealth among multiple stakeholders, attaining 
social legitimacy and so on (Bruce et al., 2005; Davis et al., 1997). In the process, 
shareholders’ interests may be sacrificed even in the absence of managers’ personal gain 
intension. That is, agency problems can occur as a result of key actors’ bounded 
rationality and circumstantial uncertainties even when the agents are honest in their 
intensions (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2005; Hendry, 2002); hence, effective CG is necessary in 
all instances.    
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To address P-A problem in the stand-alone firms, commonly recommended 
Monitoring CG includes the enactment of an independent board and board leadership 
structure of CEO-Separation (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998; García-Castro, 
Aguilera, & Ariño, 2013; Rechner & Dalton, 1991; van Essen, van Oosterhout, & 
Carney, 2012b). Publicly listed corporations are required by law to elect a board of 
directors responsible for hiring, firing, compensating, and advising top management on 
behalf of the shareholders (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003). Appointment of outside 
directors (a proxy for board independence) is critical to ensure effective monitoring by 
the board; these members have higher motivation for building their reputation in the 
market for corporate directors (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Zajac & Westphal, 1996). 
Separation of the roles of CEO (Chief Executive Officer) and Board Chair is another 
Monitoring CG aimed at avoiding concentration of authority in one individual (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983; Higgs, 2003). The CEO is responsible for running and managing the 
company, while the Board Chair is responsible for running and directing the board, 
whose task is to monitor and evaluate top management. In P-A relationship between 
shareholders and managers, CEO Duality is usually discouraged – i.e. Board Chair 
should not be the same person playing the role of CEO; otherwise there will be self-
evaluation and ineffective monitoring (Jensen, 1993). 
 Incentive CG comprises of extrinsic managerial incentives in the form of 
Managerial Ownership and Performance based Pay (Murphy, 1999). The Anglo-Saxon 
internal CG prescribes a compensation policy that will tie top management expected 
utility to the interest of shareholders (Jensen & Murphy, 1990). Managerial Ownership 
implies that the self-interested management team (self-interest is not only limited to 
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personal gain) will be willing to act towards maximizing the shareholder value if doing so 
provides them with greater benefit as well; and the most straightforward way to ensure 
such interest alignment is to have top managers hold equity ownership in firms and 
thereby, incentivize them to increase firm valuation (Denis, 2001). Performance based 
Pay policy is another alignment policy of Incentive CG. It implies that top management 
will be rewarded with high compensation on the basis of their past and present 
performance in improving firms’ desired outcomes. Such incentive mechanism motivates 
top management to improve their future performance and continue their effort to serve 
the interests of shareholders (Buck et al., 2008).  
In addition to the internal mechanisms, country level CG institutions are also 
critical in shaping the complete set of “good” governance principles (Estrin & Prevezer, 
2011; Fama, 1980; Sun, Zhao, & Yang, 2010). Countries’ legal institutions protect 
shareholders from managerial opportunism by providing them with the means of control 
contest and voting arrangement; ensuring shareholders’ engagement in decision making; 
and allocating power between agents and principal (Guillén & Capron, 2015; Siems, 
2008). Availability of necessary legal institutions support enforcing the internal policies 
through the formal rules of ex-ante constraints and ex-post punishments/sanctions 
(Djankov et al., 2008; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000). Disclosure 
related regulation is the other crucial component of the country level CG institutions. 
Periodic reporting of company activities serves principals by reducing information 
asymmetry between shareholders and managers; allowing constant tracking of firms’ 
prospects and risk profile; and providing with information to check for corruption by the 
insiders (Diamond & Verrecchi, 1991; Leuz & Verrecchi, 2000). Countries’ disclosure 
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provisions support the implementation of formal policies by requiring reporting of the 
board compliance, leadership structure, managerial incentives, and other relevant 
mechanisms of internal CG (Coffee, 1999; Mahoney, 1995).  
2.3 Closely-held Firms, Excess Control, & Minority Shareholder Wealth  
In contrast to the widely held stand-alone firms with dispersed owners, a large 
number of corporations in many developed and emerging economies are closely-held 
within the control of concentrated owners (Claessens et al., 2000; Cueto, 2013; Faccio & 
Lang, 2002). There is a deficiency of necessary CG institutions in protecting the minority 
shareholders in many Non-Anglo-Saxon nations (Granovetter, 2005; Klapper & Love, 
2004; Sun et al., 2016). To avoid the risk of being expropriated by top management, less 
protected shareholders in such contexts prefer investing through the mechanism of 
substantial block holdings and maintaining such block holdings through a complex 
network of ownership structure (Dharwadkar et al., 2000; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, & Vishny, 2002). While closely-held firm structure shields the interests of 
UCOs, it also provides them with the mechanisms that can be exercised to expropriate the 
minority shareholders (Enriques & Volpin, 2007; Young et al., 2008). UCOs can deviate 
from ‘one share-one vote’ principle and procure higher proportion of voting control rights 
in excess of their cash flow rights (Grossman & Hart, 1988; Hwang, Kim, Park, & Park, 
2013). This disproportional ownership is the root cause of Type II agency problem (P-P 
problem) as UCOs (family, state, financial institution, corporation, and so forth) can 
exercise their Excess Control for private benefit acquisition (Dharwadkar et al., 2000). 
Series of studies have shown that disproportional ownership negatively affects Firm 
Value. For instance, La Porta et al., (2002) found negative effect on Tobin’s Q; Claessens 
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et al., (2002) found negative effect on Market-to-Book; Jiang & Peng (2011) found 
negative effect on Stock Return; and Faccio, Lang, & Young (2001) found negative 
effect on dividend payout. Such adverse impact on Firm Value essentially indicates 
expropriation of Minority Shareholder Wealth and presence of Type II agency problem in 
the closely-held firms (Ghoul et al., 2016; Hale, 2006; Saggese & Sarto, 2016). 
The key mechanisms through which UCOs deviate from ‘one share-one vote’ 
principle include the techniques of dual-class share, cross-shareholding, pyramiding, and 
multiple control chains (Bebchuk et al., 2000; Coffee, 1999; Morck et al., 2005). Unlike 
ordinary common stock, dual-class share (or superior voting share) is a distinct class of 
share that permits multiple votes per stock; it allows the controlling shareholders to 
control majority of firms’ votes even though they may own only a small fraction of the 
equity. Cross-shareholding is a mechanism through which network-affiliated firms own 
blocks of each other’s stocks; it is mostly common in the horizontal business group 
networks and at the lower levels of pyramid business group networks. Pyramiding is a 
complex top-down chain of ownership structure, where UCOs (mostly vested in the apex 
firm) acquire higher proportion of voting right in excess of their cash-flow right in the 
successive layers of affiliated firms. Multiple Control Chains are established by UCOs 
for procuring complex disproportional ownership through the mechanism of multiple 
pyramiding. A detail illustration by Ariffin (2009) is presented in Table 2.1 to better 
understand the mechanisms of disproportional ownership.  
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Table 2.1: Illustration of Disproportional Ownership Structure (Source: Ariffin, 2009: 11-12) 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Separation of Cash Flow Rights (CFR) and Control (CR): 
… … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … …  
By definition, CFRs represent owner’s actual ownership in a company (Claessen et al., 2000). Because, ownership arises only with 
investment, this would mean that the CFRs also proxy for owner investment in a company (Morck & Yeung, 2004). CRs, on the 
other hand, represents voting rights for the controller (Claessen et al., 2000). Logically, owners’ voting rights in a company should 
equal the owner’s CFRs that arise from his actual investment. But due to the pyramid structure described, these two are no longer 
equal (a point to be illustrated shortly). 
Pyramid structure that creates the separation of CFR and CR is defined as owning a majority of the stock of one corporation 
that, in turn, holds a majority of the stock of another (Wolfenzon, 2004). For example, Halim bin Saad a Malaysian entrepreneur 
owns 28.3 per cent of Renong Berhad (see figure 1). The 28.3 per cent stakes makes Halim the majority stockholder and ultimate 
owner (UO) of Renong Berhad. At the same time, the Renong owns 32.5 per cent of shares in United Engineers Malaysia (UEM). 
Just like previously, this makes Renong the controlling stockholder of UEM. The fact that Halim controls Renong Berhad, and 
Renong Berhad is a major shareholder of UEM, this gives Halim the right to control UEM also. In this pyramid group, Halim has a 
direct ownership of Renong only. For the rest of the firms, the ownership comes indirectly. For instance, Halim’s ownership in UEM 
comes through Renong Berhad. For Kinta Kelas, Halim’s ownership arises from his stake in Renong Berhad and UEM. Resulting  
 
		
	
32 
Table 2.1 (Continued): Illustration of Disproportional Ownership Structure (Source: Ariffin, 2009: 11-12)2
from this particular arrangement, Halim’s actual ownership (CFR) in Kinta Kelas is 5.73 percent. This value is determined in the 
following manner: 
Halim’s CFR in Kinta Kelas = 28.3% x 32.5% x 62.4% 
                                              = 0.05739 ~ 5.73% 
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Table 2.1 (Continued): Illustration of Disproportional Ownership Structure (Source: Ariffin, 2009: 11-12) 2 
 Since, theoretically, ownership arises from one’s investments, if the amount of Halim’s ownership in Kinta Kelas is 5.73 
percent, this would mean that his investment in Kinta Kelas is also 5.73 per cent. If dollar value are applied in the example (ie., 
assuming that Kinta Kelas is worth $10,000,000), because ownership comes with one’s investment (Morck & Yeung, 2004; 
Claessen et al., 2000), with an investment of worth $573,000 (5.73 per cent x $10,000,000 ), Halim Saad is able to control a 
company worth $10,000,000. 
Halim’s indirect control of Kinta Kelas is proxy by the CR. The control arises from Halim’s controlling stake in Renong, 
which then controls UEM, and finally the controls of Kinta Kelas by UEM. La Porta et al. (1999) and Claessens et al. (2000) 
define the weakest link in the line of control as the CRs. Based on this definition, the CR that Halim has over Kinta Kelas is 28.3 
per cent (i.e., the weakest link in the chain of ownership). Practically speaking, with these control, Halim has the rights to 
influence (indirectly through Renong and UEM) matters such as firm policy and appointing BOD in Kinta Kelas. Evidently, 
because of the pyramid structure, with 5.73 per cent of ownership or RM 573,000 worth of investment, Halim has 28.3 per cent 
of CR in a firm (Kinta Kelas) worth RM10,000,000. This significant separation of ownership and control clearly deviates from 
the traditional idea of one share – one vote (Grossman & Hart, 1988). Crucially, the incentives to expropriate other shareholders 
may also arise from this separation (Claessens et al., 2000)  … … … … … … … … … … 
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Table 2.1 (Continued): Illustration of Disproportional Ownership Structure (Source: Ariffin, 2009: 11-12) 2 
 As in La Porta et al. (1999) and Claessens et al. (2000), the separation can be measured by looking at both the ratio of 
CFR to CR and the difference of CFR and CR. The following illustrates how such separation can be measured using ownership 
data in Figure 1.  
The separation of CFR and CR in Kinta Kelas can be measured in two forms; 
I. The separation of CFR and CR in Kinta Kelas as measured by the ratio of CFR to CR:  
= Halim’s CFR/ Halim’s CR 
= 5.73% / 28.3% 
= 0.2024 
II. The separation of CFR and CR in Kinta Kelas as measured by the different of CR and CFR:  
= Halim’s CR - Halim’s CFR 
= 28.3% - 5.73% 
         = 22.57% 
Based on these techniques of computation, the smaller the ratio of CFR to CR indicates wider separation between actual 
ownership (CFR) and control (CR) in the hand of the UO. In similar manner, the larger differences between CR and CFR also 
indicate wider separations between actual ownership (CFR) and control (CR). 
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There are, however, arguments in the governance literature that view UCOs and 
their control mechanisms as means to serve the interests of minority shareholders (Adams 
& Ferreira, 2008; Burkart & Lee, 2008; Chung & Luo, 2013). The Transaction Cost 
Economics perspective views the network of closely-held firms as a useful organizational 
mechanism capable of overcoming obstacles due to inefficient and/or missing external 
institutions in the capital, labor, and product markets (Khanna & Palepu, 2000; Khanna & 
Palepu, 1997). By forming the internal input market, UCOs provide network-affiliated 
firms with access to critical resources which would otherwise be difficult to obtain in the 
open market at times of market failure (Hoshi, Kashyap, & Scharfstein, 1991; Leff, 1979; 
Shin & Park, 1999). The Resource Based View describes UCOs as facilitators of 
entrepreneurial activities, risk managers of the member firms, providers of special skills, 
resources and abilities, and so forth (Guillén, 2000; White, Hoskisson, Yiu, & Bruton, 
2008). Leff (1978) and Keister (2000) describe closely-held firm structure as a 
collaborative and relation-based network which is mostly common in collectivistic 
societies. Consequently, agent’s decision making in these firms is not necessarily driven 
by self-interest motivation but rather by maximization of collectivistic welfare (Brewer & 
Venaik, 2011).  
In fact, in the CG literature, scholars have long been debating over whether in 
certain institutional contexts, closely-held firm structure with UCOs is more (or less) 
beneficial compared to stand-alone firm structure with dispersed owners (Carney, 
Shapiro, & Tang, 2009; Khanna & Yafeh; Perotti & Gelfer, 2001). In my dissertation, I 
am not focusing on such debate; rather I am arguing that CG is necessary in all sorts of 
firms. While the above mentioned views inherently describe UCOs as the stewards of 
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closely-held firms, a similar view also exists in the studies of stand-alone firms. It 
describes top managers as the stewards of dispersed firms (Donaldson & Davis, 1991; 
Donaldson & Davis, 1994; Fox & Hamilton, 1994). So, should we not govern our 
corporate agents? – I find this conclusion overly optimistic as divergence in interests and 
undesirable behavior in organizations can occur even in the absence of corporate actors’ 
sinister intensions (Hendry, 2002; Hoenen & Kostova, 2015; Kostova et al., 2016). 
Closely-held firm structure may offer certain type of benefits particularly in countries 
with weak external institutions but they do generate their own set of agency problems. In 
fact, expropriation of minority shareholders is not always caused by UCOs’ private 
benefit acquisition. It can also occur due to UCOs’ collective benefit motivation such as 
bailing-out of inefficient firms (Burkart & Lee, 2008), maintaining high employment rate 
(Bai, Li, Tao, & Wang, 2000), directing resources to social and developmental projects 
(Cheung, Jiang, Limpaphayom, & Lu, 2008), and so forth even at the expense of 
shareholders’ interest. Hence, effective CG has to be ensured in any circumstances.  
Studies by Griffin et al. (2017) and Renders & Gaeremynck (2012) suggest that 
UCOs in the concentrated firms tend to adopt fewer CG mechanisms. As the decision of 
CG adoption is contingent on the tradeoff between the cost of reduction in their 
controlling ability and the benefit of capital procurement at a lower cost (Durnev & Kim, 
2005; Klapper & Love, 2004). Furthermore, the sources of agency conflict between 
minority shareholders and UCOs are different in many aspects compared to that between 
dispersed shareholders and top managers. Hence, the question is whether universally 
suggested “good” CG mechanisms (internal and external) are the appropriate means to 
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govern the closely-held firms with UCOs – a thorough investigation in this regard is 
necessary in governance policy research.   
2.4 Cross-Country Trend in Governance Policy Reform 
Since the 1990s global financial crisis, local and international actors alike have 
been emphasizing the importance of CG reforms in both developed and emerging 
economies (Bratton & McCahery, 1999; Soederberg, 2003). Even though governments 
and policy-experts across nations have been conducting rigorous policy reforms, 
expected goals still have not been achieved (Chen et al., 2011). Since Agency Theory has 
been at the core in shaping key governance policies, it is often concluded that Agency 
Theory is not generating effective CG measures and is failing to address the differences 
among national governance systems (Bruce et al., 2005; Davis et al., 1997; Dharwadkar 
et al., 2000; Peng, 2004; Tian & Lau, 2001). In depth review of the literature actually 
suggests that policy recommendations in CG reforms have been mostly driven by the 
Anglo-Saxon Model – which is in fact, one of the earliest and most important 
applications of Agency Theory. 
With the progression of Agency Theory, changes and relaxations of classical 
assumptions permit its application in generating different models for different actors 
involved in specific principal-agent relationships (Eisenhardt, 1989; Hendry, 2002; 
Hoenen & Kostova, 2015). Agency scholars extend the classical bilateral assumptions to 
multilateral settings, where multiple agents interact with multiple principals (Holmström, 
1982; Holmström & Milgrom, 1990; Milgrom & Weber, 1982; Tirole, 1986). By 
incorporating the complementary theories and acknowledging the diversity among 
societies, cultures, and institutions, progression of Agency Theory also allows the 
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contextualization of derived models and their governance mechanisms (Cuevas-
Rodríguez, Gomez-Mejia, & Wiseman, 2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2005; Lubatkin et al., 
2007; Wiseman et al., 2012). In fact, different disciplines are utilizing the development of 
Agency Theory in addressing different types of agency problems associated with various 
actors and/or various contexts (Kiser, 1999). In Economics, Agency Theory has been 
applied to govern the conflict between employer and employee (Stiglitz, 1975), insurer 
and insured (Spence & Zeckhauser, 1975), buyer and supplier, lawyer and client, and so 
forth (Harris & Raviv, 1978). In Political Science, Agency Theory has been utilized to 
understand the issue of state policy implementation and the agency relationship between 
politicians and bureaucrats (Banfield, 1975; Niskanen, 1971). In the organizational 
research, Agency Theory has been useful to study vertical integration (Eccles, 1991), 
outsourcing (Bahli & Rivard, 2003), strategic alliance (Das & Teng, 1998), acquisition 
and diversification (Amihud & Lev, 1981), and similar issues.  In International Business, 
Agency Theory has been applied to examine the management of multinational 
corporations and agency relationship between MNC headquarter and subsidiaries 
(Kostova et al., 2016; O’Donnell, 2000; Roth & Nigh, 1992; Roth & O'Donnell, 1996).  
Despite being challenged by serious criticism (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; 
Aguilera & Jackson, 2010; Bebchuk & Hamdani, 2009; Young et al., 2008), CG research 
and policymaking have not sufficiently utilized the progression of Agency Theory; but 
have rather remained consistent in recommending a universal set of governance 
mechanisms that are rooted in the Anglo-Saxon Model (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 
2004; Ananchotikul & Eichengreen, 2009; Hansmann & Kraakman, 2000). Why did the 
field of CG follow such a narrow approach? First, it can be suggested that the first 
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generation CG research was primarily concerned with governing stand-alone dispersed 
firms from Anglo-Saxon nations. The initial application of Agency Theory was focused 
towards developing a set of CG mechanisms necessary to govern top managers and 
protect company owners from managerial opportunism (Denis & McConnell, 2003). 
Later on, right before the global financial crisis of 1990s, comparative CG research 
started to emerge; and scholars, policy-experts, and transnational organizations started to 
realize the importance of worldwide CG reforms. In the process, institutional actors 
embraced the comprehensively studied Anglo-Saxon CG Model as the universal 
benchmark and recommended most of its measures as “good” governance principles 
(Bratton & McCahery, 1999; Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013; Soederberg, 2003). Second, it 
can be argued that it is relatively straightforward to develop and promote compliance 
based standardized system versus create and maintain actor and context specific varied 
institutions (Wijen, 2014). In order to ensure policy compliance by a maximum number 
of adopters, institutional entrepreneurs often prefer a standardized set of concrete rules 
(Wijen, 2015). Similarly, in case of CG, researchers and policy experts have constructed 
a compliance based system. To ensure a large scale policy adoption, they have designed a 
universal set of “good” CG mechanisms, which are mostly rooted in the Anglo-Saxon 
Model (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009; Ananchotikul & Eichengreen, 2009).  
In the governance literature, research and policymaking on the U.S. corporations 
can be traced back to mid-1970s; whereas, in the rest of the world such efforts emerged 
almost two decades later (Cheffins, 2012; Denis & McConnell, 2003). The worldwide 
CG reforms during 1990s were prompted by the global financial crisis, market failure, 
and corporate misconduct committed by top management (e.g. Enron, HIH Insurance, 
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and Polly Peck in Anglo-Saxon economies), and controlling shareholders (e.g. Parmalat, 
Olympus, and Satyam in Non-Anglo-Saxon economies). During the same period, 
worldwide wave of economic liberalization, deregulation, and privatization stimulated 
the pace of globalization (Cuervo-Cazurra & Dau, 2009; Useem, 1998). According to 
World Investment Report (2015), from 1990 to 2014, inward foreign direct investment 
increased to almost 4 times in Europe, 20 times in Asia, and 19 times in Latin America; 
and outward foreign direct investment increased to almost 3 times in Europe, 9 times in 
Asia, and 17 times in Latin America. According to World Federation of Stock Exchanges 
Report (2015), the number of cross-listed foreign companies trading in major stock 
exchanges outside their home markets reached over 3000 by the year 2014. This data 
indicates that there has been a significant increase in the involvement of international 
actors in influencing local business institutions and requiring the adoption of “good” CG 
principles (Coffee, 2002; Marano & Kostova, 2015; Useem, 1998). In an effort to ensure 
stability in the world economy, supranational organizations such as OECD, World Bank, 
European Corporate Governance Network, Asian Corporate Governance Association, and 
Latin American Corporate Governance Roundtable have been pushing for improvement 
of CG policies. Such global efforts have been accompanied by a long list of national level 
reform initiatives in both developed and emerging economies (for detail see the website 
of European Corporate Governance Institute; http://www.ecgi.org/codes/all_codes.php).     
In 1999, OECD issued a set of “good” CG principles which later were revised during 
2004. These principles became highly influential in the development of Codes of Good 
Governance across nations. The majority of these codes and their content followed the 
key principles of Anglo-Saxon governance (Chizema, 2008; Cromme, 2005; Krambia-
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Kapardis & Psaros, 2006; Roberts, 2004). As shown in Figure 2.1, since 1990s, countries 
have been increasingly adopting codes of “good” governance as means to attain the 
global standard of CG (Source: Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009). As suggested by 
Coffee (2000) and Manning (2002), one of the core drivers of movement towards the 
shareholder-oriented CG reforms is the global expansion of security exchanges. Stock 
markets are central to shareholder driven CG model as investors play critical roles as the 
provider of corporate finance. Consequently, supporting legal institutions get developed 
to protect the interests of shareholders (Coffee, 2001). Figure 2.2 shows a rising trend in 
the creation of stock markets across independent nations during the period of 1800-2005 
(Source: Weber, Davis, & Lounsbury, 2009). 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Worldwide Creation of Codes of Good Governance, 1978-2008 
         (Source: Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009) 
 
 
Top Line indicates increase in the number of cumulative governance codes across nations  
Bottom Line indicates increase in the number of cumulative nations issuing governance codes  
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Figure 2.2: Prevalence of Stock Markets among Independent Countries, 1800-2005 
(Source: Weber, Davis, & Lounsbury, 2009) 
 
Comparative CG research discusses the historical differences between 
shareholder-oriented CG model common in the Anglo-Saxon economies versus 
stakeholder-oriented CG model common in the European, Asian, and Latin American 
economies (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Fiss & Zajac, 2004; Zink, 2005). Since early 
1980s, however, the world map of shareholder protection has changed significantly. 
Legal and disclosure related institutions have improved substantially in the Non-Anglo-
Saxon context and the trajectory is increasing overtime (Guille´n & Capron, 2015; 
Hellman et al., 2018). Irrespective of any particular agency situation, it is quite regular 
for the external CG institutions to require/expect all firms to adopt the basic set of 
internal CG mechanisms. Enactment of a corporate board with independent directors and 
Top Line indicates increase in the number of independent nations 
Bottom Line indicates increase in the number stock exchanges across independent nations  
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appointment of separate CEO and Board Chair are the most important Monitoring CG 
often recommended as the firm level “good” mechanism (Gregory, 1998, 1999). 
Countries’ codes of good governance and OECD suggested best CG principles lay out 
specific instructions on the corporate board structure and its functionality; and as 
discussed previously, majority of such universal recommendations are based on the 
Anglo-Saxon CG model (Gregory & Simmelkjaer, 2002; O’Shea, 2005). A long list of 
empirical research on Incentive CG has shown that managerial equity ownership and 
performance based compensation have been increasing in firms from Non-Anglo-Saxon 
nations even though these mechanisms used to be institutionally contested in this context 
(Brunello, Graziano, & Parigi, 2001; Buck et al., 2008; Ferris, Kim, & Kitsabunnarat, 
2001; Fiss & Zajac, 2004). Comparative studies in 1970s and 1980s showed that 
executive compensation used to vary significantly in firms from European, Asian, and 
Latin American nations (Bass & Burger, 1979; Pennings, 1993). Since 1990s, however, 
these Non-Anglo-Saxon nations have started introducing Anglo-Saxon based incentive 
plans holding the idea that executive compensation linked to firm performance is an 
effective mechanism of Internal CG (Zattoni, 2007).            
In sum, international CG research and policymaking have been consistent in 
benchmarking a standardized set of “good” CG principles. The proponents of Universal 
View of CG argue that various nations and firms are adopting the standardized policies as 
these measures are effective in addressing common agency problems (Hansmann & 
Kraakman, 2001; Lam & Lee, 2008). In contrast, the proponents of Embedded View 
argue that in many instances firms across nations are adopting the universal policies only 
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as fads and fashion which may facilitate the attainment of legitimacy; but may not be 
effective in achieving the intended goal (Abrahamson, 1991; Aguilera & Jackson, 2003). 
2.5 Universal View of CG 
A large number of CG scholars support the standardization of “good” governance 
principles. They recognize the differences in firm types in arguing that various firms from 
various nations are adopting commonly recommended internal mechanisms as these 
policies are aligned with the intended goal of attaining good governance (Chen et al., 
2009; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2005; Kaplan, 1994a; Nyberg, Fulmer, Gerhart, & Carpenter, 
2010). Furthermore, scholars in this line suggest that governments and policy-experts are 
improving their country level CG institutions (Coffee, 2001; Easterbrook & Fischel, 
1991; Useem, 1998), which in turn is strengthening the firm level governance impact 
(Doidge et al., 2007; van Essen et al., 2012a). I refer to this perspective as the Universal 
View of CG. For an in depth analysis of the Universal View, I distinguish between the 
ideas of Generalizability of Internal CG and Complementarity of External CG. 
2.5.1 Generalizability of Internal CG 
According to the idea of Generalizability of Internal CG, firms embedded in 
various institutional contexts may have various features and forms; but there are 
evidences of organizational convergence in adopting internal CG mechanisms (Chen et 
al., 2009; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2005; Kang & Shivdasani, 1995; Kaplan, 1994b; Nyberg 
et al., 2010; Tosi & Gomez-Mejia, 1989). Commonly recommended Monitoring CG and 
Incentive CG are designed to address the core problems in agency relationship (Alchian 
& Demsetz, 1972; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Various firms from various nations are 
experiencing positive results by incorporating these measures since agency problems 
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occur in all sorts of separation and delegation relations (Hendry, 2002). In the Law 
literature, scholars recognize the firm level convergence in CG policy adoption and 
describe it as ‘convergence in function’ (Gilson, 2001; Yoshikawa & Rasheed, 2009).  
In the governance literature, a large body of theoretical and empirical research 
supports the idea of Generalizability of Internal CG. In Japan and Germany, firms are 
addressing their agency problems through the means of universal CG (Kaplan, 1994a, 
1994b; Kaplan & Minton, 1994; Sanders & Tuschke, 2007); even though the nature of 
agency problem is different in firms from the Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs – 
Japan and Germany) versus in firms from the Liberal Market Economies (LMEs – 
Anglo-Saxon Economies) (Hall & Soskice, 2001). Similarly in China, commonly 
recommended internal CG is improving firms’ accountability and transparency (Buck et 
al., 2008); even though the Chinese firms are different in many aspects in comparison to 
the dispersed firms from the Anglo-Saxon context (Ma et al., 2006). Organizational 
convergence in CG policy adoption and its positive impact have been supported by 
Dehaene, De Vuyst, & Ooghe (2001) for Belgian firms, Koski, Marengo, & Makinen 
(2012) for Finish firms, Minichilli, Zattoni, & Zona (2009) for Italian firms, Beiner, 
Schmid, & Wanzenried (2011) for Swish firms, and Cerbioni & Parbonetti (2007) for a 
large number of European firms. Similar findings are reported by Black & Khanna (2007) 
for Indian firms, Connelly & Limpaphayom (2004) for Thai firms, Abidin, Kamal, & 
Jusoff (2009) for Malaysian firms, and Mitton (2002) for a large number of East Asian 
firms. 
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2.5.2 Complementarity of External CG  
Scholars supporting the idea of Complementarity of External CG assert that along 
with the firm level policy convergence, cross-country external institutional framework is 
also becoming similar in many aspects (Coffee, 2001; Easterbrook & Fischel, 1991; 
Hansmann & Kraakman, 2000; Morck et al., 2005; Useem, 1998). According to their 
logic, formation and rapid growth of stock markets in Europe, Asia, Latin America and 
other parts of the world point towards global spread of shareholder-oriented CG model 
(Coffee, 2001; Manning, 2002). Upward trends in the adoption of good governance codes 
and development of legal and disclosure provisions indicate growing awareness for 
shareholder protection (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009; Guillén & Capron, 2015; 
Hellman et al., 2018). Prominence of global corporate intermediaries such as 
international law firms, international consulting firms, Big Five accounting firms, and so 
on suggest widespread support for the standardized system (Hansmann & Kraakman, 
2000). In the Law literature, scholars describe the country level convergence in CG 
policy adoption as ‘convergence in form’ (Gilson, 2001; Yoshikawa & Rasheed, 2009).  
Proponents of Complementarity of External CG argue that the universal 
governance measures offer maximum value in their entirety. That is, in weak contexts 
with less developed external CG, organizations ensure good governance mainly through 
the means of internal CG. Such firm level positive impact gets further enhanced in the 
strong contexts when the internal CG is supported by developed external CG. 
Governance scholars have extensively studied the complementary role of national laws 
and disclosure regulations in strengthening firm level governance. Doidge et al. (2007) 
and van Essen et al. (2012a) suggest that stronger legal CG institutions enhance the 
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positive impact of internal CG through the command of policy enforcement or 
penalization otherwise. Analyses by Hope (2003) and Renders & Gaeremynck (2012) 
imply that higher quality disclosure environment mandates stricter reporting of the 
organizational activities; thereby, directly influences implementation of the internal CG.      
2.6 Embedded View of CG 
Many Institutional and CG scholars have expressed doubts about the universality 
of “good” governance principles. According to their logic, many countries lack the 
availability of external CG institutions, which are necessary to implement the firm level 
mechanisms and sustain the shareholder-oriented CG model (Hall & Soskice, 2001; 
Kogut; Schmidt & Spindler, 2006). Moreover, researchers have questioned the goal 
alignment of standardized CG policies in mitigating unique agency conflicts across 
various types of firms (Bebchuk & Hamdani, 2009; Fiss, 2008; Young et al., 2008). I 
refer to this perspective as the Embedded View of CG. For an in depth analysis of the 
Embedded View, I utilize the Neo-Institutional constructs of Policy-Practice Decoupling 
and Means-Ends Decoupling.  
2.6.1 Policy-Practice Decoupling of CG 
 Institutional scholars emphasize an open system view of organizations (Berger & 
Luckmann, 1967; Granovetter, 1985; Selznick, 1957), where they argue that “external 
influences — both directly in the form of legislation, public policy, and the 
professionalization of management, and more diffusely through public opinion and social 
activism — led organizations to be more attentive and responsive to their external 
environments” (Bromley & Powell, 2012: 2). In discussing the power of the external 
environment in shaping organizational formal structure, Meyer & Rowan (1977) suggest 
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that responses to the external pressures often generate a gap between official policies and 
daily practices which firms tend to buffer from the outside inspections. Typically, Policy-
Practice Decoupling occurs when the formal policies are aligned with their intended 
objective; but positive results are seldom achieved since firms conduct ceremonial policy 
adoption just to secure institutional legitimation.  
It is critical to incorporate the issue of ‘quality of external institutions’ in 
discussing the concept of Policy-Practice Decoupling. As the Neo-Institutional Theory 
suggests, when formal policies are aligned with their intended objective, ceremonial 
policy adoption decreases with the development of external institutions (Guillén & 
Capron, 2015; Wijen, 2015). Generally, in weak institutional environment, external 
institutions are not strong enough in implementing the firm level desired policies 
(Dharwadkar et al., 2000; Schøtt & Jensen, 2008; Westphal & Zajac, 1994). In such 
context, firms often can get away with the act of Policy-Practice Decoupling and 
nonattainment of the expected outcomes (Greve, Palmer, & Pozner, 2010). In contrast, in 
strong institutional environment, external institutions are relatively effective in 
implementing the formal policies (Espeland & Sauder, 2007; Masulis, Pham, & Zein, 
2011; Rajan & Zingales, 1998). Policy-Practice Decoupling is no longer viewed as an 
accepted means to achieve legitimacy; rather it is penalized as an act of ethical 
misconduct and organizational failure (Tilcsik, 2010). Expected outcomes in such context 
are often achieved since effective policies are enforced/supported to attain both technical 
efficiency and environmental legitimacy (Heugens & Lander, 2009; Kennedy & Fiss, 
2009).                                              
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In the governance literature, many scholars hold the idea of Policy-Practice 
Decoupling in analyzing the value of universal CG (Jaiswall & Firth, 2009; Klapper & 
Love, 2004; Leuz, Nanda, & Wysocki, 2003; van Essen et al., 2012b; Yeh & Woidtke, 
2005). They argue that the internal mechanisms may be aligned with the intended goal of 
ensuring good governance; however, success of such policy mechanisms is contingent on 
the presence of supporting external CG institutions (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Aguilera 
& Jackson, 2010). Countries are not necessarily converging towards a standardized 
system; rather in many instances, ceremonially adopting common governance policies 
mainly to secure global legitimacy (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Cuervo, 2002). 
Among many developed economies, there are differences in national governance system 
which may not be fully supportive of the shareholder-oriented CG model (Hall & 
Soskice, 2001; La Porta et al., 1998). In emerging economies, there is a void in the 
availability of external CG institutions, which severely constraints the firm level policy 
implementation (Khanna & Palepu, 2000; Khanna & Palepu, 1997). Fiss & Zajac (2004), 
Peng et al. (2003), Peng (2004), and La Porta et al. (2000) have found that commonly 
recommended internal CG could not guarantee organizational good governance in many 
Non-Anglo-Saxon nations. In explaining such insignificant/negative result, CG scholars 
point towards the organizational act of Policy-Practice Decoupling which essentially has 
been possible due to weaknesses in external CG institutions.  
2.6.2 Means-Ends Decoupling of CG 
Traditionally, ‘Decoupling’ research has focused on the gap between formal 
policies and organizational practices; and examined when and why organizations violate 
or avoid the implementation of goal-aligned policies (Fiss & Zajac, 2004; Westphal, 
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Gulati, & Shortell, 1997). Recent developments in the Neo-Institution literature focus on 
the gap between organizational practices and intended outcomes; and examine how and 
why misaligned policies are being rationalized within formal structures (Abrahamson, 
1991; Bowen, 2014; Dick, 2015). As discussed by Bromley & Powell (2012), Means-
Ends Decoupling occurs when the causal links between formal policies and intended 
outcomes are opaque and weak; yet organizations adopt these misaligned policies due to 
rationalization of the recommended structure by powerful actors and institutions. Means-
Ends Decoupling is common in more fragmented environments and “may increase over 
time with the worldwide adoption of New Public Management and neo-liberal 
ideologies.” (Bromley & Powell, 2012: 27).                              
Neo-Institution scholars have argued that Policy-Practice Decoupling is a 
transitory phenomenon (Guillén & Capron, 2015; Wijen, 2015). Overtime with 
institutional development, expected outcomes can be often achieved as the goal-aligned 
policies are enforced by powerful external institutions (Espeland & Sauder, 2007; Rajan 
& Zingales, 1998; Westphal et al., 1997). However, Means-Ends Decoupling is a 
relatively persistent phenomenon (Dick, 2015). In order to ensure clarity, manageability, 
and large scale policy implementation, institutional actors prefer developing a 
compliance based system with uniform set of rules (Wijen, 2014). Such institutional 
arrangements lead to rigidity and constrain flexibility in effectively responding to unique 
issues/problems (Wijen, 2015), which can vary due to environmental complexities, actor 
diversity, and may other aspects of circumstantial uncertainties (Espinosa & Walker, 
2011; Levy & Lichtenstein, 2012). As a result, compliance based universal institutions 
often generate a gap between means (policies and practices) and ends (envisioned 
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outcomes). Developed external institutions cannot help moderate any positive outcomes 
as the core problem here is not firms’ avoidance of policy implementation (which can be 
prevented by strong external institutions); rather a misalignment between policies and 
outcomes (strong external institutions may ensure implementation of the rationalized 
policies which, however, are not effective in achieving desired goals).             
In the governance literature, many scholars imply the idea of Means-Ends 
Decoupling in criticizing the Anglo-Saxon based CG reforms (Bebchuk & Hamdani, 
2009; Bruce et al., 2005; Davis et al., 1997; Morck, Yeung, & Yu, 2000; Young et al., 
2008). They express serious concerns as extensive governance reforms over the years 
have not been able to achieve the envisioned goals (Chen et al., 2011; Young et al., 
2008). Scholars argue that the nature of ownership structures, agency problems, actors’ 
interests, and organizational dynamics vary across different types of firms from different 
contexts (Fiss, 2008; La Porta et al., 1999). Generally these differences are difficult to 
factor in while developing a standardized set of formal rules. Availability of supporting 
external institutions cannot guarantee firm level positive outcomes as these CG 
institutions are promoting a set of ineffective/misaligned internal policies to begin with 
(Bebchuk & Hamdani, 2009). 
Table 2.2 summarizes the key points of Universal View of CG vs. Embedded 
View of CG. This summary is provided based on the two core issues; policy-goal 
alignment of internal CG mechanisms in attaining good governance and significance of 
external CG institutions in implementing the firm level policies. 
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Table 2.2: Summary of Universal View of CG vs. Embedded View of CG 
Universal View Generalizability of Internal CG Complementarity of External CG 
(i) Policy-Goal Alignment  
     of Internal CG 
Firm level CG policies in general are aligned with the 
intended goal of attaining good governance. 
Firm level CG policies in general are aligned with the intended 
goal of attaining good governance. 
ii) Role of External CG in   
      Policy Implementation 
  Country level CG policies are the 'complementary' factor in 
enhancing positive impact of the firm level CG mechanisms. 
 
- In absence of developed external institutions in weak context, 
organizations rely on the internal mechanisms to attain good 
governance; in availability of developed external institutions in 
strong context, positive impact of the internal mechanisms gets 
further enhanced.  
Embedded View  Policy-Practice Decoupling of CG Means-Ends Decoupling of CG 
(i) Policy-Goal Alignment  
     of Internal CG 
Firm level CG policies in general are aligned with the 
intended goal of attaining good governance. 
Firm level universal CG policies are not aligned with the 
intended goal of solving various agency problems. 
ii) Role of External CG in   
      Policy Implementation 
Country level CG policies are the 'necessary' factor in 
ensuring/ generating positive impact of the firm level 
CG mechanisms. 
 
- In absence of developed external institutions in weak 
context, organizations conduct symbolic adoption of 
the internal CG mechanisms that can seldom attain 
good governance; in strong context, intended outcomes 
by the internal CG mechanisms are often achieved as 
necessary external institutions are available in 
implementing the formal policies.  
 
- Scholars question the universality of “good” 
governance principles from the perspective of country 
institutional heterogeneity/embeddedness. 
Because of ineffective internal mechanisms, country level CG 
institutions cannot support moderation of the firm level 
positive impact.  
 
- In various organizational contexts, the core problem is not 
lack in ‘CG policy implementation’ (which can be addressed 
by developed external institutions) but rather lack in ‘CG 
policy alignment’ (where developed external institutions may 
end up implementing the misaligned/ineffective internal 
policies). 
 
 
- Scholars question the universality of “good” governance 
principles from the perspective of firm structural 
heterogeneity/embeddedness. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK & HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
In this section, I begin with developing my first hypothesis in regard to how 
‘Excess Control’ by UCOs affects ‘Minority Shareholder Wealth’ in the concentrated 
firms. The purpose of my base hypothesis is to indicate the presence of P-P conflict in 
this empirical setting. Next, I incorporate the Universal View of CG versus Embedded 
View of CG to generate alternative policy hypotheses and thereby, examine how a set of 
standardized CG mechanisms influence the negative relationship between Excess Control 
and Minority Shareholder Wealth. In other words, the purpose of my policy hypotheses is 
to examine the effectiveness of internal CG and external CG in addressing P-P conflict. 
Theoretically, my approach offers important benefits.       
In the International CG literature, a large stream of research has focused on 
assessing the value of “good” governance mechanisms in various firms from various 
nations (Abdullah, 2004; Edwards et al., 2009; Lam & Lee, 2008; Li et al., 2008; Schmid 
& Zimmermann, 2007; van Essen et al., 2012a; van Essen et al., 2012b). While 
improving scholarly understandings of the topic, empirical findings of this research have 
been ambiguous and inconclusive. A parallel stream of research has examined the 
diversity of firm types across nations (Aguilera & Jackson, 2010; Bratton & McCahery, 
1999; La Porta et al., 1999; Soederberg, 2003) and found that firms vary in terms of their 
organizational form, governance concern, and institutional context in which they are 
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embedded. Surprisingly, these two streams of CG research have not been well integrated. 
In examining the value of “good” CG policies, there has rarely been any attempt to 
specify the key organizational attributes (form, concern, and context), while such 
specification is extremely critical for systematically assessing the governance measures. 
As mentioned earlier, I am focusing on the closely-held firms with UCOs from Europe, 
Asia, and Latin America; thereby, I am specifying the organizational form (concentrated 
firms), governance concern (Type II agency problem) and institutional context (Non-
Anglo-Saxon countries) of my focal firms and assessing the generalizability of “good” 
CG principles in a relatively precise manner. 
In addition to addressing the issue of organizational attributes, my approach offers 
further clarity. In the existing literature, for understanding governance effectiveness of 
“good” CG principles, conventional approach to examines the direct impact of CG 
mechanisms on firm level various outcomes (Donaldson & Davis, 1994; Dulewicz & 
Herbert, 2004; Tian & Lau, 2001). There are ambiguities associated with such approach, 
which manifest in questionable interpretations of research findings. When authors find 
‘significant positive’ impact on firm level outcomes, their conclusions generally point 
towards effective monitoring of the company insiders (Bhabra, Ferris, Sen, & Yen, 2003; 
Bonn, 2004; Jackling & Johl, 2009). But there remain questions; – adoptions of the 
legitimate policies often enable firms to access beneficial resources, attract favorable 
responses, and/or survive within environments where other firms did not adopt the 
required/desired programs (Covaleski, 1983; Westphal & Zajac, 1998; Zott & Huy, 
2007). Firms in such circumstances are rewarded with positive outcomes; however, there 
is no certainty that the positive outcomes are rightfully distributed among the 
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shareholders. Ambiguities are also evident when authors find ‘insignificant /negative’ 
impact. While Peng (2004) points lack of policy implementation in explaining his 
insignificant results, Dalton, Hitt, Certo, & Dalton (2007) suggest lack of policy 
alignment in discussing their insignificant results. In contrast, Donaldson & Davis (1991; 
1994) and Tian & Lau (2001) explain their ‘insignificant/negative’ results completely 
from a different perspective by drawing on the Stewardship View of the corporate agents. 
They describe the corporate insiders as the stewards of the company and suggest that. 
these corporate stewards nullify the value of “good” CG mechanisms by generating 
substitution effects; hence, the lack of significant positive result.  
In brief, it is possible to justify the empirical findings of the direct impact 
analyses from different perspectives which frequently can be susceptible to biased 
interpretations. Therefore, instead of conducting a direct impact analysis, my theoretical 
framework first specifies the presence of Type II agency problem in a particular 
empirical setting and then examines the effectiveness of “good” CG policies in mitigating 
such governance concern. Thereby, my approach addresses the arguments raised by the 
Stewardship View; – ‘insignificant/negative’ impact of CG mechanisms cannot be 
explained by the logic of UCOs’ substitution effect as presence of P-P conflict has 
already been established and it indicates intentional and/or unintentional expropriations 
by the UCOs. Next, by examining the value of internal CG in conjunction with the 
external CG, my approach aims to offer a relatively bias free conclusion in regard to 
whether the significant positive (insignificant/negative) result is the outcome of 
successful (unsuccessful) ‘policy implementation’ or is it the outcome of effective 
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(ineffective) ‘policy alignment’ of the governance mechanisms. These arguments will be 
clarified further during the development of policy-related hypotheses.    
3.1 Hypothesis to Indicate Presence of P-P Problem 
In the concentrated ownership structure, greater separation between voting control 
and cash-flow right generates Type II (P-P) agency problem between UCOs and minority 
shareholders. UCOs can utilize their Excess Control in directing and managing the 
closely-held firms so as to serve their own private benefits. Examples of private benefit 
of control include influence over determining board of directors and key management 
positions (Steinfeld, 1998), persuasion of selected strategies that prioritize personal, 
family or political obligations (Backman, 1999), resource tunneling in the forms of - 
granting related party loans at lower interest rate (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & 
Zamarripa, 2003), procuring supplies and materials at above market price from firms with 
higher cash-flow right, selling products and services at below market price to firms with 
lower cash-flow right (Chang & Hong, 2000; Khanna & Rivkin, 2000), and so forth. 
An analysis with mathematical example will be helpful to clarify how Excess 
Control provides incentives and opportunities to expropriate minority shareholders. 
Suppose, in Company X, UCO’s voting right is 28.93% and cash-flow right is 5.73%. 
Now utilizing the power of high voting control, UCO launches a business venture in 
Company X; which due to some unexpected events fails and leads to a loss of $1 million. 
Since UCO’s cash-flow stake is 5.73%, a million dollar hit translates into a loss of only 
$57,300 (5.73% of $1 million) for them. The remaining loss of almost $0.95 million is 
incurred by the direct shareholders of Company X. Thus, Excess Control incentivizes 
UCOs to venture into risky investments at the expense of minority shareholders, who are 
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ultimately bearing the loss. On the contrary, suppose that business venture in Company X 
succeeds and leads to a gain of $1 million. Since voting control is 28.93%, UCO has the 
authority to order Company X to sell or transfer its asset worth of $1 million at a minimal 
cost to the company where UCO possess higher cash-flow stake. Thus, Excess Control 
provides UCO with the opportunity to tunnel inter-corporate assets for private benefit 
acquisitions. 
There are many real life examples of Type II agency problem. Minority owners of 
German auto-company Volkswagen were struck by a drastic decline in their share value 
when the ‘Emission Scandal’ news erupted in September, 2015. Investigation by the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency found that Volkswagen had cheated on emission tests 
by installing sophisticated on-board software known as the ‘Defeat Device’. Such 
criminal act was possible by the auto-company as its organizational culture had seldom 
been transparent and accountable to the minority owners. Its board of directors and 
management positions had always been decided and controlled by the powerful Porsche-
Piech family who possess excessive control within the company through a complex 
network of equity holdings (The New York Times, 2015). Similarly, share value of 
Indian IT company Satyam Computers plunged by nearly 80% once the news on 
‘Accounting Fraud’ broke into light in January, 2009. Ramalinga Raju – founder, CEO, 
and controlling owner of Satyam – admitted that his company had been falsifying its 
accounts for years by overstating revenues, inflating profits, and manipulating earnings. 
Raju was attempting to have Satyam invest $1.6 billion in Maytas Properties and Maytas 
Infrastructure – two firms controlled by his family members – and in the process, 
covering up the fake account through pseudo investments (Forbes, 2009).  Japanese 
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camera maker and imaging company Olympus had been conducting fraudulent takeovers 
within its business network in order to hide $1.7 billion in losses over 13 years. In 
October 2011, newly appointed British CEO, Michael C. Woodford, was abruptly 
terminated by the internally controlled Olympus board when he demanded investigation 
over the irregular payments for numerous acquisitions. By 2012, this scandal had 
developed into one of the biggest financial misconducts in the history of corporate Japan 
that had wiped off almost 80% of the company's valuation (The Economist, 2012). State 
controlled Brazilian oil company Petrobras’ market value declined drastically when an 
investigation over corruption and bribery started in March, 2014. Petrobras scandal was a 
complex network of secretive schemes in which company officials, politicians, and 
businessmen had colluded for years in illicitly channeling billions of dollars. Ruling 
Workers’ Party and its coalition partners appointed their own candidates in Petrobras 
board and executive positions causing lack of transparency and accountability and also 
allowing tunneling of Petrobras assets for serving their private benefits at the expense of 
minority owners and Brazilian citizens (Financial Times, 2016).  
Exercise of Excess Control, however, is not always limited to the motivation of 
private benefit acquisition; it can also occur due to collective benefit motivation. UCOs 
may engage in resource tunneling for propping up under-performing firms and/or bailing 
out distressed (‘zombie’) firms (Burkart & Lee, 2008; Chang & Hong, 2000. There are 
negative externalities associated with such tunneling {Hoshi, 2006 #292; Hoshi & 
Kashyap, 2004). Inherently this mechanism allows the managers of member firms to 
shirk their responsibilities since other firms would rescue them at times of difficulties 
(Khanna & Rivkin, 2000). In the process, productive firms are adversely affected as their 
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resources are often wasted in the poorly managed firms (Claessens, Fan, & Lang, 2006). 
In extreme cases, this may turn out to be damaging for the entire business group network 
and all minority shareholders (George & Kabir, 2008). UCOs also transfer resources from 
closely-held firms for financing projects related to social welfare and employment 
creation; even though this strategy may conflict with the interests of minority 
shareholders (Bai, Lu, & Tao, 2006; Cheung et al., 2008).       
Series of studies in the finance (Lins, 2003; Schmid, 2009), management (Saggese 
& Sarto, 2016; Sun et al., 2016), economics (Friedman, Johnson, & Mitton, 2003; Morck 
et al., 2005), and law (Hale, 2006; Kastiel, 2015) literatures theoretically and empirically 
have shown that expropriation of minority shareholders increases with the extent of 
UCOs’ disproportional ownership. Such findings are confirmed by Bennedsen & Nielsen 
(2010) in cases of European firms, Carney & Child (2013) in cases of Asian firms, and 
Cueto (2013) in cases of Latin American firms. The overwhelming evidences of Excess 
Control and its negative impact on Minority Shareholder Wealth do indicate that Type II 
agency problem is real irrespective of the UCOs’ intentional (private benefit motivation) 
and/or unintentional (collective benefit motivation) expropriations. Based on this 
analysis, I generate my first hypothesis to indicate presence of P-P conflict in the 
concentrated firms:  
Hypothesis 1: Excess Control has a negative effect on Minority Shareholder Wealth. 
3.2 Universal View based Hypotheses: Generalizability of Internal CG 
 According to the Generalizability of Internal CG idea, internal governance 
mechanisms are effective in  reducing Type II Agency problem (Cerbioni & Parbonetti, 
2007; Chen et al., 2009; Croci, Gonenc, & Ozkan, 2012; Kaplan, 1994a, 1994b; Shan, 
2013). Proponents of this view argue that as long as there exist delegation and separation 
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relationships, agency problems are inevitable irrespective of the identities of agents and 
principals (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2005; Hendry, 2002; Hoenen & Kostova, 2015; Nyberg 
et al., 2010). In stand-alone firms, agency problem arises between dispersed owners and 
top management; whereas in closely-held firms, agency problem arises between minority 
shareholders and UCOs. In many instances in concentrated firms, top management is 
formed directly by the UCO (in cases of firms with family owner-manager) or at least top 
management is appointed by the UCO (in cases of firms with professional managers). As 
in the case of Type I agency problem, – information asymmetry, divergence in actors’ 
interests, and possibility of opportunism are also relevant in Type II Agency problem 
(Wiseman et al., 2012). Commonly recommended governance mechanisms of Monitoring 
CG and Incentive CG are inherently designed to address these exact concerns.     
(a) Monitoring CG 
 Board Independence and CEO-Separation are defined as the key Monitoring CG. 
In the absence of independent directors, internal decision making in the closely-held 
firms would be dominated by UCOs. There will not be checks and balances over 
excessive power possessed by these organizational insiders. Presence of independent 
directors ensures that the agents are regularly monitored on behalf of the principals. As 
the outsiders, independent directors put their fair efforts to govern the dominant insiders 
and protect the interests of minority shareholders as these are their core duties (Fama, 
1980; Jensen & Meckling, 1976); there is a reputation concern in regard to how well the 
independent directors are performing their tasks (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Zajac & 
Westphal, 1996). Furthermore, independent directors bring diversity and professional 
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knowledge to internal decision making which enables the board to better represent the 
interests of principals (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Pearce & Zahra, 1991).  
Separation of CEO and Board Chair roles is the other Monitoring CG considered 
to be able to address Type II agency conflict. Presence of an independent Board Chair is 
an addition to the system of checks and balances since it prevents concentration of power 
within one individual (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Higgs, 2003). CEO-Separation ensures that 
the CEO is fulfilling his/her role in running and managing the company, while the Board 
Chair is fulfilling his/her role in running the board and directing unbiased evaluation of 
the key insiders. In sum, CEO-Separation enhances the capacity of Monitoring CG; in its 
absence, there will be self-evaluation leading to ineffective monitoring (Jensen, 1993). 
The idea of Generalizability of Internal CG claims that the closely-held firms are 
converging in adopting the Monitoring CG as these mechanisms are effectively working 
in governing Type II agency conflict. This claim is supported by Kaplan & Minton 
(1994), Shan (2013), Lam & Lee (2008), Cueto (2013), Luo, Wan, & Cai, (2012), and 
Liu & Lu (2007), who have reported significant positive impacts by Monitoring CG in 
firms outside the Anglo-Saxon context and in firms with UCOs. Therefore:   
Hypothesis 2(a): The negative effect of Excess Control on Minority Shareholder 
Wealth is attenuated (positively moderated) by Monitoring CG (Board 
Independence; CEO-Separation). 
(b) Incentive CG 
Managerial Ownership and Performance based Pay are recommended as the key 
Incentive CG. Managerial Ownership is aimed at aligning the interests of agent with 
those of the principals (Denis, 2001; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Morck et al., 1988). The 
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idea is that professionally hired managers will act towards maximizing the shareholder 
value if doing so also provides them with greater benefits (Barak, Cohen, & Lauterbach, 
2011; Singla, Veliyath, & George, 2014). One of the most effective ways to have such 
interest alignment is to reward the professional management with equity shareholding 
and thereby incentivize them to increase closely-held firms’ market valuation. Even 
though, in most instances, top management in the family owned firms already possess 
equity shareholding (when top management is from the controlling family), 
Generalizability of Internal CG suggests that managerial ownership is an effective 
Incentive CG in these family owned-managed firms as well (Tiscini & Raoli, 2013). 
Overtime, more and more firms are converging in adopting Managerial Ownership as an 
important Incentive CG. In line with peer and rival firms, family controlled-managed 
firms are also adopting this internal mechanism  professionally since the insiders (family 
members) of these firms are highly concerned about family reputation, social legitimacy, 
companies’ future, and internal policies’ long term success (Croci et al., 2012; Cueto, 
2013; Gomes, 2000; Mishra, Randøy, & Jenssen, 2001).  
Performance based Pay policy implies that top management will be compensated 
in proportion to their past and present performance in improving firms’ final outcomes 
(Cadsby, Song, & Tapon, 2007; Hall & Liebman, 1998; Jensen & Murphy, 1990; 
Murphy, 1999). Such incentive mechanism ensures a system of evaluation`, enhances 
transparency in compensation decision`, and continuously motivates top management in 
improving their future performance and thereby acting in the interest of the principals. 
Instead of deciding top management compensation arbitrarily`, tying it to the minority 
shareholders’ wealth is particularly beneficial in closely-held firms as in these firms`, one 
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of the key ways to expropriate minority shareholders’ wealth is to remunerate top 
management with extravagant compensation even when their performance is 
unsatisfactory (Amdouni & Boubaker, 2015; Gallego & Larrain, 2012; Jaiswall & Firth, 
2009; Urzúa, 2009). A large number of CG research, in fact, have found a significant 
positive effect of “good” Incentive CG in various types of firms across different Non-
Anglo-Saxon economies (Brahmi, 2015; Buck et al., 2008; Hassan & Hoshino, 2007; 
Kaplan, 1994b; Koski, Marengo, & Mäkinen, 2012; Liu & Lu, 2007; Sanders & Tuschke, 
2007). Hence:  
Hypothesis 2(b): The negative effect of Excess Control on Minority Shareholder 
Wealth is attenuated (positively moderated) by Incentive CG (Managerial 
Ownership; Performance based Pay). 
3.3 Universal View based Hypotheses: Complementarity of External CG 
The idea of Complementarity of External CG not only acknowledges that firm 
level governance mechanisms are capable of addressing P-P problem, it also asserts that 
countries are converging towards providing supporting external institutions (Aguilera & 
Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009; Coffee, 1999, 2001; Hansmann & Kraakman, 2000, 2001). And 
the more the institutional environment becomes stronger in implementing desired policies 
and punishing misconducts, the stronger will be the positive impact of the firm level 
mechanisms in attaining goals (Engelen & van Essen, 2010; Goodin, 1998). The central 
premise of this idea is built on the argument that firm level CG mechanisms are utilized 
to the maximum when country level CG mechanisms are available as the 
‘complementary’ factor.  
Scholars argue that in countries with weak governance institutions, firms address 
their agency problems mainly through the organizational convergence of internal CG 
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(Bonetti et al., 2016; Chen et al., 2009; Dahyaa et al., 2008; Durnev & Kim, 2005). That 
is, in weak context, organizations mostly rely on the firm level mechanisms of 
Monitoring CG and Incentive CG to protect the interests of minority shareholders. In 
countries with strong governance institutions, the positive impact of internal mechanisms 
gets further enhanced as the external mechanisms function as an additional force to 
implement arm’s length agency contract (Barney & Ouchi, 1986; Fama, 1980; Sun et al., 
2010). Countries’ legal and disclosure provisions are the critical elements of external CG 
mechanisms.     
Strict legal institutions induce the ‘complementary’ effect by strengthening 
accountability by corporate insiders (La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2006), 
providing regulatory means to minority shareholders (La Porta et al., 2002), and creating 
a rational system whereby the benefit of investment in governance is higher compared to 
the cost (Doidge et al., 2007). In sum, CG related national laws reduce the expropriation 
of minority shareholders through the legal means of ex-ante constraints and ex-post 
punishment/sanction (Djankov et al., 2008). Similarly, high quality of country level 
disclosure provisions enhances the firm level governance by reducing information 
asymmetry between investors and company insiders (Leuz & Verrecchi, 2000); 
mandating transparent reporting on within network transactional activities, and requiring 
information release on the complex ownership structure (OECD Report, 2004). More 
directly, disclosure related institutions influence firms’ governance by requiring periodic 
information on compliance vs. non-compliance of the suggested measures (Mahoney, 
1995). Analyses by Doidge et al. (2007), Hope (2003), Renders & Gaeremynck (2012), 
and van Essen et al. (2012a) provide support for the complementary effect generated by 
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the country level CG institutions. Based on this analysis, I hypothesize (Universal View 
based hypotheses are summarized in Figure 3.1):   
Hypothesis 3(a): The negative effect of Excess Control on Minority Shareholder 
Wealth is attenuated (positively moderated) by Monitoring CG (Board 
Independence; CEO-Separation) and the degree of attenuation increases with the 
quality of external CG institutions (legal institution; disclosure standard). That is, 
external mechanisms are the ‘complementary’ factor in enhancing the positive 
impact of internal mechanisms. 
Hypothesis 3(b): The negative effect of Excess Control on Minority Shareholder 
Wealth is attenuated (positively moderated) by Incentive CG (Managerial 
Ownership; Performance based Pay) and the degree of attenuation increases with 
the quality of external CG institutions (legal institution; disclosure standard). That 
is, external mechanisms are the ‘complementary’ factor in enhancing the positive 
impact of internal mechanisms. 
3.4 Embedded View based Hypotheses: Policy-Practice Decoupling of CG 
Scholars believing in Policy-Practice Decoupling of CG argue that internal 
governance policies may be aligned with the intended goal of addressing Type II agency 
problem but their effectiveness is contingent on the presence external governance 
institutions (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Aguilera & Jackson, 2010; Goyer, 2010; Schmidt 
& Spindler, 2006). Institutional scholars suggest that there are differences among national 
governance systems, which in many instances may not be supportive of the shareholder- 
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Figure 3.1: Universal View based hypotheses regarding the effectiveness of Internal 
CG and External CG in attenuating P-P problem; P-P problem is indicated by H1 
 
 
oriented CG model (Hall & Soskice, 2001; La Porta et al., 1998). Many countries are 
ceremonially adopting common CG policies mainly to secure global legitimacy (Aguilera 
& Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Cuervo, 2002). Institutional scholars also analyze the condition 
of institutional voids in emerging economies (Khanna & Palepu, 2000; Khanna & Rivkin, 
2000; Kogut & Spicer, 2002) and assert that in such contexts, external CG mechanisms 
are missing in enforcing firm level good governance. In short, the success of internal 
mechanisms in protecting the minority shareholders’ wealth depends on the availability 
of necessary CG institutions, which are not present universally across nations.   
When the firm level CG mechanisms are not mandated by strong institutions, 
UCOs seldom comply with the formal recommendations (Kim, Kitsabunnarat-
Chatjuthamard, & Nofsinger, 2007; Nowland, 2008; Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, & 
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Buchholtz, 2001; Shi, Magnan, & Kim, 2012). Even if they comply, most firms manage 
to engage in ceremonial policy adoption because of the weaknesses in the external 
institutions (Guillén & Capron, 2015; Peng, 2003, 2004). Ironically, in weak context, 
suggested internal mechanisms can be utilized as a means of further expropriation. For 
example, UCOs can exercise their excessive power to manipulate the board structure by 
appointing their own people as board members and Board Chair. Formally, on paper, 
these board members and Board Chair may be the outsiders in the focal firms; in reality, 
they serve the interest of UCOs (Singla et al., 2014; Veliyath & Ramaswamy, 2000; Yeh 
& Woidtke, 2005). There is also evidence of misappropriation of the incentive 
mechanisms. In the concentrated firms, UCOs themselves belong to the top management 
team or they appoint top management and engage in collusions. At the expense of 
minority shareholders, UCOs reward top management with extravagant pay and equity 
ownership irrespective of their (top management’s) performance results (Amdouni & 
Boubaker, 2015; Gallego & Larrain, 2012; Jaiswall & Firth, 2009).   
In sum, according to the idea of Policy-Practice Decoupling of CG, availability of 
developed external institutions is crucial for the success of Monitoring CG and Incentive 
CG. When legal and disclosure related CG institutions are strong enough to enforce firm 
level implementation of the internal policies and punish the act of ceremonial policy 
adoption (Espeland & Sauder, 2007), firms will conduct real policy adoption. Such policy 
implementation may be legitimacy motivated (Kostova & Roth, 2002); however, due to 
‘positive externality’ there will be mitigation of P-P conflict. There is a difference 
between Complementarity of External CG and Policy-Practice Decoupling of CG that 
should be recognized with caution. Both emphasize the importance of external 
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mechanisms. However, Complementarity of External CG explains the availability of legal 
and disclosure provisions as a ‘complementary’ factor. In their absence in weak context, 
organizations rely on the internal CG mechanisms to attain good governance; in strong 
context, its availability functions as an additional force to enhance the positive impact of 
firm level mechanisms. On the contrary, Policy-Practice Decoupling of CG emphasizes 
the availability of legal and disclosure provisions as a ‘necessary’ factor. In their absence 
in weak context, organizations conduct symbolic adoption of the internal CG that seldom 
attains good governance; in strong context, intended outcomes by the internal CG are 
often achieved as necessary institutions are available in enforcing the desired policies. 
Empirical findings by Hellman et al. (2018), Heugens et al. (2009), Klapper & Love 
(2004), and Leuz et al. (2003), have shown that availability of developed external 
institutions is a pre-requisite for the success of internal governance; otherwise there will 
be ceremonial policy adoption with no impact on the intended outcomes. Accordingly, I 
hypothesize (Embedded View based hypotheses are summarized in Figure 3.2):    
Hypothesis 4(a): The negative effect of Excess Control on Minority Shareholder 
Wealth is attenuated (positively moderated) by Monitoring CG (Board 
Independence; CEO-Separation) on the pre-condition that the internal 
mechanisms are implemented by developed external institutions (legal institution; 
disclosure standard). That is, external mechanisms are the ‘necessary’ factor in 
moderating the positive impact of internal mechanisms. 
Hypothesis 4(b): The negative effect of Excess Control on Minority Shareholder 
Wealth is attenuated (positively moderated) by Incentive CG (Managerial 
Ownership; Performance based Pay) on the pre-condition that the internal 
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mechanisms are implemented by developed external institutions (legal institution; 
disclosure standard). That is, external mechanisms are the ‘necessary’ factor in 
moderating the positive impact of internal mechanisms. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Embedded View based hypotheses regarding the effectiveness of 
Internal CG and External CG in attenuating P-P problem; P-P problem is indicated 
by H1 
 
Rejection of significant positive impact by the internal and external CG policies in 
attenuating P-P problem will provide support for the analysis of Means-Ends Decoupling 
of CG, which raises serious concerns about the effectiveness of common CG policies in 
governing the UCOs (Attig et al., 2016; Bebchuk & Hamdani, 2009; Davis et al., 1997; 
Fiss, 2008; Heracleous & Lan, 2012; Morck et al., 2000; Young et al., 2008). Proponents 
of this view agree that agency problem occurs in both the dyads – dispersed owner-
manager (P-A) and minority shareholder-UCO (P-P). However, in the P-A conflict, top 
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management exploit their day to day decision making power to expropriate the dispersed 
shareholders; whereas in the P-P conflict, UCOs utilize their excessive control to 
expropriate the minority shareholders. That is, agents’ identity and their means of power 
vary substantially. Universal CG policies are fundamentally designed to govern the top 
management; they are not equipped with curtailing the excessive power of UCOs 
(Bebchuk & Hamdani, 2009). According to Means-Ends Decoupling of CG, when 
internal CG mechanisms are misaligned to begin with, external CG institutions cannot 
support moderating any positive result at the organizational level (Bromley & Powell, 
2012; Dick, 2015). The core problem in such instance is not lack in ‘policy 
implementation’ (which can be addressed by developed external institutions) but rather 
lack in ‘policy-goal alignment’ (where developed external institutions may end up 
enforcing misaligned policies) (Wijen, 2014; 2015). In short, proponents of Policy-
Practice Decoupling of CG question the universality of “good” CG principles from the 
perspective of country institutional heterogeneity/embeddedness; whereas proponents of 
Means-Ends Decoupling of CG question the universality of “good” CG principles from 
the perspective of firm structural heterogeneity/embeddedness. A large number of studies 
have shown that commonly recommended internal policies cannot improve the firm level 
governance even when the external institutions are relatively developed to sustain the 
shareholder-oriented CG model (Daily & Dalton, 1997; Dalton, Hitt, Certo, & Dalton, 
2007; Mizruchi, 2004; Walsh & Seward, 1990). 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH DESIGN & METHODOLOGY 
This chapter describes the research design and methodology to test all the 
hypotheses developed in Chapter 3. It provides discussion on the sample selection, data 
sources, variable definition and corresponding measure operationalization. Chapter 4 
ends with elaborating the statistical method and models to test the hypotheses.   
4.1 Sample Selection & Data 
 The sample of this investigation consists of the publicly traded non-finance 
companies from 40 countries across Europe, Asia, and Latin America. The first criterion 
of the sample selection was to start with all the companies that are closely-held within the 
control of UCOs. The closely-held firms then were ordered based on the size of their 
market capitalization. The top companies were included in the final dataset given that for 
these companies, data were available on all the measures. At the end, I developed a cross-
sectional dataset of 1109 concentrated firms for the year 2016. It is important to note that 
the data period of company ownership is spread between the years 2015 to 2017.  The 
sample includes closely-held firms with different types of UCOs, such as – family, state, 
financial institution, corporation, and so forth. It also includes the domestic and 
multinational corporations and corporations that are cross-listed in the foreign stock 
markets.  
In many instances, data on the concentrated firms are not readily available. 
Therefore, major portions of the data have been manually collected/calculated from the 
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sources like Bureau van Dijk-Orbis, Capital-IQ, and company annual reports. Data on the 
measures of Minority Shareholder Wealth and firm level control variables are directly 
obtained from Bureau van Dijk-Orbis. The same source has been utilized to manually 
collect data on the company ownership structure. For majority of the sample firms, data 
on Monitoring CG has been manually collected from the company annual reports; 
however, for 369 companies, data on Monitoring CG are directly obtained from NRG-
Matrics. Information provided by Capital-IQ has been utilized to manually calculate data 
on Incentive CG. Indices and measures created by the World Bank and International 
Country Risk Guide have been incorporated to capture the quality of countries’ legal and 
disclosure institutions.       
 Table 4.1 presents the list of 40 countries of which 19 are from Europe, 15 are 
from Asia, and 6 are from Latin America. Among the 1109 sample firms, 565 are from 
Europe, 487 are from Asia, and 57 are from Latin America. Table 4.2 shows a breakdown 
of number of companies based on the types of UCOs; as expected the dataset is 
dominated by family controlled firms. Table 4.2 also shows that 265 of the sample firms 
are owned by the foreign UCOs and 561 are cross-listed in the foreign stock markets. 
4.2 Variables & Measures 
 Before discussing the operationalization of variables and measures, it is critical to 
re-emphasize that the dissertation intends to examine the effectiveness of “good” 
governance policies in addressing Type II agency problem. In testing the base hypothesis 
(where it is hypothesized that Excess Control negatively affects Minority Shareholder 
Wealth), even though ‘Minority Shareholder Wealth’ appears as the dependent variable 
and UCOs’ ‘Excess Control’ appears as the independent variable, the core objective of
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Table 4.1: Country List & Sample Information 
Europe Firm # Asia Firm # Latin America Firm # 
1. Austria 14 20. Bangladesh 14 35. Argentina 9 
2. Belgium 23 21. China 58 36. Brazil 18 
3. Bulgaria 9 22. Egypt 8 37. Chile 12 
4. Czech Republic 8 23. Hong Kong 46 38. Colombia 5 
5. Denmark 19 24. India 85 39. Mexico 8 
6. Finland 18 25. Indonesia 22 40. Peru 5 
7. France 83 26. Israel 25    
8. Germany 60 27. Japan 40    
9. Greece 15 28. Jordan 10    
10. Italy 65 29. Malaysia 25    
11. Netherlands 25 30. Pakistan 19    
12. Norway 36 31. Philippines 30    
13. Poland 53 32. Singapore 45    
14. Portugal 14 33. South Korea 35    
15. Russia 15 34. Thailand 25    
16. Spain 21       
17. Sweden 50       
18. Switzerland 25       
19. Turkey 12       
Total (Europe) 565 Total (Asia) 487 Total (Latin 
America) 
57 
 
 
Table 4.2: Identity of UCOs & Type of Firms’ International-Orientation 
Identity of UCOs Firm # Type of Firms’ International-Orientation  Firm # 
Family  650 Foreign Ownership 265 
State 190 Foreign Ownership from Anglo-Saxon Nation 62 
Financial Institution 147 Crosslisting 561 
Corporation 100 Crosslisting in Anglo-Saxon Market 413 
Other 22     
 
my dissertation is to investigate whether commonly recommended “good” CG policies 
attenuate the negative impact of Excess Control on the Minority Shareholder Wealth. In 
the policy-related alternative hypotheses, even though the internal CG and external CG 
appear as the moderating variables, these are my core variables of interest. In brief, the 
negative relationship between Excess Control and Minority Shareholder Wealth in 
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hypothesis 1 indicates the presence of Type II agency problem and my goal is to 
investigate to what extent the internal and external CG mechanisms moderate this 
negative relationship. In other words, to what extent the internal and external CG 
mechanisms address Type II agency problem. In the following section, I present the 
definition of variables and measures along with a discussion on their data sources. 
Minority Shareholder Wealth 
In the CG research, scholars have employed measures of Firm Value to proxy for 
the variable of Minority Shareholder Wealth (Bae, Baek, Kang, & Liu; Bennedsen & 
Nielsen, 2010; Cueto, 2013). In the closely-held firms, UCOs can divert resources for 
attaining their private and/or collective benefit interests; consequently, Firm Value gets 
adversely impacted which represents expropriation of Minority Shareholder Wealth. The 
idea of employing Firm Value as the proxy of Minority Shareholder Wealth implies that 
higher or lower valuation of firms in the market provides information on whether the 
minority shareholders have been protected or expropriated by the UCOs (Dahyaa et al., 
2008). Following Claessens et al. (2001), La Porta et al. (2002), and Renders & 
Gaeremynck (2012), I am employing Tobin’s Q as the measure of my dependent 
variable. For robustness tests, I will employ Market-to-Book as the second measure of 
Firm Value. Data on Tobin’s Q and Market-to-Book are directly obtained from Bureau 
van Dijk-Orbis. 
Excess Control 
 Excess Control is the difference between UCOs’ voting control and cash-flow 
right. Following the approach applied by Faccio & Lang (2002), and Lins (2003), I define 
a shareholder as the UCO whose direct and indirect voting control sum up to 10% or 
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more. In the chain of ownership, indirect voting control is measured by the weakest link. 
For example, if company X owns fraction y of company Y and company Y owns fraction 
z of company Z, then company X’s indirect voting control in company Z is min of (y, z). 
If company X also owns direct voting control in company Z, then company X’s direct 
and indirect voting control are aggregated to calculate the total voting control right. 
Company X will be defined as the UCO of company Z if its aggregate voting control 
reaches the 10% threshold (i.e., aggregate voting control sums up to 10% or more). To 
compute the indirect cash-flow right, intermediary cash-flow rights are multiplied along 
the chain of ownership. In the above example, company X’s indirect cash-flow right in 
company Z is the product of y and z. If company X also owns direct cash-flow right in 
company Z, then company X’s direct and indirect cash-flow rights are aggregated to 
calculate the total cash-flow right. Voting controls by the UCOs differ from their cash-
flow rights because of the pyramidal structure, multiple control chains, cross-
shareholding, and dual class share; such difference provides the UCOs with Excess 
Control in the closely-held firms. Bureau van Dijk – Orbis contains detail information on 
the company ownership structure that they present via the ownership maps. I have 
accessed the ownership map of each closely-held firm individually, traced the identity of 
UCOs, and finally, calculated their (UCOs’) voting control and cash-flow right following 
the process explained above.  
Internal Mechanisms (Monitoring CG & Incentive CG) 
At the firm level, I am analyzing the effectiveness of two major governance 
policies – Monitoring CG and Incentive CG. Mechanisms of Monitoring CG are designed 
to monitor top management so that they act in the interest of the shareholders and 
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mechanisms of Incentive CG are designed to provide top management with the incentive 
packages so as to align their interest with that of the shareholders and thereby motivate 
their action towards serving the shareholders (Denis, 2001).  
Monitoring CG comprises of Board Independence and CEO-Separation. Board 
Independence is measured by the ratio of total number of independent board members to 
total number of overall board members. Independent board members are required to be 
the non-executive of the focal company and non-affiliated to the focal company’s 
business group network. For the concentrated firms, a board member is defined to be an 
independent director if he/she satisfies the following criteria – (i) he/she is not an 
executive/employee of the focal firm, (ii) he/she is not the UCO, (iii) he/she is not an 
executive/employee/director of any company within the business group network, (iv) 
he/she is not an executive/employee/director of any company where the UCO has 
shareholding, (v) in cases of family controlled firms, he/she is not a member of the 
controlling family, (vi) in cases of state controlled firms, he/she is not a politician and/or 
not an employee of the government, and (vii) in cases of foreign controlled firms, he/she 
is not a citizen of the particular foreign country (Dahya et al., 2008). For robustness tests, 
I am including a second measure of board independence where company outsiders are 
defined as the independent directors. That is, if a board member is not an 
executive/employee of the focal firm, he/she will be considered as an outside director. 
For majority of the sample firms, data on Board Independence have been manually 
collected from company annual reports. In particular, board members’ biography section 
has been consulted to code data on ‘executive’, ‘affiliated’, and ‘independent’ directors. 
For 369 firms, data on Board Independence were directly obtained from NRG-Matrics.  	
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CEO-Separation is defined as the board leadership structure where company CEO 
and Board Chair are two different individuals (Zajac & Westphal, 1996). CEO-
Separation is measured by a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if CEO and 
Board Chair are two different individuals or zero if CEO and Board Chair is the same 
person. Data on CEO-Separation has been manually collected from company annual 
reports.    
Incentive CG comprises of Managerial Ownership and Performance based Pay. 
Managerial Ownership is measured by the percentage of voting control directly and 
indirectly owned by the company CEOs (Mueller & Spitz-Oener, 2006). For robustness 
tests, I have also applied the percentage of cash-flow right directly and indirectly owned 
by the company CEOs as the second measure of Managerial Ownership. The ownership 
maps of Bureau van Dijk – Orbis have been utilized to calculate each CEO’s voting 
control and cash-flow right, – a process similar to the calculation of Excess Control. For 
the ownership threshold below 5%, data has been directly obtained from Capital-IQ.  
Performance based Pay3 is measured by CEO’s ‘variable pay’ (which is 
determined based on CEO’s performance) to CEO’s ‘total pay’ (which is the summation 
of CEO’s base salary and variable pay) (Gao & Li, 2015). CEO’s ‘variable pay’ is the 
summation of bonus, stock option, restricted stock, and LTIP. For robustness tests, I have 
applied CEO’s ‘total pay’ (summation of base salary, bonus, stock option, restricted 
stock, and LTIP) as the second measure of Performance based Pay. Information provided 
by Capital-IQ has been consulted to calculate data on CEOs’ Performance based Pay. It is 
important to mention that for the concentrated firms, data availability on CEO 
compensation is very limited. Among the 1109 sample firms, data on ‘variable pay/total 
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pay’ is available for 750 firms from 33 countries and data on ‘total pay’ is available for 
848 firms from 34 countries.  
External Mechanisms (Legal & Disclosure Institutions) 
At the country level, I am analyzing the significance of legal and disclosure 
provisions in implementing the firm level governance policies. To capture the quality of 
countries’ legal institution, I employ the ‘Minority Shareholder Protection’ index of 
World Bank Doing Business (2016). The index ranges from 0 to 10 and covers the de-
jure regulations of anti-self-dealing and shareholder governance. To capture both the de-
jure and de-facto regulatory environment of minority shareholder protection, I re-scale 
the Minority Shareholder Protection index to 0 to 1 and multiply it with the index of Rule 
of Law developed by the International Country Risk Guide, 2016. Following Bell, 
Filatotchev, Aguilera (2014), I classify countries below the sample median as the context 
with weak legal institution and above the sample median as the context with strong legal 
institution.  
For measuring the quality of country level disclosure standard, I utilize the indices 
of ‘Extent of Corporate Transparency’ and ‘Extent of Disclosure’ of World Bank Doing 
Business (2016). The combined index ranges from 0 to 10. In many countries, 
information reporting is mandated following the ‘comply-or-explain’ principle. Hence, to 
capture the enforcement of disclosure standard, I re-scale the combined index to 0 to 1 
and multiply it with the index of Rule of Law. As described above, I classify countries 
below the sample median as the context with weak disclosure institution and above the 
sample median as the context with strong disclosure institution.      
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For robustness test, I am employing an additional measure of external CG 
institution covering the overall quality of countries’ public institution, corporate 
transparency, and governance standard. The index of Institution from the Global 
Competitiveness Report has been incorporated for the year 2016 and the index is 
developed by World Economic Forum.        
Control Variables 
A number of firm, industry, and country level variables can influence the measure 
of Minority Shareholder Wealth; hence, the empirical analysis is controlled for the 
respective measures. At the firm level, I include the control variables of Firm Age, Firm 
Size, Firm Profitability, Firm Growth, Crosslisting dummy, Foreign UCO dummy, and 
indicators for UCOs’ identity. Firm Age is measured by the count of total years since the 
time of company foundation to year 2016. Firm Size is measured by computing the 
natural log of total asset. Firm Profitability is measured by Return on Asset. Firm Growth 
is measured by computing sales growth. Cross-listed firms and Foreign firms operate in 
an environment with relatively advanced external institutions, which can influence 
internal governance and firms’ valuation (Coffee, 2002; Useem, 1998). Therefore, 
Crosslisting dummy is employed to indicate whether a firm is cross-listed in the foreign 
stock market and Foreign UCO dummy is employed to indicate whether a firm is 
controlled by the foreign owners. Differences in ownership types also can have impact 
over internal governance and firms’ valuation (Gilson, 2006); hence the analysis is 
controlled for the identity of UCOs. Dummies and indicators are incorporated to capture 
the impact of family, state, financial institution, corporation, and other types of UCOs. 
Data on the measures of firm level control variables are gathered from Bureau van Dijk-
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Orbis and Capital-IQ. Firms’ Industry Affiliation is determined based on the category 
defined by Campbell (1996)4. An indicator has been assigned for each of the sample 
firms according to their industry SIC codes.  The World Bank data on countries’ GDP 
growth is utilized to control for country effect. Table 4.3 presents the summary of 
variable definition, measure operationalization, and respective data sources. 
4.3 Methodology 
For testing the hypotheses, I am analyzing the data with multiple-regression 
involving interaction between Excess Control and internal CG mechanisms. As suggested 
by Aiken & West (1991) and Irwin & McClelland (2001), I address the issue of 
multicollinearity by mean-centering the measures of interaction terms, – i.e. Excess 
Control and internal CG mechanisms that are continuous in nature. Since 
heteroscedasticity is an inherent problem of cross-sectional data, I am employing the 
OLS technique with Huber-White estimators, whose robust standard errors take care of 
the assumption of homoscedasticity. The analysis is also accounted for the endogeneity 
of ownership structure. Scholars define firm size, firm portability, and countries’ 
economic growth as the potential instruments of UCO’s excessive control (Guedhami & 
Pittman, 2006). The current study incorporates these firm and country level measures as 
the control variables. Additionally, following the approach of Guedhami & Mishra 
(2009), I use UCOs’ average excess control in firms located in the same country as the 
instrument to obtain the fitted value of Excess Control and then apply the fitted estimator 
in the second stage of the endogeneity investigation. I am also conducting multiple 
robustness tests by incorporating various measures of Minority Shareholder Wealth, 
Monitoring CG, Incentive CG, and external institution. For further investigation of the
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Table 4.3: Summary of Variables, Measures, and Data Sources 
Variables Measures Data Sources 
Minority Shareholder Wealth Firm Value measure of Tobin's Q 
(for robustness test, Market-to-Book)  
Bureau van Dijk-Orbis, 2016 
Excess Control (%) Difference between the percentage of UCOs' voting control and cash-flow right Manually calculated data from 
Bureau van Dijk-Orbis, 2015-2017 
Internal CG:     
Board Independence (%) 
(Monitoring CG) 
Independent directors divided by total directors; independent directors are 
required to be non-executive and non-affiliated to the focal firm 
(for robustness test, outside directors divided by total directors; outside directors 
are required to be non-executive of the focal firm)   
Manually collected data from 
annual reports, 2016 
Directly obtained data from  
NRG-Metrics, 2016 
CEO-Separation 
(Monitoring CG) 
Dummy variable; if CEO-Separation = 1, otherwise = 0  Manually collected data from  
annual reports, 2016 
Managerial Ownership (%) 
(Incentive CG) 
Percentage of CEOs' direct and indirect voting ownership 
(for robustness test, percentage of CEOs' direct and indirect cash-flow ownership) 
Manually calculated data from 
Bureau van Dijk-Orbis, 2016 
Directly obtained data from 
Capital-IQ, 2016 
Performance based Pay (%) 
(Incentive CG) 
CEO's variable pay divided by CEO's total pay 
(for robustness test, CEO's total pay) 
Capital-IQ, 2016 
External CG:     
Legal Institution 
 
 
Disclosure Standard 
Product of Minority Shareholder Protection index and Rule of Law index 
 
 
Product of Transparency-Disclosure  index and Rule of Law index 
World Bank Doing Business, 2016 
International Country Risk Guide, 2016 
 
World Bank Doing Business, 2016 
International Country Risk Guide, 2016 
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Control Variables:     
Firm Age Measured by counting the years since time of company establishment to 2016 Capital-IQ, 2016 
Firm Size Natural log of total assets  Bureau van Dijk-Orbis, 2016 
Firm Profit Return on Asset Bureau van Dijk-Orbis, 2016 
Firm Growth Sales Growth Bureau van Dijk-Orbis, 2016 
Crosslisting Dummy variable; whether the focal firm is cross-listed in the foreign stock 
market (if yes = 1, otherwise = 0) 
Manually collected data from 
Bureau van Dijk-Orbis, 2016 
UCO Foreign Dummy variable; if UCO is Foreign = 1, otherwise = 0 Manually collected data from 
Bureau van Dijk-Orbis, 2015-2017 
Identity of UCOs Dummies and indicators are assigned for different types of UCOs (family, state, 
financial institution, corporation, and other) 
Manually collected data from 
Bureau van Dijk-Orbis, 2015-2017 
Industry  An indicator is assigned for each firm according to their industry SIC code; 
industry category is defined following Campbell (1996) 
Manually collected data from 
Bureau van Dijk-Orbis, 2016 
Country GDP Growth (%) World Bank, 2016 
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policy-related hypotheses, I am incorporating additional relevant aspects of the CG 
literature and appending this extended investigation as ad-hoc analysis. All the statistical 
analyses of the dissertation have been conducted with STATA version 15. In the 
following section, I explain the model specification for testing all the hypotheses. 
For testing Hypothesis 1, the model specification can be expressed as follows: 
Yi = β0 + β1X1i + βnCmi + εi                                                                                                                         (1) 
Where: = 
Yi = Minority Shareholder Wealth for focal firm i 
β0 = the intercept of Yi  
β1 = the direct effect of X1i on Yi 
X1i = Excess Control by UCOs for focal firm i 
βn = the direct effect of Cmi on Yi (where n = 2, 3, 4,……) 
Cmi = vector of control variables for focal firm i (where m = 1, 2, 3, ……)  
εi = the randomly varying unique error term contributed by firm i to β0 (where εi: N(0,σ2)) 
Hypothesis 1 (Excess Control has a negative effect on Minority Shareholder 
Wealth) will be supported if the coefficient of Excess Control is negative and significant 
(i.e., Ha: β1<0).  
Two way interaction regression analyses will be conducted for testing Hypotheses 
2(a) and 2(b). Model specification for the analysis is as follows:  
Yi = β0 + β1X1i + β2X2i + β3X1iX2i + βnCmi + εi                                                                                  (2) 
Where: = 
Yi = Minority Shareholder Wealth for focal firm i 
β0 = the intercept of Yi  
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β1 = the direct effect of X1i on Yi 
X1i = Excess Control by UCOs for focal firm i 
β2 = the direct effect of X2i on Yi 
X2i = Internal CG for focal firm i 
β3 = the interaction effect of X1i and X2i on Yi 
βn = the direct effect of Cmi on Yi (where n = 4, 5, 6, ……) 
Cmi = vector of control variables for focal firm i (where m = 1, 2, 3, ……...)  
εi = the randomly varying unique error term contributed by firm i to β0 (where εi: N(0,σ2)) 
Hypotheses 2(a) and 2(b) – The negative effect of Excess Control on Minority 
Shareholder Wealth is attenuated (positively moderated) by (a) Monitoring CG (Board 
Independence; CEO-Separation) and (b) Incentive CG (Managerial Ownership and 
Performance based Pay) – will be supported if the coefficient of the interaction term 
between Excess Control and internal CG is positive and significant (i.e., Ha: β3>0). 
Significant positive effect by the two way interaction will imply that negative effect of 
Excess Control on Minority Shareholder Wealth (β1<0) is attenuated by the internal CG. 
For testing Hypotheses 3(a), 3(b) and 4(a), 4(b), I need to examine the three way 
interaction among Excess Control, internal CG, and external CG. To capture the 
interaction effect of countries’ legal institution, I split the dataset into two sub-samples, – 
first, with the firms that belong to the countries with weak legal institution (these 
countries’ legal institutional index is below the sample median) and next, with the firms 
that belong to the countries with strong legal institution (these countries’ legal 
institutional index is above the sample median). Then for each of the two sub-samples, I 
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run separate regressions based on the model specification of equation 2. I repeat these 
exact same steps for analyzing the interaction effect of countries’ disclosure institution.  
Hypotheses 3(a) and 3(b) – The negative effect of Excess Control on Minority 
Shareholder Wealth is attenuated (positively moderated) by (a) Monitoring CG (Board 
Independence; CEO-Separation) and (b) Incentive CG (Managerial Ownership; 
Performance based Pay) and the degree of attenuation increases with the quality of 
external CG institutions (legal institution; disclosure standard) – will be supported if the 
coefficient of the interaction term between Excess Control and internal CG is positive 
and significant (i.e., Ha: β3>0) and additionally, the coefficient of the interaction term is 
higher for the sample firms belonging to the context with strong institutions than that of 
the sample firms belonging to the context with weak institutions. Significant positive 
effect by the two way interaction will imply that negative effect of Excess Control on 
Minority Shareholder Wealth (β1<0) is attenuated by the internal CG and a higher β3 for 
the sub-sample with strong institutions will imply that the attenuation of the negative 
effect is further enhanced when the internal CG is complemented by the external CG.      
Hypotheses 4(a) and 4(b) – The negative effect of Excess Control on Minority 
Shareholder Wealth is attenuated (positively moderated) by (a) Monitoring CG (Board 
Independence; CEO-Separation) and (b) Incentive CG (Managerial Ownership; 
Performance based Pay) on the pre-condition that the internal mechanisms are 
implemented by developed external institutions (legal institution; disclosure standard) – 
will be supported if the coefficient of the interaction term between Excess Control and 
internal CG is insignificant/negative (i.e., Ha: β3≤0) for the sample firms belonging to the 
context with weak institutions; however, the coefficient of the interaction term between 
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Excess Control and internal CG is positive and significant (i.e., Ha: β3>0) for the sample 
firms belonging to the context with strong institutions. Significant positive β3 for the sub-
sample with strong institutions versus insignificant/negative β3 for the sub-sample with 
weak institutions will imply that the negative effect of Excess Control on Minority 
Shareholder Wealth (β1<0) is attenuated by the internal mechanisms when such formal 
policies are implemented by necessary external institutions.    
Rejection of significant positive interaction by the internal CG (i.e., Ha: β3≤0) 
across the entire analysis will indicate that the recommended firm level mechanisms are 
not aligned with the goal of reducing P-P conflict. Insignificant/negative β3 particularly 
for the sub-sample with strong institutions will imply that the negative effect of Excess 
Control on Minority Shareholder Wealth (β1<0) cannot be attenuated by the internal CG 
even in the presence of developed external CG. Such results will manifest in supporting 
the idea that there is a problem of policy-goal alignment between recommending a 
standardized CG policies and governing the UCOs.  
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CHAPTER 5 
RESULTS 
This chapter begins with presenting the basic statistics, correlations, and related 
information on the country level measures. Next, it describes the basic statistics and 
correlations among the firm level measures. It details the results of hypotheses test 
followed by the investigation of endogeneity test and robustness tests. For further 
analyses of the policy-related hypotheses, an ad-hoc analysis section with a series of 
additional regressions has been incorporated at the end of this chapter.  
5.1 Results of Country Level Measures 
Table 5.1 reports the basic statistics and correlations of countries’ legal 
institution, disclosure standard, and GDP growth. Correlations among the country level 
measures are low and not significant. The basic statistics of legal CG institution indicate 
that the mean is 0.44 on a scale from 0 to 1 with a standard deviation of 0.17 and a range 
of 0.15 to 0.75. For disclosure standard, the mean is 0.48 on a scale from 0 to 1 with a 
standard deviation of 0.18 and a range of 0.20 to 0.80. Table 5.2 and Table 5.3 rank the 
40 countries based on the quality of their legal and disclosure institutions, respectively. 
Countries above the sample median are assigned to the context with strong institution and 
countries below the sample median are assigned to the context with weak institution. 
According to Table 5.2 and Table 5.3, Norway, Malaysia, Portugal, and Czech Republic 
are listed in the context with strong legal institution; these countries’ positions get 
switched to the weak context for disclosure standard. On the contrary, Poland, Italy, 
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Russia, China, and Mexico are listed in the context with weak legal institution; these 
countries’ positions get upgraded to the strong context for disclosure standard.   
 
Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics & Correlations of Country Level Measures 
 
N Mean St.Dev. Min Max 1 2 3
1. Legal Institution (0-1) 40 0.44 0.17 0.15 0.75 1.00
2. Disclosure Standard (0-1) 40 0.48 0.18 0.20 0.80 0.05 1.00
3. GDP Growth (%) 40 2.64 2.24 -3.47 7.11 -0.12 -0.17 1.00
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
Table 5.2: Countries with Strong vs. Weak Legal Institution 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Countries in Strong Context Countries in Weak Context 
..1.Norway 21. Poland 
..2. Austria 22. Chile 
..3. Sweden 23. Switzerland 
..4. Denmark 24. Italy 
..5. Singapore 25. Turkey 
..6. Hong Kong 26. Bulgaria 
..7. Israel 27. Pakistan 
..8. South Korea 28. Peru 
..9. Spain 29. Russia 
10. Finland 30. China 
11. Netherlands 31. Thailand 
12. India 32. Jordan 
13. France 33. Colombia 
14. Malaysia 34. Indonesia 
15. Belgium 35. Egypt 
16. Portugal 36. Brazil 
17. Czech Republic 37. Argentina 
18. Germany 38. Bangladesh 
19. Japan 39. Philippines 
20. Greece 40. Mexico 
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Table 5.3: Countries with Strong vs. Weak Disclosure Institution 
 
Countries in Strong Context Countries in Weak Context 
..1. Denmark 22. Bulgaria 
..2. Sweden 23. Norway 
..3. Finland 24. Turkey 
..4. Hong Kong 25. Chile 
..5. Singapore 26. Jordan 
..6. France 27. Thailand 
..7. Israel 28. Egypt, Arab Rep. 
..8. Spain 29. Portugal 
..9. Austria 30. Philippines 
10. Belgium 31. Indonesia 
11. Poland 32. Pakistan 
12. Mexico 33. Peru 
13. Netherlands 34. Czech Republic 
14. Russia 35. Switzerland 
15. Greece 36. Colombia 
16. India 37. Argentina 
17. China 38. Brazil 
18. South Korea 39. Malaysia 
19. Italy 40. Bangladesh 
20. Germany   
21. Japan 		
 
 
 
5.2 Results of Firm Level Measures 
 Table 5.4 presents the descriptive statistics of key firm level measures including 
Tobin’s Q (the proxy of Minority Shareholder Wealth), Excess Control, Monitoring CG, 
Incentive CG, and control variables. Data for all the measures are available on 1109 
observations except for Performance based Pay; data for this Incentive CG is limited to 
750 observations.  
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Table 5.4: Descriptive Statistics of Firm Level Key Measures 
 
  
N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Tobin's Q 1109 1.17 1.65 0.00 17.38 
Excess Control (%) 1109 13.15 9.96 0.00 54.70 
Board Independence (%) 1109 40.42 19.45 0.00 100.00 
CEO-Separationa 1109 0.79 0.41 0.00 1.00 
Managerial Ownership (%) 1109 8.64 18.15 0.00 92.47 
Performance based Pay (%) 750 37.65 27.25 -4.94 99.02 
Firm Age (yr) 1109 51.37 46.65 1.00 650.00 
Firm Sizeb 1109 20.14 2.32 11.83 26.79 
Firm Profitability 1109 0.03 0.21 -2.56 4.23 
Firm Growth 1109 2.70 82.65 -1.00 2749.71 
Crosslistinga  1109 0.51 0.50 0.00 1.00 
UCO Foreigna  1109 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00 
a. Dummy variables 
b. Natural Log transformed variable 
 
Table 5.5 shows the correlations among key firm level measures. In general, 
correlation values are low. Excess Control and Tobin’s Q are negatively and significantly 
correlated (ρ = -0.18; p < .001), which provides initial support for the predicted 
relationship. Correlations among Excess Control and internal CG are insignificant except 
for Managerial Ownership (ρ = -0.11; p < .01), where the ρ value is low. For the globally-
driven firms, correlations are significantly positive for Crosslisting to Board 
Independence, CEO-Separation, and Performance based Pay and for Foreign UCOs to 
Tobin’s Q, Excess Control, and CEO-Separation. For both Crosslisting and Foreign 
UCOs, correlations are significantly negative with Managerial Ownership.        
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Table 5.5: Correlations among Firm Level Key Measures 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1. Tobin's Q 1.00
2. Excess Control (-0.18*** 1.00
3. Board Independence 0.03 -0.02 1.00
4. CEO-Separationa 0.07** 0.04 0.09*** 1.00
5. Managerial Ownership -0.01 (-0.11*** 0.01 (-0.33*** 1.00
6. Performance Based Pay 0.05 0.00 0.09*** 0.10*** (-0.13*** 1.00
7. Firm Age -0.05 0.05* 0.04 0.02 (-0.07** 0.18*** 1.00
8. Firm Sizeb (-0.23*** 0.15*** 0.08** 0.03 (-0.22*** 0.39*** 0.26*** 1.00
9. Firm Profitability 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.07** 0.10*** 1.00
10. Firm Growth 0.00 -0.04 0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 1.00
11. Crosslistinga 0.03 -0.02 0.19*** 0.09*** (-0.07** 0.29*** 0.11*** 0.29*** 0.02 0.03 1.00
12. UCO Foreigna 0.11*** 0.09*** 0.02 0.09*** (-0.18*** 0.03 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.08** 1.00  
a.  Dummy variables; b. Natural Log transformed variable 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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5.3 Hypotheses Tests 
 Table 5.6 presents the results of OLS regressions with two-way interactions for 
the full sample. Model 1 tests H1, Models 3 & 5 test H2(a), and Models 7 & 9 test H2(b). 
My base hypothesis predicts that Excess Control has a negative effect on Minority 
Shareholder Wealth, which indicates presence of P-P conflict in the concentrated firms. 
Model 1 provides support for significant negative effect of Excess Control on Minority 
Shareholder Wealth (i.e. Tobin’s Q) with β = -0.025 and p<0.01. That is, for a percentage 
increase in Excess Control, the value of Minority Shareholder Wealth (i.e. Tobin’s Q) 
gets decreased by 0.025. The sign, magnitude, and significance of the effect of Excess 
Control persist across all the models of Table 5.6. The β and p values of Excess Control 
in Model 5 (which includes the interaction for CEO-Separation) should be interpreted 
with caution. Since CEO-Separation is a dummy variable (if CEO-Separation = 1, 
otherwise = 0), the β = -0.011 with p>0.1 of Excess Control in Model 5 basically 
represents the coefficient at CEO-Separation = 0. For computing the coefficient at CEO-
Separation = 1, I utilized the ‘margin’ command of STATA which derives the results as β 
= -0.029 with p < 0.001. In sum, hypothesis 1 is supported by all the models in Table 5.6.  
 Since P-P conflict is evident in the concentrated firms, my next objective is to 
examine whether commonly recommended “good” CG policies attenuate the negative 
effect of Excess Control. Hypotheses built on the idea of Generalizability of Internal CG 
predict that the negative effect is attenuated by the mechanisms of Monitoring CG and 
Incentive CG. That is, hypothesis 2(a) will be supported if the interaction between Excess 
Control and Monitoring CG is positive and significant; whereas hypothesis 2(b) will be 
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Table 5.6: OLS Regression with Mean-Centered Interactions & Huber-White Robust Errors 
DV Tobin's Q Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5c Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
Excess Control (EC)a -0.025*** -0.024*** -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.011 -0.025*** -0.026*** -0.029*** -0.031***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Board Independencea 0.004* 0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
EC*Board Independence -0.000
(0.000)
CEO-Separation 0.282*** 0.198*
(0.108) (0.107)
EC*CEO-Separation -0.018*
(0.010)
Managerial Ownershipa -0.006* -0.004
(0.003) (0.003)
EC*Managerial Ownership 0.000
(0.000)
Performance based Paya 0.011*** 0.010***
(0.002) (0.002)
EC*Performance based Pay -0.000
(0.000)
Firm Age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Firm Sizeb -0.163*** -0.144*** -0.164*** -0.142*** -0.162*** -0.150*** -0.169*** -0.228*** -0.243***
(0.028) (0.025) (0.027) (0.025) (0.027) (0.025) (0.027) (0.038) (0.042)
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Firm Profit 0.388 0.364 0.380 0.376 0.395 0.392 0.399 0.246 0.238
(0.630) (0.634) (0.632) (0.628) (0.628) (0.627) (0.628) (0.631) (0.624)
Firm Growth -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Crosslisting 0.376*** 0.363*** 0.352*** 0.367*** 0.227
(0.101) (0.103) (0.103) (0.102) (0.168)
UCO Foreign 0.400*** 0.400*** 0.388*** 0.380*** 0.491***
(0.133) (0.133) (0.132) (0.134) (0.171)
UCO Family -0.470 -0.558 -0.467 -0.495 -0.408 -0.491 -0.420 -0.579 -0.532
(0.382) (0.390) (0.388) (0.384) (0.384) (0.382) (0.382) (0.474) (0.467)
UCO State -0.623 -0.677* -0.615 -0.646* -0.578 -0.678* -0.615 -0.595 -0.599
(0.389) (0.396) (0.395) (0.389) (0.390) (0.388) (0.388) (0.489) (0.484)
UCO Financial Institution -0.512 -0.494 -0.509 -0.445 -0.460 -0.499 -0.509 -0.401 -0.535
(0.402) (0.408) (0.407) (0.403) (0.404) (0.401) (0.401) (0.512) (0.515)
UCO Corporation -0.085 -0.104 -0.087 -0.064 -0.032 -0.095 -0.075 0.011 -0.078
(0.436) (0.443) (0.441) (0.438) (0.439) (0.437) (0.437) (0.547) (0.540)
Industry yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 4.755*** 4.599*** 4.441*** 4.465*** 4.227*** 4.927*** 4.534*** 6.201*** 6.146***
(0.700) (0.705) (0.703) (0.682) (0.709) (0.682) (0.699) (0.928) (0.947)
Observations 1,109 1,109 1,109 1,109 1,109 1,109 1,109 750 750
R-squared 0.114 0.093 0.114 0.096 0.118 0.095 0.116 0.124 0.140
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
a. In models with interaction, continuous variables are mean-centered; b. measure is natural log transformed 
c. At CEO-Separation = 1, β3 = -0.029 with robust st. error = 0.006 and p<0.01 
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supported if the interaction between Excess Control and Incentive CG is positive and 
significant. Model 2 and Model 3 present the findings of Board Independence. As the 
results show, Board Independence has significant positive effect on firms’ valuation (β = 
0.004 and p<0.1); however, the interaction between Excess Control and Board 
Independence is not significant (β = -0.000 and p>0.1). Model 4 and Model 5 present the 
results of CEO-Separation. Like Board Independence, CEO-Separation has significant 
positive effect on firms’ valuation (β = 0.282 and p<0.01); the interaction between Excess 
Control and CEO-Separation is significant but in negative direction (β = -0.018 and 
p<0.1). Hence, the results reject H2(a). While Board Independence and CEO-Separation 
improve firms’ valuation, these Monitoring CG cannot prevent the UCOs from exercising 
excessive control. The finding of CEO-Separation is particularly interesting. The negative 
effect on Minority Shareholder Wealth (i.e. Tobin’s Q) for a percentage increase in 
Excess Control actually gets increased by 0.018 when there is CEO-Separation.  Figure 
5.1 and Figure 5.2 plot the moderation effect of Monitoring CG on the negative relation 
between Excess Control and Minority Shareholder Wealth (i.e. Tobin;s Q). According 
Figure 5.1, the negative effect of Excess Control gets enhanced for high Board 
Independence as opposed to the prediction of H2(a); the interaction, however, is not 
significant. Figure 5.2 depicts the moderation effect of CEO-Separation. The negative 
effect of Excess Control gets enhanced for CEO-Separation = 1 as opposed to the 
prediction of H2(a) and the interaction is significant.  
Model 6 and Model 7 present the findings of Managerial Ownership. Managerial 
Ownership has significant but negative impact on firms’ valuation (β = -0.006 and p<0.1) 
and the interaction between Excess Control and Managerial ownership is insignificant (β 
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Figure 5.1: Interaction plot for the moderation effect of Board Independence on the 
negative relationship between Excess Control and Minority Shareholder Wealth (i.e. 
Tobin’s Q) using OLS regression with Huber-White robust errors 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Interaction plot for the moderation effect of CEO-Separation on the 
negative relationship between Excess Control and Minority Shareholder Wealth (i.e. 
Tobin’s Q) using OLS regression with Huber-White robust errors 
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= 0.000 and p>0.1). Finally, Model 8 and Model 9 report the results of Performance 
based Pay. On firms’ valuation, Performance based has positive and significant impact (β 
= 0.011 and p<0.01). Like all the other internal CG, the interaction between Excess 
Control and Performance based Pay is not significant (β = -0.000 and p>0.1). In sum, the 
results reject H2(b). Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4 depict the moderation effect of Incentive 
CG. According to Figure 5.3, the negative effect of Excess Control gets decreased for 
high Managerial Ownership as predicted by H2(b); the interaction, however, is not 
significant. Figure 5.4 plots the moderation effect of Performance based Pay. The 
negative effect of Excess Control gets enhanced for high Performance based Pay as 
opposed to the prediction of H2(a) and the interaction again is not significant. Table 5.6 
presents significant results for a number of control variables. Firm Size has significant 
negative impact on firms’ valuation. But the measure of Firm Size has been natural log 
transformed across the entire analyses; hence, the value of coefficient is very low in 
absolute term. For globally-driven firms, crosslisitng in the foreign stock market and 
presence of foreign UCO show significant positive impact on firms’ valuation.  
According to the findings of Table 5.6, interactions between Excess Control and 
internal mechanisms are not significant for the full sample. It is, therefore, critical 
examine whether the country level external institutions produce three-way interaction in 
influencing the firm level CG. Table 5.7 and Table 5.8 incorporate the measures of 
countries’ legal and disclosure institutions respectively to illustrate the combined effect 
of external institution and internal mechanisms. In Table 5.7, the dataset is split between 
firms from countries with weak legal institution vs. strong legal institution. Similarly, in  
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Figure 5.3: Interaction plot for the moderation effect of Managerial Ownership on 
the negative relationship between Excess Control and Minority Shareholder Wealth 
(i.e. Tobin’s Q) using OLS regression with Huber-White robust errors 
 
 
Figure 5.4: Interaction plot for the moderation effect of Performance based Pay on 
the negative relationship between Excess Control and Minority Shareholder Wealth 
(i.e. Tobin’s Q) using OLS regression with Huber-White robust errors 
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Table 5.8, the dataset is divided between firms from countries with weak disclosure 
standard vs. strong disclosure standard. The effect of Excess Control on Minority 
Shareholder Wealth (i.e. Tobin’s Q) remains negative and significant across all the 
models of both the sub-samples. Hence, P-P conflict is evident in the concentrated firms 
from countries with weak external institutions as well as countries with strong external 
institutions.  
Hypotheses 3(a) and 3(b) predict that the negative effect of Excess Control on 
Minority Shareholder Wealth (i.e. Tobin’s Q) is attenuated by Monitoring CG and 
Incentive CG and the degree of attenuation increases with the quality of legal institution 
and disclosure standard. That is, the first condition to support H3(a) and H3(b) requires 
that the interactions between Excess Control and internal mechanisms have to be positive 
and significant in the entire analyses. The rejection of H2(a) and H2(b) by the results of 
Table 5.6 already sets the back drop to reject H3(a) and H3(b). Additionally, Table 5.7 
shows that the interactions are insignificant not only for the sub-sample of weak legal 
institution but also for the sub-sample of strong legal institution. Table 5.8 presents 
similar results of insignificant interaction for the sub-samples of weak and strong 
disclosure institution. Therefore, H3(a) and H3(b) are rejected.  
Hypotheses 4(a) and 4(b) predict that the negative effect of Excess Control on 
Minority Shareholder Wealth (i.e. Tobin’s Q) is attenuated by Monitoring CG and 
Incentive CG when such internal mechanisms are implemented by stronger legal and 
disclosure institutions. In sum, H4(a) and H4(b) require positive interactions between 
Excess Control and internal mechanisms specifically in the context with strong external 
institutions. As discussed above, the interactions are insignificant across the entire  
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Table 5.7: OLS Regression with Mean-Centered Interactions & Huber-White Robust Errors for Legal Institution 
DV Tobin's Q Model 1 Model 2 Model 3c Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8d Model 9 Model 10
Excess Control (EC)a -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.016 -0.020*** -0.028*** -0.030*** -0.030*** -0.015 -0.031*** -0.034***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.013) (0.006) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.008)
Board Independencea 0.003 -0.004
(0.003) (0.003)
EC*Board Independence -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
CEO-Separation 0.250** 0.089
(0.125) (0.159)
EC*CEO-Separation -0.005 -0.019
(0.015) (0.013)
Managerial Ownershipa -0.004 -0.004
(0.004) (0.004)
EC*Managerial Ownership -0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.000)
Performance based Paya 0.007*** 0.012***
(0.003) (0.003)
EC*Performance based Pay 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Firm Age 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Firm Sizeb -0.145*** -0.147*** -0.148*** -0.152*** -0.269*** -0.188*** -0.189*** -0.185*** -0.193*** -0.248***
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.040) (0.085) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.036) (0.049)
Firm Profit 3.025** 3.040** 2.986** 2.917** 2.840* 0.180 0.204 0.189 0.198 0.101
(1.216) (1.185) (1.213) (1.224) (1.653) (0.624) (0.618) (0.624) (0.623) (0.621)
Firm Growth 0.036 0.040 0.042 0.028 0.351 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.081) (0.082) (0.076) (0.090) (0.319) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Context with Weak Legal Institution Context with Strong Legal Institution
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Crosslisting 0.319** 0.280* 0.310** 0.345** 0.316 0.476*** 0.505*** 0.452*** 0.456*** 0.265
(0.142) (0.152) (0.140) (0.143) (0.262) (0.148) (0.147) (0.161) (0.153) (0.232)
UCO Foreign 0.408*** 0.408*** 0.376** 0.379** 0.696** 0.327* 0.317* 0.325* 0.314* 0.361*
(0.153) (0.153) (0.154) (0.152) (0.282) (0.173) (0.173) (0.173) (0.174) (0.201)
UCO Family -0.509 -0.531 -0.474 -0.480 -2.584 -0.437 -0.439 -0.393 -0.381 -0.156
(1.131) (1.136) (1.137) (1.144) (1.956) (0.332) (0.321) (0.335) (0.331) (0.379)
UCO State -0.578 -0.577 -0.572 -0.567 -2.315 -0.558 -0.556 -0.505 -0.536 -0.183
(1.127) (1.131) (1.133) (1.138) (1.983) (0.353) (0.341) (0.355) (0.350) (0.415)
UCO Financial Institution -0.730 -0.755 -0.692 -0.717 -2.870 -0.418 -0.428 -0.383 -0.411 -0.110
(1.138) (1.142) (1.144) (1.149) (1.960) (0.365) (0.354) (0.368) (0.363) (0.451)
UCO Corporation -0.462 -0.505 -0.447 -0.461 -2.523 0.048 0.049 0.093 0.068 0.456
(1.146) (1.154) (1.151) (1.156) (1.976) (0.422) (0.413) (0.427) (0.421) (0.487)
Industry yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 4.377*** 4.424*** 4.214*** 4.497*** 8.785*** 4.451*** 4.419*** 4.336*** 4.568*** 5.745***
(1.429) (1.430) (1.416) (1.434) (2.458) (0.823) (0.812) (0.847) (0.815) (1.022)
Observations 422 422 422 422 214 687 687 687 687 536
R-squared 0.165 0.172 0.171 0.171 0.236 0.135 0.137 0.137 0.137 0.149
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
a. Continuous variables of the interaction terms are mean-centered; b. measure is natural log transformed 
c. At CEO-Separation = 1, β3 = -0.021 with robust st. error = 0.007 and p<0.01 
d. At CEO-Separation = 1, β3 = -0.034 with robust st. error = 0.008 and p<0.01 
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Table 5.8: OLS Regression with Mean-Centered Interactions & Huber-White Robust Errors for Disclosure Standard  
DV Tobin's Q Model 1 Model 2 Model 3c Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8d Model 9 Model 10
Excess Control (EC)a -0.020*** -0.021*** -0.006 -0.022*** -0.036*** -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.014 -0.028*** -0.030***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.014) (0.007) (0.012) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.007)
Board Independencea -0.001 0.002
(0.003) (0.003)
EC*Board Independence -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
CEO-Separation 0.186 0.139
(0.134) (0.135)
EC*CEO-Separation -0.018 -0.018
(0.017) (0.012)
Managerial Ownershipa -0.007** -0.002
(0.003) (0.004)
EC*Managerial Ownership 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Performance based Paya 0.008 0.010***
(0.005) (0.003)
EC*Performance based Pay -0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.000)
Firm Age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Firm Sizeb -0.190*** -0.194*** -0.192*** -0.200*** -0.383*** -0.176*** -0.177*** -0.173*** -0.178*** -0.222***
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.043) (0.103) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.045)
Firm Profit 4.529*** 4.531*** 4.509*** 4.485*** 4.880*** 0.114 0.112 0.123 0.118 0.055
(1.616) (1.596) (1.596) (1.600) (1.829) (0.608) (0.607) (0.607) (0.607) (0.611)
Firm Growth 0.052*** 0.052*** 0.052*** 0.052*** 0.048*** -0.000* -0.000* -0.000** -0.000* -0.000
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Context with Weak Disclosure Standard Context with Strong Disclosure Standard
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Crosslisting 0.650*** 0.660*** 0.625*** 0.600*** 1.082** 0.313** 0.302** 0.291** 0.312** 0.073
(0.191) (0.204) (0.187) (0.187) (0.470) (0.126) (0.127) (0.130) (0.127) (0.183)
UCO Foreign 0.404** 0.386* 0.384* 0.345* 0.706** 0.365** 0.361** 0.359** 0.356** 0.415**
(0.198) (0.199) (0.196) (0.204) (0.329) (0.156) (0.157) (0.156) (0.158) (0.186)
UCO Family -0.778 -0.822 -0.730 -0.706 -2.226 -0.434 -0.423 -0.382 -0.413 -0.315
(1.298) (1.287) (1.314) (1.309) (1.745) (0.317) (0.317) (0.318) (0.319) (0.370)
UCO State -0.524 -0.531 -0.480 -0.543 -1.635 -0.734** -0.719** -0.698** -0.732** -0.469
(1.294) (1.279) (1.311) (1.303) (1.793) (0.328) (0.328) (0.326) (0.327) (0.393)
UCO Financial Institution -0.875 -0.920 -0.801 -0.890 -2.280 -0.433 -0.423 -0.398 -0.431 -0.251
(1.294) (1.284) (1.312) (1.304) (1.758) (0.348) (0.349) (0.349) (0.349) (0.427)
UCO Corporation -0.453 -0.521 -0.397 -0.477 -1.565 -0.026 -0.019 0.019 -0.021 0.201
(1.348) (1.342) (1.366) (1.359) (1.820) (0.393) (0.392) (0.393) (0.394) (0.459)
Industry yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 5.393*** 5.511*** 5.237*** 5.644*** 10.277*** 4.496*** 4.518*** 4.335*** 4.537*** 5.597***
(1.656) (1.656) (1.659) (1.689) (2.552) (0.743) (0.742) (0.754) (0.727) (0.945)
Observations 306 306 306 306 145 803 803 803 803 605
R-squared 0.294 0.299 0.300 0.304 0.417 0.117 0.118 0.120 0.117 0.131
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
a. Continuous variables of the interaction terms are mean-centered; b. measure is natural log transformed 
c. At CEO-Separation = 1,	β3 = -0.024 with robust st. error = 0.008 and p<0.01 
d. At CEO-Separation = 1, β3 = -0.031 with robust st. error = 0.007 and p<0.01
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analyses. Particularly, the mechanisms of internal CG cannot attenuate the negative effect 
of Excess Control even in the context with stronger legal institution and disclosure 
standard. Hence, H4(a) and H4(b) are rejected.  
 In sum, empirical findings of the current study consistently show significant 
negative effect of Excess Control on Minority Shareholder Wealth (i.e. Tobin’s Q). Such 
findings indicate presence of P-P conflict in the concentrated firms from both countries 
with weak external institutions as well as countries with strong external institutions. 
Findings are also consistent in depicting insignificant interactions between Excess 
Control and internal CG mechanisms in firms across all the contexts. Table 5.6 shows 
insignificant interactions for the full sample; Table 5.7 shows insignificant interactions 
for the sub-samples incorporating countries’ legal institution; and finally, Table 5.8 
shows insignificant interactions for the sub-samples incorporating countries’ disclosure 
standard. Interaction plots for Table 5.7 and Table 5.8 are provided in Appendix B 
(Figure B.1 – Figure B.16). 
 In terms of impacting firms’ valuation, CEO-Separation shows significant 
positive effect for firms from the countries with weak legal institution. Also, Performance 
based Pay shows significant positive effect for firms from the countries with weak and 
strong legal institution and for firms from the countries with strong disclosure institution. 
Across the sub-samples, crosslisting in the foreign stock market and presence of foreign 
UCO consistently generate significant positive impact on firms’ valuation.  
5.5 Endogeneity Test 
 The scholars of corporate ownership argue that UCO’s excessive control can be 
endogenously determined by firm size, firm profitability, and countries’ economic growth 
(Guedhami & Pittman, 2006). The current investigation has already been controlled for 
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these firm and country level attributes. It can also be argued that firm’s internal 
governance acts as an antecedent to influence its ownership structure. To check for such 
endogeneity, I regressed Excess Control on the internal mechanisms of Monitoring CG 
and Incentive and the results show insignificant coefficients for all these measures.  
Finally, following the approach of Guedhami & Mishra (2009), I use the average 
value of expropriation in firms located in the same country as an alternative to obtain the 
fitted value of Excess Control. In the second stage, I apply this fitted value of Excess 
Control as the instrument to run OLS regressions on the full sample. Table 5.9 presents 
the results of endogeneity test. As shown in Model 1, the negative effect of fitted Excess 
Control on Minority Shareholder Wealth (i.e. Tobin’s Q) remains significant at 10% 
level. Additionally, the negative effect of Excess Control remains significant in Models 2, 
3, 5, 6, 8, and 9 and the interactions remain fairly same across all the models. Therefore, 
it can be concluded that endogeneity has not been a problem for the main analyses. 
5.5 Robustness Tests 
For robustness test of the hypotheses, I have run additional regressions with an 
alternative model of three-way interactions. The robustness tests also include analyses 
with alternative measures of Minority Shareholder Wealth, internal CG mechanisms, and 
external institutions. I have employed the Firm Value proxy of Market-to-Book for 
measuring Minority Shareholder Wealth, percentage of outside directors for measuring 
Minority Shareholder Wealth, percentage of outside directors for measuring Board 
Independence, percentage of CEOs’ cash-flow right for measuring Managerial 
Ownership, and CEOs’ total pay for measuring Performance based Pay. I have also 
incorporated the measure of CEO-Duality to examine the impact of board leadership
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Table 5.9: Endogeneity Test 
DV Tobin's Q Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5c Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
Fitted Excess Control (FEC)a -0.024* -0.029* -0.027* -0.023 -0.012 -0.026* -0.022 -0.069*** -0.072***
(0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.028) (0.015) (0.015) (0.022) (0.021)
Board Independencea 0.004* 0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
FEC*Board Independence -0.001
(0.001)
CEO-Separation 0.234** 0.170
(0.105) (0.106)
FEC*CEO-Separation -0.013
(0.032)
Managerial Ownershipa -0.004 -0.002
(0.003) (0.003)
FEC*Managerial Ownership -0.001*
(0.001)
Performance based Paya 0.011*** 0.011***
(0.002) (0.002)
FEC*Performance based Pay -0.001
(0.001)
Firm Age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Firm Sizeb -0.188*** -0.167*** -0.188*** -0.167*** -0.188*** -0.171*** -0.192*** -0.241*** -0.251***
(0.025) (0.023) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.034) (0.036)
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Firm Profit 0.417 0.391 0.412 0.406 0.419 0.417 0.411 0.251 0.249
(0.646) (0.647) (0.645) (0.640) (0.645) (0.641) (0.641) (0.642) (0.636)
Firm Growth 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Crosslisting 0.399*** 0.377*** 0.383*** 0.402*** 0.165
(0.102) (0.105) (0.103) (0.102) (0.163)
UCO Foreign 0.324** 0.324** 0.313** 0.310** 0.469***
(0.129) (0.129) (0.129) (0.130) (0.165)
UCO Identity yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 4.617*** 4.347*** 4.320*** 4.296*** 4.204*** 4.649*** 4.390*** 6.247*** 5.721***
(0.577) (0.563) (0.545) (0.552) (0.540) (0.562) (0.544) (0.789) (0.745)
Observations 1,109 1,109 1,109 1,109 1,109 1,109 1,109 750 750
R-squared 0.089 0.072 0.091 0.072 0.091 0.070 0.092 0.115 0.129  
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
a. In models with interaction, continuous variables are mean-centered; b. measure is natural log transformed 
c. At CEO-Separation = 1, β3 = -0.025 with robust st. error = 0.016 and p>0.1 
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structure through a different lens. Finally, for measuring the overall quality of countries’ 
public institutions, corporate transparency, and governance standard, I have utilized the 
index of Institution from the Global Competitiveness Report.        
5.5.1 Robustness Test with Alternative Model of Three-Way Interactions 
 For testing the three-way interaction among Excess Control, internal CG, and 
external CG, following alternative model has been employed to conduct robustness test. 
Yi = β0 + β1X1i + β2X2i + β3X3i + β4X1iX2i + β5X2iX3i + β6X1iX3i + β7X1iX2iX3i +βnCmi + εi                  (3)                                                                                                                              
Where: = 
Yi = Minority Shareholder Wealth for focal firm i 
β0 = the intercept of Yi  
β1 = the direct effect of X1i on Yi 
X1i = Excess Control by UCOs for focal firm i 
β2 = the direct effect of X2i on Yi 
X2i = Internal CG for focal firm i 
β3 = the direct effect of X3i on Yi 
X3i = External CG for focal firm i 
β4 = the two way interaction effect of X1i and X2i on Yi 
β5 = the two way interaction effect of X2i and X3i on Yi 
β6= the two way interaction effect of X1i and X3i on Yi 
β7= the three way interaction effect of X1i, X2i, and X3i on Yi 
βn = the direct effect of Cmi on Yi (where n = 8, 9, 10, ……) 
Cmi = vector of control variables for focal firm i (where m = 1, 2, 3, ……...)  
εi = the randomly varying unique error term contributed by firm i to β0 (where εi: N(0,σ2)) 
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Hypothesis 3(a) and 3(b) will be supported if the coefficient of two way 
interaction between Excess Control and internal CG is positive and significant (i.e., Ha: 
β4>0 in equation 3) and additionally, the coefficient of three way interaction among 
Excess Control, internal CG, and external CG is positive and significant (i.e., Ha: β7>0 in 
equation 3). Significant positive effect by the two way interaction term implies that 
negative effect of Excess Control on Minority Shareholder Wealth (β1<0) is attenuated by 
the internal CG. Moreover, significant positive effect by the three way interaction term 
implies that attenuation of negative effect (β1<0) is further enhanced when the internal 
CG is complemented by the external CG.   
Hypothesis 4(a) and 4(b) will be supported if the coefficient of two way 
interaction between Excess Control and internal CG is insignificant (i.e., Ha: β4≤0 in 
equation 3) but the coefficient of three way interaction among Excess Control, internal 
CG, and external CG is positive and significant (i.e., Ha: β7>0 in equation 3). Significant 
positive effect by the three way interaction term implies that negative effect of Excess 
Control on Minority Shareholder Wealth (β1<0) is attenuated by internal CG only when 
such firm level mechanisms are supported by necessary external CG.    
Rejection of H3(a), H3(b) and H4(a), H4(b) will indicate that the internal CG are 
not aligned with the intended goal of attenuating Excess Control’s negative effect and the 
external CG cannot moderate any firm level positive impact. Table 5.10 and Table 5.11 
summarize the results for legal institution and disclosure standard, respectively. 
Empirical findings are fairly similar across the analyses with sub-sampling technique and 
integrated model of three-way interactions. There is a significant negative relationship 
between Excess Control and Minority Shareholder Wealth (i.e. Tobin’s Q). However, the  
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Table 5.10: OLS of Three-Way Interactions for Legal Institution 
DV Tobin's Q Model 1 Model 2c Model 3 Model 4
Excess Control (EC)a -0.026*** -0.012 -0.026*** -0.032***
(0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006)
Legal Institutiona 0.571* 0.573 0.654** 0.500
(0.319) (0.463) (0.313) (0.445)
EC*Legal -0.020 -0.005 -0.021 0.009
(0.028) (0.049) (0.026) (0.042)
Board Independencea 0.001
(0.002)
EC*Board Independence -0.000
(0.000)
Board Independence*Legal -0.032**
(0.016)
EC*Board Independence*Legal 0.001
(0.002)
CEO-Separation 0.184*
(0.110)
EC*CEO-Separation -0.017*
(0.010)
CEO-Separation*Legal 0.030
(0.589)
EC*CEO-Separation*Legal -0.015
(0.058)
Managerial Ownershipa -0.004
(0.003)
EC*Managerial Ownership 0.000
(0.000)
Managerial Ownership*Legal -0.008
(0.014)
EC*Managerial Ownership*Legal 0.001
(0.001)
Performance based Paya 0.010***
(0.002)
EC*Performance based Pay -0.000
(0.000)
Performance based Pay*Legal 0.006
(0.013)
EC*Performance based Pay*Legal -0.001
(0.001)
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Firm Age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Firm Sizeb -0.164*** -0.160*** -0.167*** -0.243***
(0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.041)
Firm Profit 0.413 0.414 0.420 0.238
(0.626) (0.630) (0.629) (0.628)
Firm Growth -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Crosslisting 0.338*** 0.313*** 0.326*** 0.233
(0.111) (0.113) (0.112) (0.167)
UCO Foreign 0.368*** 0.363*** 0.352*** 0.466***
(0.131) (0.131) (0.132) (0.172)
UCO Family -0.432 -0.377 -0.377 -0.492
(0.380) (0.384) (0.380) (0.475)
UCO State -0.535 -0.513 -0.527 -0.535
(0.386) (0.389) (0.386) (0.490)
UCO Financial Institution -0.463 -0.425 -0.458 -0.500
(0.400) (0.403) (0.401) (0.520)
UCO Corporation -0.053 -0.007 -0.035 -0.033
(0.436) (0.440) (0.436) (0.551)
Industry yes yes yes yes
GDPGrowth yes yes yes yes
Constant 4.417*** 4.181*** 4.471*** 6.097***
(0.701) (0.718) (0.703) (0.958)
Observations 1,109 1,109 1,109 750
R-squared 0.121 0.121 0.120 0.142  
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
a. Continuous variables of the interaction terms are mean-centered; b. measure is natural log transformed 
c. At CEO-Separation = 1, β3 = -0.029 with robust st. error = 0.006 and p<0.01 
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Table 5.11: OLS of Three-Way Interactions for Disclosure Standard 
DV Tobin's Q Model 1 Model 2c Model 3 Model 4
Excess Control (EC)a -0.026*** -0.013 -0.026*** -0.031***
(0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006)
Legal Institutiona 0.224 0.775 0.210 -0.131
(0.315) (0.540) (0.317) (0.417)
EC*Legal -0.002 0.010 0.004 0.045
(0.029) (0.044) (0.028) (0.044)
Board Independencea 0.001
(0.002)
EC*Board Independence 0.000
(0.000)
Board Independence*Legal -0.018
(0.013)
EC*Board Independence*Legal 0.002
(0.001)
CEO-Separation 0.204*
(0.106)
EC*CEO-Separation -0.016*
(0.010)
CEO-Separation*Legal -0.686
(0.641)
EC*CEO-Separation*Legal -0.011
(0.055)
Managerial Ownershipa -0.004
(0.003)
EC*Managerial Ownership 0.000
(0.000)
Managerial Ownership*Legal 0.015
(0.014)
EC*Managerial Ownership*Legal 0.000
(0.001)
Performance based Paya 0.010***
(0.002)
EC*Performance based Pay -0.000
(0.000)
Performance based Pay*Legal -0.023
(0.015)
EC*Performance based Pay*Legal 0.001
(0.001)
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Firm Age 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Firm Sizeb -0.166*** -0.161*** -0.168*** -0.241***
(0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.042)
Firm Profit 0.405 0.404 0.405 0.250
(0.623) (0.628) (0.627) (0.624)
Firm Growth -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Crosslisting 0.349*** 0.327*** 0.348*** 0.236
(0.114) (0.115) (0.115) (0.172)
UCO Foreign 0.392*** 0.383*** 0.375*** 0.485***
(0.133) (0.132) (0.134) (0.171)
UCO Family -0.452 -0.406 -0.419 -0.637
(0.379) (0.387) (0.386) (0.481)
UCO State -0.595 -0.567 -0.609 -0.717
(0.384) (0.391) (0.390) (0.499)
UCO Financial Institution -0.492 -0.444 -0.506 -0.641
(0.401) (0.407) (0.406) (0.528)
UCO Corporation -0.076 -0.026 -0.073 -0.188
(0.433) (0.440) (0.438) (0.549)
Industry yes yes yes yes
GDPGrowth yes yes yes yes
Constant 4.459*** 4.209*** 4.532*** 6.173***
(0.703) (0.717) (0.711) (0.966)
Observations 1,109 1,109 1,109 750
R-squared 0.117 0.119 0.117 0.144  
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
a. Continuous variables of the interaction terms are mean-centered; b. measure is natural log transformed 
c. At CEO-Separation = 1, β3 = -0.029 with robust st. error = 0.006 and p<0.01 
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two-way interactions between Excess Control and internal CG and the three-way 
interactions among Excess Control, internal CG, and external CG remain insignificant.    
5.5.2 Robustness Test with Alternative Measure of Minority Shareholder Wealth 
 Table 5.12, Table 5.13, and Table 5.14 present the results for Market-to-Book 
(MTB). The findings are mostly consistent in showing significant negative effect by 
Excess Control on Minority Shareholder Wealth (i.e. MTB). Table 5.12 is developed for 
the full sample, which shows positive and significant effect by CEO-Separation and 
Performance based Pay on MTB. The interaction effects remain insignificant for all the 
internal mechanisms. Table 5.13 depicts the results for MTB on the sub-samples of legal 
institution and Table 5.14 depicts the results for MTB on the sub-samples of disclosure 
standard. Again, the interaction effects are insignificant. Similar to the previous analyses, 
Crosslisting and Foreign UCOs show positive and significant effect on Minority 
Shareholder Wealth (i.e. MTB).  
5.5.3 Robustness Test with Alternative Measures of Internal CG 
 Table 5.15, Table 5.16, and Table 5.17 summarize the results of regression 
analyses that incorporate the alternative measures of internal mechanisms. Tables 5.15 
presents the results for full sample and according to its findings, CEO-Duality positively 
and significantly attenuates the negative effect of Excess Control. In specific terms, the 
negative effect on Minority Shareholder Wealth for a percentage increase in Excess 
Control gets decreased by 0.018 when there is CEO-Duality. The interaction effects are 
insignificant for other alternative internal CG. Table 5.16 and Table 5.17 depict the 
results for legal institution and disclosure standard respectively. CEO-Duality and 
Managerial Cash Ownership show negative and significant effect on Minority
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Table 5.12: OLS Regression with Mean-Centered Interactions & Huber-White Robust Errors (Market-to-Book) 
DV Market-to-Book Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5c Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
Excess Control (EC)a -0.040*** -0.035*** -0.040*** -0.037*** -0.038 -0.037*** -0.042*** -0.053*** -0.057***
(0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.024) (0.014) (0.014) (0.017) (0.017)
Board Independencea -0.000 -0.002
(0.010) (0.011)
EC*Board Independence -0.000
(0.001)
CEO-Separation 1.390*** 1.262**
(0.509) (0.531)
EC*CEO-Separation -0.005
(0.026)
Managerial Ownershipa -0.015 -0.011
(0.010) (0.012)
EC*Managerial Ownership -0.000
(0.001)
Performance based Paya 0.023** 0.021**
(0.009) (0.009)
EC*Performance based Pay 0.000
(0.001)
Firm Age 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.006*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Firm Sizeb -0.293*** -0.271*** -0.292*** -0.277*** -0.292*** -0.296*** -0.310*** -0.461*** -0.497***
(0.113) (0.096) (0.113) (0.095) (0.112) (0.094) (0.108) (0.145) (0.172)
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Firm Profit 3.748 3.696 3.747 3.692 3.745 3.740 3.772 3.515 3.533
(2.638) (2.612) (2.638) (2.615) (2.633) (2.626) (2.645) (2.758) (2.804)
Firm Growth 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Crosslisting 0.451 0.471 0.334 0.439 0.604
(0.451) (0.477) (0.469) (0.454) (0.689)
UCO Foreign 1.291** 1.293** 1.222** 1.233** 1.308*
(0.529) (0.530) (0.518) (0.533) (0.683)
UCO Identity yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 7.395*** 7.298*** 6.836*** 6.572*** 6.130** 8.156*** 7.341*** 10.229*** 10.331***
(2.546) (2.405) (2.589) (2.431) (2.712) (2.244) (2.430) (3.545) (3.708)
Observations 1,109 1,109 1,109 1,109 1,109 1,109 1,109 750 750
R-squared 0.040 0.031 0.041 0.039 0.047 0.033 0.041 0.046 0.053  
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
a. In models with interaction, continuous variables are mean-centered; b. measure is natural log transformed 
c. At CEO-Separation = 1, β3 = -0.043 with robust st. error = 0.015 and p<0.01 
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Table 5.13: OLS Regression with Mean-Centered Interactions & Huber-White Robust Errors for Legal Institution (MTB) 
DV Market-to-Book Model 1 Model 2 Model 3c Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8d Model 9 Model 10
Excess Control (EC)a -0.009 -0.017 -0.033 -0.006 -0.023 -0.062*** -0.063*** -0.045 -0.064*** -0.071***
(0.020) (0.017) (0.028) (0.022) (0.033) (0.018) (0.018) (0.028) (0.018) (0.020)
Board Independencea -0.031 -0.002
(0.025) (0.010)
EC*Board Independence -0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.001)
CEO-Separation 0.542 1.427*
(0.490) (0.831)
EC*CEO-Separation 0.028 -0.022
(0.038) (0.032)
Managerial Ownershipa 0.012 -0.025
(0.015) (0.016)
EC*Managerial Ownership 0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Performance based Paya -0.001 0.030**
(0.011) (0.014)
EC*Performance based Pay 0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Firm Age -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.006** 0.006** 0.005* 0.006** 0.005*
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Context with Weak Legal Institution Context with Strong Legal Institution
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Firm Sizeb -0.251** -0.229** -0.257** -0.226* -0.454 -0.353** -0.356** -0.332** -0.384** -0.526**
(0.122) (0.110) (0.127) (0.115) (0.302) (0.164) (0.164) (0.168) (0.158) (0.211)
Firm Profit 1.204 1.017 1.121 1.410 0.966 3.873 3.896 3.915 3.967 3.639
(11.633) (11.578) (11.700) (11.517) (18.298) (2.775) (2.783) (2.790) (2.801) (2.853)
Firm Growth 0.195 0.225 0.181 0.158 0.534 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.327) (0.355) (0.320) (0.349) (0.615) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Crosslisting 0.666 0.895 0.661 0.650 1.197 0.839 0.842 0.525 0.748 0.661
(0.713) (0.862) (0.707) (0.683) (0.952) (0.606) (0.619) (0.733) (0.645) (0.951)
UCO Foreign 2.081* 2.061* 2.035* 2.157* 2.781 0.776 0.769 0.737 0.654 0.700
(1.140) (1.110) (1.117) (1.175) (1.858) (0.572) (0.568) (0.562) (0.537) (0.670)
UCO Identity yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 7.991** 7.575** 7.711** 7.308** 11.759 6.487* 6.513* 5.551 7.441** 10.080**
(3.683) (3.385) (3.544) (3.496) (7.947) (3.579) (3.602) (3.842) (3.388) (4.398)
Observations 422 422 422 422 214 687 687 687 687 536
R-squared 0.044 0.056 0.045 0.045 0.059 0.060 0.061 0.067 0.064 0.070  
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
a. Continuous variables of the interaction terms are mean-centered; b. measure is natural log transformed 
c. At CEO-Separation = 1, β3 = -0.005 with robust st. error = 0.024 and p>0.1 
d. At CEO-Separation = 1, β3 = -0.067 with robust st. error = 0.020 and p<0.01 
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Table 5.14: OLS Regression with Mean-Centered Interactions & Huber-White Robust Errors for Disclosure Standard (MTB) 
DV Market-to-Book Model 1 Model 2 Model 3c Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8d Model 9 Model 10
Excess Control (EC)a -0.013 -0.019 -0.008 -0.004 -0.014 -0.052*** -0.052*** -0.046* -0.054*** -0.068***
(0.022) (0.021) (0.033) (0.029) (0.044) (0.017) (0.018) (0.028) (0.017) (0.019)
Board Independencea -0.035 0.011
(0.024) (0.010)
EC*Board Independence -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
CEO-Separation 0.483 1.310*
(0.546) (0.670)
EC*CEO-Separation -0.007 -0.009
(0.042) (0.031)
Managerial Ownershipa 0.018 -0.018
(0.029) (0.013)
EC*Managerial Ownership 0.002 -0.001
(0.002) (0.001)
Performance based Paya -0.006 0.024**
(0.019) (0.011)
EC*Performance based Pay 0.001 0.000
(0.002) (0.001)
Firm Age -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 0.000 0.008** 0.008** 0.008** 0.008** 0.007**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.009) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Context with Weak Disclosure Standard Context with Strong Disclosure Standard
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Firm Sizeb -0.332*** -0.316*** -0.336*** -0.311*** -0.610** -0.325** -0.323** -0.312** -0.349** -0.480**
(0.106) (0.104) (0.108) (0.100) (0.266) (0.147) (0.148) (0.149) (0.142) (0.195)
Firm Profit 3.315 3.255 3.260 3.411 4.746 3.795 3.749 3.813 3.832 3.529
(11.925) (11.719) (11.988) (11.798) (17.856) (2.723) (2.738) (2.726) (2.730) (2.809)
Firm Growth 0.028 0.038 0.027 0.029 0.027 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.045) (0.041) (0.046) (0.044) (0.076) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Crosslisting 1.271** 1.584** 1.216** 1.257* 2.900** 0.332 0.265 0.169 0.322 0.144
(0.640) (0.800) (0.616) (0.680) (1.206) (0.551) (0.556) (0.600) (0.556) (0.792)
UCO Foreign 1.844 1.752 1.814 1.906 3.072 1.018* 1.020* 0.952* 0.926* 0.950
(1.356) (1.269) (1.350) (1.452) (2.950) (0.522) (0.527) (0.511) (0.496) (0.613)
UCO Identity yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 9.550*** 9.325*** 9.234*** 9.089*** 13.068* 6.527** 6.588** 5.717* 7.187** 9.677**
(2.941) (2.859) (2.793) (2.428) (7.080) (3.217) (3.245) (3.415) (3.048) (4.078)
Observations 306 306 306 306 145 803 803 803 803 605
R-squared 0.054 0.072 0.055 0.059 0.086 0.049 0.050 0.056 0.052 0.061  
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
a. Continuous variables of the interaction terms are mean-centered; b. measure is natural log transformed  
c. At CEO-Separation = 1, β3 = -0.025 with robust st. error = 0.047 and p>0.01 
d. At CEO-Separation = 1, β3 = -0.071 with robust st. error = 0.022 and p<0.01 
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Table 5.15: OLS Regression with Mean-Centered Interactions & Huber-White Robust Errors (alternative internal CG) 
DV Tobin's Q Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
Excess Control (EC)a -0.025*** -0.024*** -0.025*** -0.024*** -0.028*** -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.027***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Board Outsidera 0.002 0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
EC*Board Outsider 0.000
(0.000)
CEO-Duality -0.274** -0.193*
(0.107) (0.106)
EC*CEO-Duality 0.018*
(0.010)
Cash Ownershipa -0.005 -0.004
(0.004) (0.004)
EC*Cash Ownership -0.000
(0.000)
Total Paya 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000)
EC*Total Pay -0.000
(0.000)
Firm Age 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Firm Sizeb -0.176*** -0.155*** -0.176*** -0.156*** -0.175*** -0.162*** -0.180*** -0.214*** -0.234***
(0.025) (0.023) (0.025) (0.023) (0.025) (0.023) (0.025) (0.031) (0.034)
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Firm Profit 0.408 0.402 0.412 0.394 0.414 0.409 0.415 0.295 0.298
(0.634) (0.632) (0.633) (0.630) (0.632) (0.631) (0.633) (0.620) (0.618)
Firm Growth -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Crosslisting 0.375*** 0.372*** 0.352*** 0.372*** 0.308**
(0.101) (0.103) (0.103) (0.103) (0.143)
UCO Foreign 0.384*** 0.384*** 0.373*** 0.372*** 0.461***
(0.131) (0.131) (0.131) (0.133) (0.159)
UCO Identity yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 4.387*** 4.078*** 4.069*** 4.353*** 4.143*** 4.455*** 4.170*** 5.416*** 5.279***
(0.543) (0.536) (0.538) (0.530) (0.540) (0.522) (0.535) (0.690) (0.716)
Observations 1,109 1,109 1,109 1,109 1,109 1,109 1,109 848 848
R-squared 0.109 0.087 0.109 0.091 0.113 0.089 0.109 0.104 0.121  
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
a. In models with interaction, continuous variables are mean-centered; b. measure is natural log transformed 
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Table 5.16: OLS Regression with Mean-Centered Interactions & Huber-White Robust Errors for Legal Inst. (alt. int. CG) 
DV Tobin's Q Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
Excess Control (EC)a -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.020*** -0.021*** -0.018** -0.030*** -0.030*** -0.034*** -0.031*** -0.033***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Board Outsidera -0.003 0.001
(0.004) (0.003)
EC*Board Outsider 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
CEO-Duality -0.258** -0.085
(0.125) (0.158)
EC*CEO-Duality 0.004 0.020
(0.015) (0.013)
Cash Ownershipa -0.008* -0.002
(0.005) (0.006)
EC*Cash Ownership -0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Total Paya 0.000** 0.000**
(0.000) (0.000)
EC*Total Pay 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Firm Age 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Context with Weak Legal Institution Context with Strong Legal Institution
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Firm Sizeb -0.151*** -0.149*** -0.155*** -0.158*** -0.210*** -0.198*** -0.198*** -0.196*** -0.201*** -0.242***
(0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.037) (0.057) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.042)
Firm Profit 3.049** 3.047** 3.015** 2.938** 2.811* 0.196 0.200 0.205 0.207 0.182
(1.243) (1.250) (1.240) (1.252) (1.505) (0.625) (0.623) (0.625) (0.626) (0.612)
Firm Growth 0.038 0.040 0.043 0.018 0.413 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.079) (0.080) (0.075) (0.095) (0.288) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Crosslisting 0.318** 0.318** 0.310** 0.343** 0.273 0.469*** 0.460*** 0.446*** 0.457*** 0.315
(0.140) (0.141) (0.138) (0.140) (0.205) (0.148) (0.160) (0.161) (0.154) (0.203)
UCO Foreign 0.406** 0.412** 0.377** 0.381** 0.506** 0.301* 0.302* 0.302* 0.293* 0.387*
(0.162) (0.162) (0.163) (0.162) (0.233) (0.172) (0.172) (0.171) (0.173) (0.197)
UCO Identity yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 3.971*** 3.917*** 4.123*** 4.106*** 5.141*** 4.067*** 4.069*** 4.082*** 4.167*** 5.219***
(0.833) (0.846) (0.868) (0.847) (1.272) (0.712) (0.712) (0.709) (0.704) (0.904)
Observations 422 422 422 422 283 687 687 687 687 565
R-squared 0.160 0.162 0.167 0.170 0.163 0.131 0.131 0.133 0.132 0.136
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
a. Continuous variables of the interaction terms are mean-centered; b. measure is natural log transformed 
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Table 5.17: OLS Regression with Mean-Centered Interactions & Huber-White Robust Errors for Disclosure Std. (alt. int. CG) 
DV Tobin's Q Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
Excess Control (EC)a -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.025*** -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.031*** -0.027*** -0.029***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
Board Outsidera -0.004 0.003
(0.004) (0.003)
EC*Board Outsider 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
CEO-Duality -0.218 -0.118
(0.134) (0.135)
EC*CEO-Duality 0.019 0.017
(0.017) (0.012)
Cash Ownershipa -0.012** 0.000
(0.005) (0.005)
EC*Cash Ownership -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.001)
Total Paya 0.000** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000)
EC*Total Pay 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Firm Age 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Context with Weak Disclosure Standard Context with Strong Disclosure Standard
 
 
		
126	
Firm Sizeb -0.181*** -0.178*** -0.184*** -0.198*** -0.272*** -0.195*** -0.192*** -0.193*** -0.194*** -0.203***
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.040) (0.072) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.031) (0.035)
Firm Profit 4.515*** 4.467*** 4.489*** 4.496*** 3.291** 0.131 0.139 0.140 0.127 -0.034
(1.629) (1.638) (1.605) (1.617) (1.414) (0.608) (0.606) (0.607) (0.609) (0.632)
Firm Growth 0.052*** 0.053*** 0.052*** 0.052*** 0.047*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000* -0.000 -0.000
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Crosslisting 0.633*** 0.634*** 0.606*** 0.577*** 0.895*** 0.300** 0.274** 0.279** 0.304** 0.226
(0.182) (0.183) (0.178) (0.176) (0.319) (0.126) (0.136) (0.130) (0.128) (0.150)
UCO Foreign 0.384* 0.389* 0.363* 0.326 0.411 0.341** 0.341** 0.337** 0.342** 0.547***
(0.198) (0.199) (0.196) (0.204) (0.256) (0.156) (0.156) (0.155) (0.158) (0.191)
UCO Identity yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 4.374*** 4.311*** 4.466*** 4.863*** 5.982*** 4.262*** 4.262*** 4.301*** 4.223*** 4.502***
(0.775) (0.780) (0.778) (0.871) (1.416) (0.668) (0.668) (0.669) (0.643) (0.786)
Observations 306 306 306 306 300 803 803 803 803 523
R-squared 0.286 0.289 0.293 0.297 0.218 0.110 0.110 0.112 0.110 0.134  
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
a. Continuous variables of the interaction terms are mean-centered; b. measure is natural log transformed 
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Shareholder Wealth in the sub-sample of weak legal institution and Managerial Cash 
Ownership shows negative and significant effect on Minority Shareholder Wealth in the 
sub-sample of weak disclosure institution. Managerial Total Pay shows positive and 
significant effect on Minority Shareholder Wealth across the entire analyses; however, 
the coefficient value is very low for total pay (β = 0.000). Most importantly, the 
interaction effects of the alternative internal CG do not show any significant positive 
effect across the analyses with legal and disclosure institutions.         
5.5.4 Robustness Test with Alternative Measure of External Institution 
 Table 5.18 ranks the 40 countries based on the quality of their overall institutions 
(the index of Overall Institution is developed by the Global Competitiveness Report, 
2016)5. Table 5.19 presents the regression results for the sub-samples of overall 
institutions. The results are mostly similar to the main analyses. P-P conflict is present in 
both weak and strong contexts. Board Independence and CEO-Separation significantly 
improve Minority Shareholder Wealth in the weak context; whereas Performance based 
Pay is effective in both the contexts. Firms’ international orientation also remains to be 
beneficial. But interactions of the CG policies show no sign of significant positive impact 
in attenuating the P-P conflict.     
5.6 Ad-hoc Analyses: 
To extend the investigation of policy-related hypotheses, I ran a series of 
additional regressions incorporating relevant aspects of the CG literature. The ad-hoc 
analysis section starts with assessing the effectiveness of common CG policies in family 
vs. non-family firms, locally-listed vs. cross-listed firms, and domestic vs. foreign firms. 
Furthermore, I re-examined the policy-related hypotheses integrating a number of market 
and informal institutions. So far, the current study concentrated on analyzing the 
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‘moderating’ impact of external CG institutions. With a new model of regression, I 
incorporated an extended analysis to test the ‘direct’ impact of external CG institutions in 
addressing P-P conflict. Finally, I explored the presence of Multiple Blockholders as a 
potential internal CG to check on the UCOs.     
 
Table 5.18: Countries with Strong vs. Weak Overall Institution 
 
Countries in Strong Context Countries in Weak Context 
..1. Finland 21. Czech Republic 
..2. Singapore 22. Poland 
..3. Norway 23. India 
..4. Switzerland 24. Spain 
..5. Hong Kong SAR 25. Korea, Rep. 
..6. Netherlands 26. Turkey 
..7. Sweden 27. Philippines 
..8. Japan 28. Greece 
..9. Denmark 29. Thailand 
10. Germany 30. Egypt 
11. Austria 31. Russian Federation 
12. Belgium 32. Italy 
13. Malaysia 33. Bulgaria 
14. France 34. Mexico 
15. Chile 35. Colombia 
16. Jordan 36. Peru 
17. Portugal 37. Pakistan 
18. Israel 38. Brazil 
19. China 39. Bangladesh 
20. Indonesia 40. Argentina 
          
Source: World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Report, 2016 
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Table 5.19: OLS Regression with Mean-Centered Interactions & Huber-White Robust Errors for Alternative External Inst. 
DV Tobin's Q Model 1 Model 2 Model 3c Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8d Model 9 Model 10
Excess Control (EC)a -0.021*** -0.020*** -0.012 -0.021*** -0.034*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.018* -0.029*** -0.032***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.007) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.008)
Board Independencea 0.007* -0.002
(0.004) (0.003)
EC*Board Independence -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
CEO-Separation 0.217* 0.160
(0.122) (0.157)
EC*CEO-Separation -0.012 -0.013
(0.014) (0.013)
Managerial Ownershipa 0.000 -0.003
(0.004) (0.004)
EC*Managerial Ownership -0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.000)
Performance based Paya 0.011*** 0.009***
(0.003) (0.004)
EC*Performance based Pay 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Firm Age 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.006** 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Context with Weak Institution Context with Strong Institution
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Firm Sizeb -0.086** -0.093** -0.087** -0.084** -0.182*** -0.230*** -0.231*** -0.228*** -0.233*** -0.293***
(0.037) (0.038) (0.037) (0.041) (0.047) (0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.036) (0.051)
Firm Profit 5.827*** 5.804*** 5.803*** 5.833*** 0.621 -0.187 -0.174 -0.181 -0.175 -0.103
(1.532) (1.535) (1.530) (1.537) (1.509) (0.579) (0.574) (0.577) (0.579) (0.695)
Firm Growth 0.029 0.024 0.038 0.019 0.011 -0.000* -0.000* -0.000** -0.000** -0.000
(0.086) (0.086) (0.082) (0.090) (0.228) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Crosslisting 0.200 0.163 0.181 0.207 -0.094 0.528*** 0.536*** 0.512*** 0.514*** 0.555**
(0.152) (0.155) (0.152) (0.155) (0.220) (0.149) (0.150) (0.153) (0.153) (0.253)
UCO Foreign 0.509** 0.521*** 0.468** 0.509** 0.902*** 0.170 0.169 0.172 0.154 0.118
(0.199) (0.200) (0.198) (0.202) (0.304) (0.158) (0.158) (0.158) (0.157) (0.198)
UCO Identity yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 1.993** 2.179** 1.893** 1.929** 4.022*** 5.295*** 5.324*** 5.166*** 5.409*** 6.391***
(0.890) (0.910) (0.873) (0.964) (0.952) (0.720) (0.726) (0.730) (0.712) (1.019)
Observations 459 459 459 459 309 650 650 650 650 441
R-squared 0.262 0.269 0.267 0.263 0.192 0.141 0.142 0.143 0.142 0.156  
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
a. Continuous variables of the interaction terms are mean-centered; b. measure is natural log transformed 
c. At CEO-Separation = 1, β3 = -0.024 with robust st. error = 0.007 and p<0.01 
d. At CEO-Separation = 1, β3 = -0.031 with robust st. error = 0.007 and p<0.01
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5.6.1 Ad-hoc Analysis for Family Firms vs. Non-Family Firms 
 It is important to investigate the role of CG policies in governing the UCOs of 
family vs non-family firms. In contrast to the relatively distant UCOs of the non-family 
firms (state, financial institution, corporation, and other), family UCOs are closely 
involved in organizational governance and decision making (Carney et al., 2011; Chen & 
Nowland, 2010; Duran, Kostova, & van Essen, 2017). Table 5.20 summarizes the results 
of Family vs. Non-Family firms. Expropriation of Minority Shareholder Wealth is 
evident in both types of firms. Among the internal mechanisms, Performance based Pay 
significantly improves firms’ valuation. Also, presence of foreign UCOs is beneficial for 
firms’ valuation. Only the Family firms enhance their performance by cross-listing in the 
foreign stock markets. Interaction effects of the CG mechanisms are insignificant for the 
Family firms. In the Non-Family firms, interaction effects of CEO-Separation and 
Performance based Pay are significant but in the opposite direction.     
5.6.2 Ad-hoc Analysis for Locally-listed Firms vs. Cross-listed Firms 
 Globally driven firms operate in an environment where the external institutions 
are relatively advanced in implementing the firm level policies (Douma, George, & 
Kabeer, 2006; Ferris, Kim, & Noronha, 2009; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). If the internal 
CG mechanisms in their current design are aligned with mitigating the P-P conflict, then 
it is highly likely that the moderating impacts will be effective in the globally driven 
firms. For the ad-hoc analysis, I compare the concentrated firms that are listed in the 
domestic/local stock markets versus the ones that are cross-listed in the foreign stock 
markets. Cross-listed firms are exposed to the international institutional environment 
which subsequently requires higher governance standard (Cueto, 2013; Coffee, 2002); 
locally-listed firms often do not face such strict mandates.      
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Table 5.20: OLS Regression with Mean-Centered Interactions & Huber-White Robust Errors; Family vs. Non-Family Firms 
DV Tobin's Q Model 1 Model 2 Model 3c Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8d Model 9 Model 10
Excess Control (EC)a -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.019** -0.027*** -0.028*** -0.023*** -0.023*** 0.007 -0.024*** -0.035***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.017) (0.008) (0.010)
Board Independencea 0.005 0.001
(0.003) (0.003)
EC*Board Independence -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
CEO-Separation 0.184 0.227
(0.134) (0.155)
EC*CEO-Separation -0.010 -0.034*
(0.011) (0.018)
Managerial Ownershipa -0.004 -0.031***
(0.003) (0.012)
EC*Managerial Ownership 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.001)
Performance based Paya 0.011*** 0.009**
(0.003) (0.004)
EC*Performance based Pay 0.000 -0.001*
(0.000) (0.000)
Firm Age -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Family Firms Non-Family Firms
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Firm Sizeb -0.168*** -0.170*** -0.167*** -0.174*** -0.243*** -0.217*** -0.218*** -0.219*** -0.234*** -0.298***
(0.035) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034) (0.054) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.040) (0.051)
Firm Profit -0.273 -0.296 -0.269 -0.266 -0.392 4.706*** 4.714*** 4.672*** 4.718*** 5.339***
(0.592) (0.597) (0.590) (0.591) (0.583) (1.546) (1.552) (1.539) (1.527) (2.005)
Firm Growth -0.000 -0.000* -0.000* -0.000* -0.000 0.177*** 0.177*** 0.174*** 0.173*** 0.159**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.055) (0.055) (0.054) (0.055) (0.072)
Crosslisting 0.566*** 0.540*** 0.545*** 0.553*** 0.536** 0.234 0.225 0.204 0.212 -0.002
(0.135) (0.137) (0.136) (0.137) (0.208) (0.149) (0.155) (0.153) (0.149) (0.263)
UCO Foreign 0.315* 0.330** 0.297* 0.280* 0.412** 0.470** 0.471*** 0.456** 0.464** 0.484**
(0.161) (0.162) (0.162) (0.163) (0.203) (0.182) (0.181) (0.181) (0.181) (0.225)
Industry yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 3.955*** 3.991*** 3.832*** 4.119*** 5.391*** 5.118*** 5.145*** 4.986*** 5.489*** 7.110***
(0.720) (0.722) (0.717) (0.703) (1.073) (0.820) (0.818) (0.821) (0.886) (1.154)
Observations 650 650 650 650 434 459 459 459 459 316
R-squared 0.116 0.120 0.120 0.118 0.138 0.211 0.212 0.218 0.219 0.270  
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
a. Continuous variables of the interaction terms are mean-centered; b. measure is natural log transformed 
c. At CEO-Separation = 1, β3 = -0.029 with robust st. error = 0.007 and p<0.01 
d. At CEO-Separation = 1, β3 = -0.027 with robust st. error = 0.008 and p<0.01 
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Table 5.21 presents the findings of Locally-Listed vs. Cross-Listed firms. As the 
table shows, CEO-Separation significantly improves Locally-Listed firms’ efficiency and 
Performance based Pay is beneficial for both types of firms. Presence of Foreign UCOs is 
critical in improving performance in the Locally-Listed firms but not necessarily in the 
Cross-Listed firms. Interaction effects by the CG mechanisms are mostly insignificant. In 
the Locally-Listed firms, Performance based Pay shows significant impact in the opposite 
direction. In Appendix C, Table C.1 summarizes the results for firms that are cross-listed 
in the Anglo-Saxon stock market. CG mechanisms remain insignificant in attenuating the 
expropriation of minority shareholders even in such advanced environment.       
5.6.3 Ad-hoc Analysis for Domestic Firms vs. Foreign Firms 
 Concentrated firms are often owned by Foreign UCOs. To attain legitimacy in the 
international environment, these globally driven firms frequently need to comply with 
higher governance standard (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Perkins, Morck & Yeung, 2014; 
Sanders & Carpenter, 1998). Organizational culture of the Foreign firms also promote the 
adoption of standard CG measures (Kostova & Roth, 2002; Latterman, 2014). Given the 
recommended CG mechanisms are aligned with attenuating the P-P conflict, their (CG 
mechanisms) interactions more likely will be effective in the Foreign firms than in the 
Domestic firms.     
Table 5.22 shows the results for sub-samples split between Domestic vs. Foreign 
firms. CEO-Separation positively and significantly impacts Minority Shareholder Wealth 
in the Domestic firms. In this regard, Performance based Pay is beneficial for both types 
of firms. Crosslisting in the foreign market is an effective mechanism for the Domestic 
firms in enhancing their market valuation; however, for the Foreign firms, Crosslisting is 
a redundancy. The interaction effects of the CG mechanisms are insignificant in the
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Table 5.21: OLS Regression with Mean-Centered Interactions & Huber-White Robust Errors; Locally vs. Cross Listed Firms 
DV Tobin's Q Model 1 Model 2 Model 3c Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8d Model 9 Model 10
Excess Control (EC)a -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.012 -0.025*** -0.033*** -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.014 -0.027*** -0.030***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.011) (0.007) (0.007) (0.013) (0.007) (0.007)
Board Independencea 0.001 0.002
(0.004) (0.003)
EC*Board Independence -0.001 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
CEO-Separation 0.288** 0.083
(0.112) (0.191)
EC*CEO-Separation -0.017 -0.015
(0.013) (0.015)
Managerial Ownershipa -0.002 -0.003
(0.004) (0.004)
EC*Managerial Ownership 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Performance based Paya 0.014*** 0.009***
(0.005) (0.003)
EC*Performance based Pay -0.001** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Firm Age -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Locally-Listed Firms Cross-Listed Firms
 
 
		
136	
Firm Sizeb -0.108*** -0.107*** -0.110*** -0.112*** -0.166*** -0.221*** -0.222*** -0.219*** -0.225*** -0.282***
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.050) (0.040) (0.040) (0.039) (0.039) (0.050)
Firm Profit -0.151 -0.183 -0.134 -0.137 -0.746 0.563 0.558 0.567 0.567 0.473
(1.406) (1.413) (1.397) (1.405) (1.219) (0.491) (0.494) (0.493) (0.490) (0.504)
Firm Growth 0.019 0.021 0.022 0.021 0.017* -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
UCO Foreign 0.668*** 0.689*** 0.642*** 0.659*** 1.150*** 0.158 0.159 0.157 0.140 0.093
(0.235) (0.238) (0.232) (0.239) (0.361) (0.139) (0.139) (0.138) (0.139) (0.155)
UCO Identity yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 2.616*** 2.602*** 2.485*** 2.737*** 3.273*** 5.644*** 5.661*** 5.554*** 5.759*** 7.044***
(0.750) (0.745) (0.735) (0.769) (1.009) (0.892) (0.897) (0.924) (0.862) (1.124)
Observations 548 548 548 548 284 561 561 561 561 466
R-squared 0.125 0.128 0.132 0.125 0.195 0.137 0.139 0.139 0.138 0.162  
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
a. Continuous variables of the interaction terms are mean-centered; b. measure is natural log transformed 
c. At CEO-Separation = 1, β3 = -0.029 with robust st. error = 0.009 and p<0.01 
d. At CEO-Separation = 1, β3 = -0.029 with robust st. error = 0.007 and p<0.01
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Table 5.22: OLS Regression with Mean-Centered Interactions & Huber-White Robust Errors; Domestic vs. Foreign Firms 
DV Tobin's Q Model 1 Model 2 Model 3c Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8d Model 9 Model 10
Excess Control (EC)a -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.015* -0.024*** -0.028*** -0.032*** -0.031** 0.009 -0.024** -0.039***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.005) (0.007) (0.012) (0.012) (0.019) (0.012) (0.013)
Board Independencea 0.003 -0.004
(0.002) (0.006)
EC*Board Independence 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.001)
CEO-Separation 0.200* -0.009
(0.117) (0.271)
EC*CEO-Separation -0.011 -0.045**
(0.011) (0.023)
Managerial Ownershipa -0.004 0.010
(0.003) (0.016)
EC*Managerial Ownership -0.000 0.005**
(0.000) (0.002)
Performance based Paya 0.009*** 0.018***
(0.002) (0.006)
EC*Performance based Pay 0.000 -0.001**
(0.000) (0.000)
Firm Age -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.006**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Firms with Domestic UCOs Firms with Foreign UCOs
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Firm Sizeb -0.159*** -0.160*** -0.160*** -0.166*** -0.217*** -0.197*** -0.195*** -0.200*** -0.195*** -0.321***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.046) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.058)
Firm Profit 0.331 0.318 0.328 0.337 0.170 0.414 0.410 0.451 0.367 0.276
(0.500) (0.500) (0.496) (0.497) (0.494) (2.483) (2.483) (2.516) (2.457) (2.359)
Firm Growth -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000* 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.044*** 0.045*** 0.038***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Crosslisting 0.451*** 0.434*** 0.430*** 0.448*** 0.394** 0.193 0.232 0.208 0.147 -0.379
(0.110) (0.113) (0.110) (0.110) (0.178) (0.266) (0.258) (0.272) (0.270) (0.465)
UCO Identity yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 3.802*** 3.818*** 3.709*** 3.988*** 4.942*** 4.581*** 4.513*** 4.634*** 4.667*** 7.762***
(0.626) (0.626) (0.619) (0.621) (0.898) (1.122) (1.120) (1.171) (1.155) (1.379)
Observations 844 844 844 844 550 265 265 265 265 200
R-squared 0.102 0.104 0.106 0.105 0.118 0.158 0.160 0.163 0.169 0.237  
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
a. Continuous variables of the interaction terms are mean-centered; b. measure is natural log transformed 
c. At CEO-Separation = 1, β3 = -0.026 with robust st. error = 0.006 and p<0.01 
d. At CEO-Separation = 1, β3 = -0.037 with robust st. error = 0.013 and p<0.01 
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Domestic firms. In the Foreign firms, CEO-Separation and Performance based Pay show 
significant interaction effect in the opposite direction and Managerial Ownership shows 
significant interaction effect in the positive direction. In Appendix C, Table C.2 presents 
the results for firms that are owned by Anglo-Saxon UCOs. Even in these globally driven 
firms, CG mechanisms cannot attenuate the expropriation of minority shareholders  
5.6.4 Ad-hoc Analysis for Market Institutions 
Market for corporate control disciplines the company insiders through the threat 
of takeover risk (Manne, 1965). CG scholars, however, question the effectiveness of take 
over market in disciplining the UCOs as concentrated ownership structure often 
facilitates friendly transfer of control and deters hostile takeovers (Enrique & Volpin, 
2007; Rossi & Volpin, 2004). I decided to examine the impact of market institution since 
countries’ stock exchange and pro-market orientation can play important role in 
influencing the firm level policy implementation (Coffee, 2001; Kogut & Spicer, 2002). 
For analyzing the quality of Stock Market and Pro-Market institutions, I respectively 
employ the World Bank measure of Stock Turnover Ratio6 and Heritage Foundation 
index of Market Openness7. The lists of countries in the weak vs. strong contexts are 
presented in Table C.3 and Table C.4 in Appendix C.        
Table 5.23 summarizes the results for Stock Market based sub-samples. In the 
context with weak Stock Market institution, CEO-Separation and Crosslisting 
significantly improves firms’ performance; whereas in the context with strong Stock 
Market institution, Performance based Pay and Foreign UCOs are effective in 
performance improvement. Table 5.24 describes the results for Pro-Market institution. 
Board Independence and CEO-Separation are improving firms’ performance in the weak 
Pro-Market context and Performance based Pay is proven to be beneficial for both the  
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Table 5.23: OLS Regression with Mean-Centered Interactions & Huber-White Robust Errors; Stock Market Institution 
DV Tobin's Q Model 1 Model 2 Model 3c Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8d Model 9 Model 10
Excess Control (EC)a -0.019*** -0.020*** -0.008 -0.020*** -0.018** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.017* -0.030*** -0.035***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.015) (0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.008)
Board Independencea -0.000 0.002
(0.004) (0.003)
EC*Board Independence 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
CEO-Separation 0.287** 0.206
(0.133) (0.139)
EC*CEO-Separation -0.014 -0.016
(0.017) (0.012)
Managerial Ownershipa -0.000 -0.005
(0.005) (0.003)
EC*Managerial Ownership -0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.000)
Performance based Paya 0.005 0.012***
(0.003) (0.003)
EC*Performance based Pay -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Firm Age 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Context with Weak Stock Mkt Institution Context with Strong Stock Mkt Institution
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Firm Sizeb -0.144*** -0.144*** -0.146*** -0.143*** -0.204*** -0.192*** -0.192*** -0.190*** -0.199*** -0.242***
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.046) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.049)
Firm Profit 0.304 0.321 0.288 0.299 -0.145 0.443 0.434 0.453 0.460 0.356
(1.420) (1.422) (1.391) (1.425) (1.264) (0.717) (0.718) (0.719) (0.717) (0.713)
Firm Growth -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.034*** 0.027***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
Crosslisting 0.472*** 0.461*** 0.437*** 0.477*** 0.520** 0.202 0.192 0.177 0.190 -0.117
(0.165) (0.172) (0.162) (0.165) (0.234) (0.128) (0.128) (0.132) (0.130) (0.227)
UCO Foreign 0.151 0.150 0.123 0.148 0.175 0.414*** 0.415*** 0.404*** 0.385** 0.635***
(0.211) (0.214) (0.211) (0.216) (0.244) (0.157) (0.158) (0.156) (0.159) (0.216)
UCO Identity yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 3.228*** 3.232*** 3.107*** 3.191*** 3.526*** 4.571*** 4.574*** 4.434*** 4.788*** 6.161***
(0.829) (0.826) (0.803) (0.781) (0.843) (0.683) (0.683) (0.689) (0.686) (1.015)
Observations 366 366 366 366 235 743 743 743 743 515
R-squared 0.109 0.109 0.117 0.109 0.207 0.127 0.127 0.130 0.129 0.147  
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
a. Continuous variables of the interaction terms are mean-centered; b. measure is natural log transformed 
c. At CEO-Separation = 1, β3 = -0.021 with robust st. error = 0.010 and p<0.05 
d. At CEO-Separation = 1, β3 = -0.033 with robust st. error = 0.008 and p<0.01 
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Table 5.24: OLS Regression with Mean-Centered Interactions & Huber-White Robust Errors; Pro-Market Institution 
DV Tobin's Q Model 1 Model 2 Model 3c Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8d Model 9 Model 10
Excess Control (EC)a -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.021** -0.026*** -0.031*** -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.008 -0.021*** -0.023***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.007) (0.007)
Board Independencea 0.007* -0.001
(0.004) (0.003)
EC*Board Independence -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
CEO-Separation 0.240** 0.070
(0.105) (0.216)
EC*CEO-Separation -0.008 -0.015
(0.012) (0.013)
Managerial Ownershipa -0.003 0.001
(0.003) (0.005)
EC*Managerial Ownership 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Performance based Paya 0.009*** 0.008***
(0.003) (0.003)
EC*Performance based Pay -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Firm Age 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.005* -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Context with Weak Pro-Mkt Institution Context with Strong Pro-Mkt Institution
 
 
		
143	
Firm Sizeb -0.104*** -0.105*** -0.107*** -0.113*** -0.130** -0.239*** -0.238*** -0.238*** -0.238*** -0.319***
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.040) (0.054) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.038) (0.051)
Firm Profit 7.541*** 7.565*** 7.481*** 7.500*** 8.354*** -0.279 -0.277 -0.276 -0.285 -0.368
(1.661) (1.653) (1.663) (1.678) (2.375) (0.564) (0.563) (0.564) (0.565) (0.555)
Firm Growth -0.011 -0.017 0.000 0.016 0.132 -0.000* -0.000* -0.000** -0.000* -0.000*
(0.105) (0.105) (0.103) (0.101) (0.280) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Crosslisting -0.068 -0.061 -0.071 -0.066 -0.343 0.748*** 0.755*** 0.743*** 0.757*** 0.753***
(0.149) (0.149) (0.148) (0.152) (0.247) (0.161) (0.163) (0.165) (0.166) (0.214)
UCO Foreign 0.665*** 0.670*** 0.650*** 0.648*** 0.853*** 0.042 0.041 0.043 0.047 0.071
(0.196) (0.196) (0.194) (0.200) (0.306) (0.151) (0.151) (0.151) (0.151) (0.176)
UCO Identity yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 2.322*** 2.362*** 2.264*** 2.567*** 3.170** 5.346*** 5.322*** 5.288*** 5.297*** 6.845***
(0.787) (0.774) (0.772) (0.946) (1.225) (0.832) (0.831) (0.839) (0.790) (1.055)
Observations 528 528 528 528 279 581 581 581 581 471
R-squared 0.318 0.323 0.324 0.320 0.392 0.132 0.133 0.134 0.133 0.169  
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
a. Continuous variables of the interaction terms are mean-centered; b. measure is natural log transformed 
c. At CEO-Separation = 1, β3 = -0.029 with robust st. error = 0.007 and p<0.01 
d. At CEO-Separation = 1, β3 = -0.034 with robust st. error = 0.008 and p<0.01 
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contexts. The effect of Foreign UCOs is positive and significant in the weak context and 
the effect of Crosslsiting is positive and significant in the strong context. In consistent 
with the analyses for all the external institutions, the investigation for market institutions 
also suggest there is no significant positive interaction by the CG mechanisms in 
attenuating the negative effect of Excess Control.        
5.6.5 Ad-hoc Analysis for Informal Institutions 
Countries’ informal institutional environment is crucial for instilling cognitive 
and normative understanding of the desired CG policies (Dyck & Zingales, 2004; Jiang & 
Peng, 2011; van Essen et al., 2012a). Higher ethical standard in business conduct 
supports the implementation of formal policies by promoting a culture of self-
enforcement. Countries’ informal institutional environment is also crucial for 
empowering the social actors who can demand corporate accountability by legitimizing 
the best practices and attaching social sanctions to the alternative courses of behaviors. 
To incorporate the influence of country level ethical standard and accountability by the 
social actors, I utilized the Transparency International Corruption Perception8 index and 
Freedom House Media/Press Freedom9 index respectively. The lists of countries in the 
weak vs. strong contexts are presented in Table C.5 and Table C.6 in Appendix C.         
 Table 5.25 presents the results for Corruption index and Table 5.26 presents the 
results for Freedom of Media. Similar to the previous analyses, empirical findings of the 
informal institutions show that P-P conflict is evident in the concentrated firms across 
countries with weak vs. strong informal institutions. CEO-Separation significantly 
improves firms’ valuation in countries with weak informal institutions; whereas 
Performance based Pay significantly improves firms’ valuation in both the contexts. 
Crosslisting is proven to be beneficial for the concentrated firms in countries with strong  
		
145	
Table 5.25: OLS Regression with Mean-Centered Interactions & Huber-White Robust Errors; Corruption Index  
DV Tobin's Q Model 1 Model 2 Model 3b Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8c Model 9 Model 10
Excess Control (EC)a -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.020** -0.026*** -0.032*** -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.018 -0.022*** -0.025***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.011) (0.006) (0.007)
Board Independencea 0.006 -0.001
(0.004) (0.003)
EC*Board Independence 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
CEO-Separation 0.355*** -0.079
(0.119) (0.166)
EC*CEO-Separation -0.009 -0.006
(0.012) (0.013)
Managerial Ownershipa -0.003 0.000
(0.004) (0.004)
EC*Managerial Ownership 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Performance based Paya 0.009*** 0.008***
(0.003) (0.003)
EC*Performance based Pay -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Firm Age 0.004** 0.004* 0.004** 0.004** 0.006** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Context with High Corruption Context with Low Corruption
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Firm Sizeb -0.092*** -0.093*** -0.101*** -0.099** -0.130** -0.235*** -0.234*** -0.236*** -0.234*** -0.312***
(0.035) (0.034) (0.036) (0.040) (0.051) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.034) (0.049)
Firm Profit 7.222*** 7.245*** 7.121*** 7.187*** 6.771*** -0.218 -0.216 -0.216 -0.222 -0.419
(1.702) (1.695) (1.705) (1.720) (2.302) (0.560) (0.559) (0.563) (0.561) (0.562)
Firm Growth -0.065 -0.074 -0.060 -0.036 -0.061 -0.000* -0.000* -0.000* -0.000* -0.000**
(0.081) (0.080) (0.080) (0.079) (0.282) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Crosslisting -0.056 -0.061 -0.066 -0.059 -0.181 0.644*** 0.651*** 0.656*** 0.647*** 0.667***
(0.169) (0.168) (0.166) (0.171) (0.242) (0.139) (0.141) (0.148) (0.141) (0.217)
UCO Foreign 0.725*** 0.714*** 0.677*** 0.712*** 0.962*** 0.030 0.029 0.033 0.030 0.054
(0.229) (0.228) (0.228) (0.233) (0.335) (0.140) (0.140) (0.139) (0.139) (0.170)
UCO Identity yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 2.070** 2.109*** 2.057*** 2.300** 2.982*** 5.328*** 5.311*** 5.373*** 5.306*** 6.908***
(0.803) (0.784) (0.790) (0.959) (1.144) (0.793) (0.793) (0.807) (0.751) (1.035)
Observations 457 457 457 457 273 652 652 652 652 477
R-squared 0.312 0.316 0.321 0.314 0.357 0.142 0.142 0.143 0.142 0.171  
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
a. Continuous variables of the interaction terms are mean-centered; b. measure is natural log transformed 
c. At CEO-Separation = 1,	β3 = -0.029 with robust st. error = 0.008 and p<0.01 
d. At CEO-Separation = 1, β3 = -0.027 with robust st. error = 0.008 and p<0.01 
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Table 5.26: OLS Regression with Mean-Centered Interactions & Huber-White Robust Errors; Freedom of Media 
DV Tobin's Q Model 1 Model 2 Model 3c Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8d Model 9 Model 10
Excess Control (EC)a -0.025*** -0.026*** -0.014 -0.026*** -0.034*** -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.017 -0.022*** -0.025***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.007) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.011) (0.006) (0.008)
Board Independencea 0.005 0.001
(0.004) (0.003)
EC*Board Independence 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
CEO-Separation 0.280** -0.053
(0.124) (0.161)
EC*CEO-Separation -0.015 -0.006
(0.014) (0.013)
Managerial Ownershipa -0.006 0.000
(0.004) (0.004)
EC*Managerial Ownership 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Performance based Paya 0.010*** 0.009***
(0.003) (0.003)
EC*Performance based Pay -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Firm Age 0.005** 0.005** 0.005** 0.005** 0.010*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Context with Weak Media Context with Strong Media
 
 
		
148	
Firm Sizeb -0.111*** -0.109*** -0.118*** -0.123*** -0.177*** -0.228*** -0.228*** -0.229*** -0.227*** -0.301***
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.037) (0.041) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.034) (0.059)
Firm Profit 7.360*** 7.374*** 7.229*** 7.327*** 0.712 -0.230 -0.234 -0.228 -0.236 -0.185
(1.570) (1.559) (1.569) (1.564) (1.729) (0.564) (0.565) (0.566) (0.566) (0.669)
Firm Growth 0.193 0.188 0.196 0.211 0.157 -0.000* -0.000* -0.000* -0.000* -0.000*
(0.202) (0.202) (0.192) (0.188) (0.147) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Crosslisting -0.048 -0.065 -0.061 -0.051 -0.252 0.611*** 0.607*** 0.619*** 0.616*** 0.631**
(0.184) (0.177) (0.180) (0.182) (0.213) (0.137) (0.139) (0.145) (0.139) (0.263)
UCO Foreign 0.594*** 0.593*** 0.552*** 0.572*** 0.705*** 0.080 0.081 0.083 0.077 0.227
(0.185) (0.186) (0.184) (0.189) (0.236) (0.145) (0.145) (0.144) (0.145) (0.217)
UCO Identity yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 2.282*** 2.258*** 2.263*** 2.661*** 3.408*** 5.118*** 5.114*** 5.151*** 5.092*** 6.599***
(0.713) (0.703) (0.703) (0.833) (0.838) (0.757) (0.760) (0.769) (0.722) (1.164)
Observations 437 437 437 437 310 672 672 672 672 440
R-squared 0.332 0.336 0.340 0.337 0.234 0.131 0.131 0.131 0.132 0.144   
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
a. Continuous variables of the interaction terms are mean-centered; b. measure is natural log transformed 
c. At CEO-Separation = 1	β3 = -0.038 with robust st. error = 0.011 and p<0.01 
d. At CEO-Separation = 1, β3 = -0.023 with robust st. error = 0.007 and p<0.01 
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informal institutions and Foreign UCOs are proven to be beneficial in countries with 
weak informal institutions. Most importantly, the interactions between Excess Control 
and internal CG mechanisms remain consistently insignificant across the entire analysis 
of informal institutions.  
In Appendix C, I re-examine the policy-related hypotheses in firms from the 
developing/transitioning countries as well as in firms from the developed countries10. 
Table C.7 presents the list of developed and transitioning/developing countries. Table C.8 
summarizes results for this analysis. In the concentrated firms from 
developing/transitioning countries, CEO-Separation shows significant interaction; the 
interaction is in the opposite direction. For rest of the analyses, the results of interaction 
terms remain insignificant. 
5.6.7 Ad-hoc Analysis for External Institutions’ Direct Impact 
 Firms’ external institutional environment directly impacts organizational routines 
(Feldman & Rafaeli, 2002), actions (He, Tian, & Chen, 2007), and strategy framing 
(Powell, 1991). Current study focused on analyzing the ‘moderating’ role of external CG 
institutions in organizational policy implementation. In this section, I am running a new 
set of multi-regressions to investigate the ‘direct’ impact of external CG institutions in 
attenuating P-P Conflict. At the country level, I am testing the influence of legal and 
disclosure institutions. For the globally driven firms, I am investigating the impact of 
international institutional environment for which I am incorporating the measure of 
Crosslisting and Foreign UCOs. Table 5.27 presents the results of this ‘direct’ impact 
analysis. Legal institution, disclosure standard, Crosslisting, and Foreign UCOs – all are 
proven to be effective in enhancing firms’ valuation. However, their interaction effects 
are not significant in attenuating the P-P conflict. That is, external CG institutions are 
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Table 5.27: OLS Regression with Mean-Centered Interactions & Huber-White Robust Errors; External Institutions 
DV Tobin's Q Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
Excess Control (EC)a -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.023*** -0.017** -0.026*** -0.024***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
Legal Institutiona 1.072*** 1.086***
(0.278) (0.285)
EC*Legal -0.026
(0.026)
Disclosure Standarda 0.616** 0.617**
(0.278) (0.277)
EC*Disclosure 0.005
(0.028)
Crosslisting 0.409*** 0.412***
(0.098) (0.099)
EC*Crosslisting -0.011
(0.010)
UCO Foreign 0.425*** 0.432***
(0.128) (0.135)
EC*UCO Foreign -0.006
(0.012)
Firm Age 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Firm Sizeb -0.155*** -0.151*** -0.153*** -0.154*** -0.154*** -0.180*** -0.182*** -0.153*** -0.153***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.025) (0.025) (0.023) (0.023)
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Firm Profit 0.394 0.426 0.428 0.415 0.415 0.391 0.389 0.413 0.415
(0.633) (0.635) (0.634) (0.630) (0.631) (0.642) (0.644) (0.625) (0.626)
Firm Growth -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
UCO Identity yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 4.221*** 3.624*** 3.854*** 3.875*** 3.886*** 4.451*** 4.193*** 4.171*** 3.834***
(0.523) (0.553) (0.513) (0.537) (0.513) (0.541) (0.544) (0.524) (0.518)
Observations 1,109 1,109 1,109 1,109 1,109 1,109 1,109 1,109 1,109
R-squared 0.087 0.096 0.097 0.090 0.090 0.100 0.101 0.098 0.098  
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
a. In models with interaction, continuous variables are mean-centered; b. measure is natural log transformed 
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effectively playing the role of ‘performance facilitator’; but their monitoring of the power 
exercise by UCOs is not adequate.   
5.6.8 Ad-hoc Analysis for Multiple Blockholders 
A number of CG scholars discuss the benefit of multiple major/strategic 
blockholders to balance out the excessive power of UCOs (Attig, Guedhami, & Mishra, 
2008; Dharwadkar et al., 2000; Jiang & Peng, 2011). Firms with Multiple Blockholders 
refer to the concentrated firms where in addition to the UCO, multiple shareholders own 
more than or equal to 10% of the control right. By forming coalition among the key 
players and utilizing their industry internal knowledge, Multiple Blockholders can ensure 
higher accountability in the concentrated firms. In the ad-hoc analysis, I examine the 
presence of Multiple Blockholders as an alternative CG mechanism to monitor the within 
network resource transactions. 
Table 5.28 presents the results for Multiple Blockholders. The findings suggest, 
interactions of Multiple Blockholders are positive and significant for both the proxies of 
Minority Shareholders (Tobin’s Q and MTB). The negative effect on Tobin’s Q for a 
percentage increase in Excess Control gets decreased by 0.016 and the negative effect on 
MTB for a percentage increase in Excess Control gets decreased by 0.077 when Multiple 
Blockholders are present. The results, however, show significant negative effect of 
Multiple Blockholders on firms’ valuation. Further in depth research is necessary to 
investigate the ‘resource provider’ and ‘governance’ roles of the Multiple Blockholders.    
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Table 5.28: OLS Regression with Mean-Centered Interactions 
& Huber-White Robust Errors; Multiple Blockholders 
 
Tobin's Q MTB
Excess Control (EC) -0.029*** -0.067***
(0.007) (0.018)
Multiple Blockholders -0.471*** -1.262**
(0.179) (0.539)
EC*Multiple Blockholders 0.016* 0.077***
(0.009) (0.027)
Firm Age 0.001 0.005
(0.001) (0.003)
Firm Sizea -0.180*** -0.299***
(0.025) (0.115)
Firm Profit 0.406 3.729
(0.624) (2.617)
Firm Growth -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Crosslisting 0.381*** 0.440
(0.101) (0.455)
UCO Foreign 0.394*** 1.306**
(0.131) (0.524)
UCO Identity yes yes
Industry yes yes
Country yes yes
Constant 4.592*** 7.887***
(0.562) (2.604)
Observations 1,109 1,109
R-squared 0.116 0.044  
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
a. Measure is natural log transformed 
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CHAPTER 6 
DISCUSSION & IMPLICATIONS 
 In the final chapter of the dissertation, I start with discussing the insights of key 
empirical findings. Next, I focus on describing the Theoretical Contributions, Policy & 
Managerial Implications, and Limitations & Future Research. This chapter ends with 
presenting a summary of the investigation in the Conclusion section.   
6.1 Discussion  
 The empirical analysis begins with examining whether the concentrated firms are 
prone to Type II agency problem. Results are consistent in depicting significant negative 
effect of UCOs’ excessive control on the minority shareholder wealth. Such findings 
reaffirm the importance of good governance. The core objective of this dissertation has 
been to examine the effectiveness of standardized CG policies in addressing Type II 
agency problem. While the findings show positive and significant impact of Board 
Independence, CEO-Separation, and Performance based Pay on improving firms’ 
valuation, interaction impacts of all the internal mechanisms remain insignificant in 
attenuating excessive control’s negative effect. Interaction impacts of the country level 
external mechanisms in implementing the formal policies also remain insignificant, 
where the results are mostly similar across the analyses with legal and disclosure 
institutions. Hence, the investigation provides support for the Embedded View based 
analysis, in particular for the analysis of Means-Ends Decoupling of CG. In brief, the 
investigation implicates that commonly recommended CG mechanisms may be effective 
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in improving firms’ valuation; however, in their current capacity, these policies are not 
adequate in protecting the minority shareholders and preventing the UCOs from 
exercising their excessive control. As the country level external mechanisms cannot 
generate any positive moderation impact, it can be implied that the insignificant 
interaction by the internal CG is a not a result of lack in policy implementation; rather it 
is a result of lack in policy-goal alignment. These results are robust across the 
investigations with alternative measures of Minority Shareholder Wealth, Monitoring 
CG, Incentive CG, and external institution.    
 For further investigation of the Embedded View based hypotheses, I conducted a 
series of ad-hoc analyses. I started with examining the family vs. non-family firms, 
locally-listed vs. cross-listed firms, and domestic vs. foreign firms. Majority of the 
closely-held firms across nations are family owned and/or family controlled where the 
organizational culture is mostly relational in nature (Chen & Nowland, 2010; Duran et 
al., 2017). In contrast to the arm’s length transactional culture of non-family firms (state, 
financial institution, corporation, and other), family owners tend to be closely involved in 
organizational governance and management. Hence, it is important to examine whether 
commonly recommended CG mechanisms differ in governing the UCOs of family vs 
non-family firms. The interaction impacts are insignificant across the sub-samples with 
family vs. non-family firms implicating that the suggested CG policies are ineffective in 
questioning all types of UCOs. 
Cross-listed and foreign firms operate in an environment, where the external 
institutions are stricter in mandating and enforcing the formal CG policies (Coffee, 2002; 
Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Useem, 1998). If the internal CG mechanisms are aligned with 
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governing the UCOs, their (internal CG mechanisms’) moderating impacts should be 
positive and significant in the globally driven firms. The results show insignificant 
interactions across the sub-samples with locally-listed vs. cross-listed firms and domestic 
vs. foreign firms. Such findings provide stronger support for Means-Ends Decoupling of 
CG. As the globally driven firms operate in an environment with advanced institutions, 
insignificant interactions in these firms cannot be explained by the logic of lack in policy 
implementation; rather such results indicate lack in policy-goal alignment. The findings 
remain unchanged even across the analyses with Anglo-Saxon-Crosslisted firms and 
Anglo-Saxon-Foreign firms.  
 In addition to the quality of country level legal and disclosure provisions, 
International CG literature also study the importance of market and informal institutions. 
I examined the impact of Stock Market institution since countries’ stock exchanges play 
critical role in monitoring the firm level policy implementation (Coffee, 2001; Kogut & 
Spicer, 2002). Interaction impacts of the internal CG remain insignificant across the 
analyses with weak and strong Stock Market institution. Additionally, I examined the 
implementation of internal CG with the index of Pro-Market institution. This analysis 
was conducted to capture the influence of countries’ market openness. Again coefficients 
of the interaction terms are insignificant. Countries’ informal institutional environment is 
crucial for promoting self-enforced good governance (Dyck & Zingales, 2004; Jiang & 
Peng, 2011; van Essen et al., 2012a). The agent of social actors play powerful role in 
demanding corporate accountability and attaching social sanctions to the alternative 
courses of behaviors. To incorporate the influence of country level ethical standard and 
accountability by the social actors, I utilized Corruption Perception index and 
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Media/Press Freedom index respectively. Interactions by the internal CG mechanisms 
remain insignificant for both the sub-samples. I also tested the policy-related hypotheses 
by splitting the full sample into developing vs. developed economies; again the results 
remain mostly unchanged.    
 One of the core objectives of the dissertation was to examine the moderating role 
of external CG institutions in implementing the internal policies. In the ad-hoc analysis 
section, I extended the analysis by examining the ‘direct’ impact of local institutions 
(legal and disclosure standard) and global institutions (Crosslisting and Foreign UCOs) in 
addressing the P-P conflict. The findings confirm the facilitating role of the advanced 
institutions as they can help improving the firm level performance (Griffin et al., 2017; 
Jiang & Peng, 2011). While the resources of external institutions are proven to be 
extremely critical, their interactions are insignificant in mitigating the expropriation of 
minority shareholders; that is, their governance role is not powerful enough to oversee the 
UCOs.            
In sum, the findings of the dissertation point towards the benefit of internal and 
external CG mechanisms in improving firms’ technical efficiency. These results support 
the resource based view of independent board members and separate board chair who 
bring knowledge, experience, and expertise to the organizational decision making 
(Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; van Essen et al., 2012b). However, as the outsiders within the 
relational network, independent board members and separate board chair often do not 
possess any voice/power to question the act of UCOs (Arnoldi, Chen, & Na, 2013; Chung 
& Luo, 2013; García-Castro et al., 2013; Keister, 1998). Results of the current study are 
most consistent in depicting significant positive impact by Performance based Pay on 
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firms’ valuation, which provides support for the incentive-alignment principle (Buck et 
al., 2008; Sanders & Tuschke, 2007). But Managerial Ownership and Performance based 
Pay cannot prevent expropriation by the UCOs. In the family firms, family managers 
frequently possess ownership stakes in the focal firms; yet there is evidence of 
expropriation (Tiscini & Raoli, 2013). It is often found that managerial pay is relatively 
low for family managers (Gomez-Mejia, Larraza-Kintana, & Makri, 2003); that is 
because being the UCOs, these managers can exercise their excessive control for 
rewarding themselves with alternative forms of extravagant remuneration (McConaughy, 
2000; Rediker & Seth, 1995; Schulze et al., 2001; Walsh & Seward, 1990). In the non-
family firms, UCOs have the strongest voice in appointing top managers (Steinfeld, 
1998) and deciding their incentive packages (Kastiel, 2015). Being appointed and 
incentivized by the UCOs, professional managers will seldom exercise their equity stakes 
to challenge their employers. In fact the findings show, Performance based Pay is often 
used as a means of further expropriation which indicates CEOs of the affiliated firms are 
colluding with the UCOs. Concentrated firms’ local institutional environment (legal and 
disclosure provisions) and global institutional environment (Crosslisting and Foreign 
UCOs) play direct role in improving organizational efficiency; however, even the 
advanced external institutions are proven to be inadequate in protecting the minority 
shareholders.      
6.2 Theoretical Contributions 
 This dissertation offers critical insights to the International CG research. With the 
worldwide initiatives to reform/improve firm and country level CG policies, a large 
stream of literature has developed to assess the value of this policy scheme. In 
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determining the quality of national and organizational governance, CG scholars often 
employ a number of standardized indices that are developed pertaining to the universal 
CG policies. While the rigorous investigations across disciplines (economics, finance, 
law, sociology, political science, and so forth) provide invaluable insights, the findings 
have been inconclusive in international settings. Scholars have been analyzing the 
effectiveness of commonly recommended CG policies across various organizations and 
country institutional contexts. The heterogeneity of CG aspects further get complex when 
the CG scholars expand their policy analyses into examining other important governance 
concerns such as protecting interests of all the stakeholders (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003), 
safe-guarding the natural environment (Sar, 2018), fulfilling corporate social 
responsibilities (Stuebs & Sun, 2015), and so forth.  
This dissertation is built on the argument that in examining the policy 
effectiveness of recommended CG mechanisms, it is crucial to specify the governance 
concern; identify the actors that are involved in the agency relationships; and finally, 
incorporate the institutional context where the organizations are embedded in. For the 
current analysis, I examined the closely-held firms with UCOs from Europe, Asia, and 
Latin America where Type II agency problem exists between minority shareholders and 
UCOs. This approach enabled me to perform a relatively bias free investigation as I 
specified the ‘organizational form’ (concentrated firms), ‘governance concern’ 
(expropriation of minority shareholders by UCOs), and ‘institutional context’ (Non-
Anglo-Saxon countries) of the focal firms. At the organizational level, I analyzed whether 
the internal mechanisms of Monitoring CG and Incentive CG are aligned with the 
intended goal of reducing Type II agency problem and at the country level, I examined to 
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what extent the external mechanisms of legal institution and disclosure standard matter in 
implementing the formal policies. My approach has been comprehensive in developing 
an alternative set of policy-related hypotheses, where I addressed the debate between 
Universal View of CG versus Embedded View of CG. In sum, the current study aims to 
emphasize the importance of specification in conducting CG research – in absence of 
which the policy analyses will be incomplete/misleading. 
This dissertation also aims at encouraging the CG scholars to utilize the 
progression of Agency Theory in conducting CG research (Hendry, 2002; Hoenen & 
Kostova, 2015; Kostova et al., 2016) . Classical Agency Theory had been at the core in 
shaping the conventional CG mechanisms, which were mostly designed towards 
governing the stand-alone firms with dispersed owners. Often researchers tend to 
conclude that Agency Theory is not generating effective CG mechanisms as it is not 
addressing the differences among national governance systems. Whereas in reality, the 
worldwide CG reforms mostly were driven by the Anglo-Saxon MODEL, – governance 
mechanisms of which had been designed employing the classical Agency THEORY. The 
standardized CG policies were developed for a particular dyad of actors and 
organizations, which were embedded in a particular institutional environment. CG 
scholars need to join the effort by other disciplines and utilize the progression of Agency 
Theory in designing actor, problem, and context specific governance policies. In 
Economics, scholars apply Agency Theory to govern the conflict between employer and 
employee (Stiglitz, 1975), insurer and insured (Spence & Zeckhauser, 1975), buyer and 
supplier, lawyer and client, and so forth (Harris & Raviv, 1978). In Political Science, 
scholars utilize Agency Theory to examine the agency relationship between politicians 
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and bureaucrats (Banfield, 1975; Niskanen, 1971). In International Business, scholars 
suggest for the contextualization Agency Theory to understand the management of 
multinational corporations (Kostova et al., 2016; O’Donnell, 2000; Roth & Nigh, 1992; 
Roth & O'Donnell, 1996). The field of CG should advance the research agenda by 
developing newer and more advanced governance mechanisms and in the process 
contribute to the progression of Agency Theory research.  
This dissertation also contributes to the literature on Decoupling. Traditionally, 
Decoupling research focused on the gap between formal policies and organizational 
practices, where the inherent assumptions implied that the formal policies are aligned 
with achieving the intended goals (Fiss & Zajac, 2004; Westphal, Gulati, & Shortell, 
1997). Recent developments in the Neo-Institution literature shifted the focus towards the 
gap between organizational practices and intended goals (Abrahamson, 1991; Bowen, 
2014; Dick, 2015). According to Bromley & Powell (2012), Means-Ends Decoupling 
occurs when the causal links between formal policies and intended goals are opaque and 
weak; yet organizations adopt these misaligned policies due to the rationalization of 
structural forms. Scholars in this line believe that Means-Ends Decoupling will increase 
overtime with the worldwide initiatives to promote and adopt uniform concrete rules. In 
the current study, I have employed the idea of Means-Ends Decoupling of CG in 
examining the effectiveness of common governance policies. I have incorporated the 
issue of external institutional environment in distinguishing between the acts of Policy-
Practice Decoupling versus Means-Ends Decoupling. The analyses tested the 
performance of Monitoring CG and Incentive CG in addressing P-P conflict in firms 
from both weak institutional context as well as strong institutional context. If the findings 
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were positive and significant in the strong context but not in the weak context, then it 
would indicate that the internal CG policies are aligned with the intended goal of 
addressing P-P conflict; insignificant/negative results in the weak context would indicate 
that the firms are getting way with Policy-Practice Decoupling due to lack in policy 
implementation. Since the findings are mostly insignificant across the entire analyses, the 
investigation essentially is pointing towards Means-Ends Decoupling. 
Insignificant/negative results particularly in the strong context imply that the internal CG 
policies by design are not equipped with the means to attenuate P-P conflict; as lack in 
policy implementation is not a major concern in this instance. By utilizing the Neo-
Institutional ideas of Policy-Practice Decoupling and Means-Ends Decoupling, this 
dissertation provides a relatively bias free understanding of the functionality of CG 
mechanisms in diverse settings.   
6.3 Policy & Managerial Implications 
There are important policy and managerial implications associated with the 
current investigation. Concentrated ownership structure is one of the dominant forms of 
organizations in many countries around the world. The power structure and actors 
involved in the concentrated firms are different compared to the typical Anglo-Saxon 
firms, where UCOs establish their excessive control through the complex structure of 
pyramiding, multiple holdings, and dual class shares. According to the empirical 
findings, commonly recommended CG policies significantly improve concentrated firms’ 
market valuation. Unfortunately, such increase in firms’ resource seldom gets distributed 
among the minority shareholders (Kuznetsov & Muravyev, 2001; Raithatha & Komera, 
2016). Through the chain of ownership control, assets get tunneled from high productive 
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affiliates to the parent firms where UCOs possess maximum cash-flow rights (Chang & 
Hong, 2000; Khanna & Rivkin, 2000; La Porta et al., 2003) and/or to the ‘zombie’ firms 
where resources get wasted in rescuing the inefficient firms (Claessens et al., 2006; 
George & Kabir, 2008; Hoshi, 2006; Hoshi & Kashyap, 2004). To protect the affiliated 
firms and their minority shareholders, a comprehensive policy scheme with more 
targeted/focused means has to be designed and implemented with high importance.  
It is critical to emphasize that the existing mechanisms must not be excluded from 
the CG policy scheme; rather, they should be revisited and reformed to be well-equipped 
particularly for governing the UCOs.  Furthermore, there should be flexibility in 
supplementing the existing mechanisms by additional means, employing them in 
accordance with their functionality, or even substituting them given the circumstantial 
specificities. As Bromley & Powell (2012) and Wijen (2014) suggest, there must be 
clearer specifications of the relationship between policies and intended goals and between 
organizations and their external institutions. In addition to a set of ‘master’ institutions, 
the Neo-Institutional scholars also advocate for the flexibility of complementing or 
substituting the ‘master’ institutions with ‘niche’ institutions which are tailored towards 
attaining the specific goals. For example, CG scholars discuss the benefit of multiple 
major/strategic blockholders in the concentrated firms (Attig, Guedhami, & Mishra, 
2008; Dharwadkar, et al., 2000; Jiang & Peng, 2011). Compared to an individual board 
member, Multiple Blockholders can better monitor the UCOs as they are able to combine 
their industry internal knowledge with coalition opportunity. In the ad-hoc analysis, 
results show a significant positive effect by Multiple Blockholders in attenuating the 
negative effect of Excess Control. Kuzentov & Kuzentov (2003) analyze the power of 
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stakeholder coalition among the minority shareholders, company employees, resource 
suppliers, and so forth in governing the act of UCOs. As the country level external 
institution, Morck (2005) explains effectiveness of ‘double’ and ‘multiple’ taxation on 
curtailing the intensity of within network internal transactions. The source of UCOs’ 
unique power is the excessive ownership control which they often exercise in 
organizational decision making almost with zero accountability. Bebchuk & Hamdani 
(2009) recommend for customizing the country disclosure standard for the concentrated 
firms. In addition to the ‘master’ (basic) information, UCOs should be required to report 
information on their complex ownership structure and within network internal 
transactions.                
Investigations of the dissertation implicate that the governance mechanisms 
ideally have two major roles to perform – one is to enhance firms’ performance/valuation 
and the other one is to monitor agent’s act in utilizing/distributing the enhanced 
resources. The proponents of Universal View of CG should be careful in advocating for a 
concrete set of standardized CG policies as the recommended measures in their current 
form are not adequate to govern the UCOs. Similarly, the proponents of Embedded View 
of CG should be careful in opposing/rejecting the existing CG policies as the 
recommended measures are critical in improving performance of the concentrated firms. 
Capezio, Shields, & O’Donnell (2011) and Garcia-Castro et al. (2013) suggest that the 
merit of CG mechanisms should not be interpreted in isolation. Given the characteristics 
of governance concern and complementarity among the governance policies, the merit of 
CG mechanisms should be determined in ‘bundle’ and as a whole. For example, the 
conventional practice is to advocate for CEO-Separation and other checks over CEO 
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power as “good” governance principle. But the dissertation implicates that in the 
concentrated firms, CEOs should be empowered with sufficient means so that they can 
question the power exercise by UCOs. Empirical findings show that CEO-Duality 
positively and significantly attenuates the negative relationship between Excess Control 
and Minority Shareholder Wealth and CEO-Duality is more effective in the non-family 
firms and foreign owned firms. Moreover, in the foreign owned firms, Managerial 
Ownership is also proven to be effective in attenuating the negative relationship between 
Excess Control and Minority Shareholder Wealth. That is, given the internal fit between 
policies and their intended goals and between organizations and their external 
institutions, policy-experts and managers should be pragmatic in designing a meaningful 
governance structure. Such pragmatic approach may require implementing a ‘hybrid’ 
configuration of common and new or even competing CG mechanisms (Leblebici, 2000; 
Menard, 2004).              
6.4 Limitations & Future Research 
 There are limitations to this study. Historically, there have been a large number of 
closely-held firms operating in Europe, Asia, and Latin America. But data availability on 
these firms is regrettably limited. The empirical analyses have been conducted for a 
single year as data pertaining to the ownership structure is not readily available for 
multiple years. I had to manually collect/calculate data on each firm’s ownership 
structure by individually accessing their complex ownership maps. Furthermore, data on 
the closely-held firms’ governance structure is also very limited and required manual data 
collection/calculation. Such constraints precluded the possibility of constructing panel 
dataset and conducting longitudinal empirical analyses. Secondly, the Firm Value 
	166	
measure of Tobin’s Q (and Market-to-Book in robustness test) has been applied as the 
proxy of Minority Shareholder Wealth. In the CG literature, scholars advise for using 
better proxies to capture the expropriation of minority shareholder wealth; such as related 
party transactions, internal loan guarantee on favorable terms, tunneling of resources, and 
so forth (Berkman, Cole, & Fu, 2009; Dyck & Zingales, 2004; Cheung et al., 2009). 
Again sufficient data were not available on the better proxies due to lack in information 
disclosure on the within network activities. Finally, the scope of the study was limited 
within investigating the closely-held firms from the Non-Anglo-Saxon countries. 
However, concentrated firm structure is also visible in the Anglo-Saxon countries, where 
Type II agency problem is evident between minority shareholders and UCOs (Attig, 
2007). The current study investigated the CG policies in firms with Anglo-Saxon foreign 
UCOs and in firms that are cross-listed in the Anglo-Saxon stock markets; however, it 
did not cover the closely-held firms that originated from and operate in the Anglo-Saxon 
countries.        
An important extension as future research can focus on the concentrated firms 
from the Anglo-Saxon countries and examine how the recommended CG policies govern 
UCOs’ excessive control in the Anglo-Saxon firms. The aim of the current study has 
been to shed light on the functionality of common CG policies. Future research should 
conduct investigation on the niche institutions and explore the possibility of designing 
effective governance means given the specificities of actor, problem, and contextual 
environment of the concentrated firms. Future research should also focus on the value 
creation feature of the existing policies. The current study shows that the existing internal 
policies significantly improve valuation of the concentrated firms. To what extent the 
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external CG mechanisms substitute and/or complement the internal CG mechanisms in 
the concentrated firms, – a thorough investigation is critical to unpack this combined 
relationship.    
6.5 Conclusion  
I started my dissertation asking the research question, – Are the standardized set 
of “good” CG policies effective in mitigating Type II agency problem in closely-held 
firms from Non-Anglo-Saxon nations? While confirming the value creation capability of 
the recommended CG policies, empirical findings of the dissertation point towards their 
(CG policies’) ineffectiveness in mitigating Type II agency problem. For conducting the 
policy analyses, I adopted a focused approach by examining the closely-held firms with 
UCOs from Europe (Faccio & Lang, 2002), Asia (Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000), 
and Latin America (Cueto, 2013). I specified the actor, problem, and contextual attributes 
for precisely analyzing the generalizability of “good” CG principles.  
My approach was comprehensive as I summarized the debate between Universal 
View of CG vs. Embedded View of CC and developed a set of alternative hypotheses by 
incorporating these views. To define the Universal View, I integrated the ideas of 
Generalizability of Internal CG and Complementarity of External CG. The proponents of 
Generalizability of Internal CG assert that as long as there exist delegation situations, 
agency problems will arise in all sorts of separation relationships; therefore, various 
forms of firms are adopting the  internal mechanisms to mitigate their unique agency 
problems (Cerbioni & Parbonetti, 2007; Kang & Shivdasani, 1995; Kaplan, 1994a; 
Mitton, 2002; Sanders & Tuschke, 2007). The proponents of Complementarity of 
External CG not only propose that the internal mechanisms are capable of addressing 
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unique agency conflict, but also believe that countries are universally developing external 
CG institutions (Coffee, 1999, 2001; Hansmann & Kraakman, 2000, 2001; Yoshikawa & 
Rasheed, 2009). And the more the external environment provides developed supporting 
institutions, the higher will be the positive impact of firm level mechanisms. To define 
the Embedded View, I utilized the Neo-Institutional constructs of Policy-Practice 
Decoupling and Means-Ends Decoupling. The proponents of Policy-Practice Decoupling 
of CG suggest that recommended internal mechanisms may have the potential to address 
the conflict between minority shareholders and UCOs; however, success of such CG 
mechanims is contingent on the presence of country level supporting institutions. Not all 
the countries are universally developing external CG institutions; and firms can get away 
with the act of ceremonial policy adoption in countries with weak institutions.  (Fiss & 
Zajac, 2004; Gallego & Larrain, 2012; Heugens, van Essen, & van Oosterhout, 2009; 
Peng, Buck, & Filatotchev, 2003; Veliyath & Ramaswamy, 2000). The proponents of 
Means-Ends Decoupling of CG believe that the common internal mechanisms cannot 
mitigate the conflict between minority shareholders and UCOs as these mechanisms are 
designed for governing the managers of stand-alone firms (Bebchuk & Hamdani, 2009; 
Bruce, Buck, & Main, 2005; Chen et al., 2011; Lubatkin et al., 2007; Young et al., 2008).  
External CG institutions cannot moderate organizational governance improvement in the 
concentrated firms as such institutions intend to enforce the misaligned policies (Bromley 
& Powell, 2012; Wijen, 2014). 
For testing the policy-related hypotheses, I developed a cross-sectional dataset of 
publicly traded non-financial concentrated firms from Europe, Asia, and Latin America. 
Using the hand-collected dataset on recent ownership and governance structure, the 
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empirical analyses of the dissertation find support for the Embedded View based 
hypotheses. In particular, the investigations provide support for the analysis of Means-
Ends Decoupling of CG implicating that the internal mechanisms of Board Independence, 
CEO-Separation, Managerial Ownership, and Performance based Pay are not aligned 
with the intended goal of mitigating Type II agency problem. Country level external 
mechanisms of legal institution and disclosure provision cannot not generate any positive 
moderating impact as the core problem in this instance is not policy enforcement; rather it 
is policy-goal alignment. The list of literature is relatively large in International CG 
research that shares the analysis of Means-Ends Decoupling of CG in reviewing the 
effectiveness of common governance policies (Bebchuk & Hamdani, 2009; Bruce et al., 
2005; Chen et al., 2011; Davis et al., 1997; Enriques & Volpin, 2007; Fiss, 2008; 
McConaughy, 2000; Morck et al., 2000; Rediker & Seth, 1995; Schulze et al., 2001; 
Tiscini & Raoli, 2013; Young et al., 2008). Detestable corporate scandals in the affiliated 
firms of Volkswagen Group in Germany, Renault-Nissan-Mitsubishi Alliance in Japan, 
and Samsung Group in South Korea corroborate the fact that CG failure is still a major 
concern even in the context with relatively developed external institutions.  
It is to be noted that the existing mechanisms must not be excluded from the CG 
policy scheme. Studies show that the performance of concentrated firms often suffers as 
the UCOs tend to adopt fewer of the recommended CG measures (Griffin et al, 2017; 
Renders & Gaeremynck, 2012). Firms those adopt the recommended CG measures attain 
higher performance; however, the benefit of higher performance is not distributed among 
the minority shareholders. That is, the suggested mechanisms are not adequate in 
governing the UCOs. In the aftermath of 1990’s financial crisis, the worldwide initiative 
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to improve governance was a worthwhile policy decision. It is time to strengthen the 
existing measures and develop newer ones that are better apt for the modern corporations. 
This dissertation makes a comprehensive effort to contribute in this policy dialogue.  
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ENDNOTES 
1. Detail information on code of good governance across countries is provided by the 
European Corporate Governance Institute (http://www.ecgi.org/codes/all_codes.php). 
 
2. Journal articles cited in Table 2.1 are provided in the References section. 
 
3. In Capital-IQ, data provided on CEO salary and CEO bonus is straightforward. Data 
on stock option, restricted stock, and LTIP are provided under the category of ‘Other 
Compensation’. 
 
4. Industry categories developed by Campbell (1996) include – Petroleum, Consumer 
Durables, Basic, Food/Tabaco, Construction, Capital Goods, Transportation, Utilities, 
Textile/Trade, Service, and Leisure. 
 
5. World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report 2015-2016 
 http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-report-2015-2016/institutions 
 
6. World Bank Stocks Traded, Turnover Ratio of Domestic Shares (%) 
 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.TRNR?view=chart 
 
7. Heritage Foundation Index of Market Openness  
https://www.heritage.org/index/open-markets 
 
8. Transparency International Corruption Perception Index    
https://www.transparency.org/country 
 
9. Freedom House Press Freedom Index    
https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-press 
 
10. United Nations: World Economic Situation & Prospects 2016   
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APPENDIX A: EXAMPLES OF OWNERSHIP MAPS WITH UCO’s 
VOTING RIGHT AND CASH-FLOW RIGHT 
 
 
 
Figure A.1: Fielmann AG; Mr. Guenther Klaus Fielmann is the UCO with voting 
right 71.64% and cash-flow right 53.73% 
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Figure A.2: Volkswagen AG; Porsche/Piech family is the UCO with voting right 
52.22% and cash-flow right 48.36% 
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Figure A.3: NTT Data Intramart Corporation; the Japanese Ministry of Finance is 
the UCO with voting right 35.21% and cash-flow right 10.71% 
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Figure A.4: Crie Anabuki Inc.; Anabuki family is the UCO with voting right 
59.36% and cash-flow right 35.13 
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Figure A.5: BYGGMA ASA; Drangsland Family is the UCO with voting right 
77.55% and cash-flow right 77.48% 
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APPENDIX B: ADDITIONAL INTERACTION PLOTS 
 
  
Interaction plots for Table 5.7 (OLS Regression with Mean-Centered Interactions 
& Huber-White Robust Errors for Legal Institution) and Table 5.8 (OLS Regression with 
Mean-Centered Interactions & Huber-White Robust Errors for Disclosure Standard) are 
presented below.    
 
 
Figure B.1: Interaction plot for the moderation effect of Board Independence on the 
negative relationship between Excess Control and Minority Shareholder Wealth (i.e. 
Tobin’s Q) using OLS regression with Huber-White robust errors; for sub-sample 
with weak legal institution 
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Figure B.2: Interaction plot for the moderation effect of CEO-Separation on the 
negative relationship between Excess Control and Minority Shareholder Wealth (i.e. 
Tobin’s Q) using OLS regression with Huber-White robust errors; for sub-sample 
with weak legal institution 
 
 
Figure B.3: Interaction plot for the moderation effect of Managerial Ownership on 
the negative relationship between Excess Control and Minority Shareholder Wealth 
(i.e. Tobin’s Q) using OLS regression with Huber-White robust errors; for sub-
sample with weak legal institution 
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Figure B.4: Interaction plot for the moderation effect of Performance based Pay on 
the negative relationship between Excess Control and Minority Shareholder Wealth 
(i.e. Tobin’s Q) using OLS regression with Huber-White robust errors; for sub-
sample with weak legal institution 
 
 
 
 
Figure B.5: Interaction plot for the moderation effect of Board Independence on the 
negative relationship between Excess Control and Minority Shareholder Wealth (i.e. 
Tobin’s Q) using OLS regression with Huber-White robust errors; for sub-sample 
with strong legal institution 
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Figure B.6: Interaction plot for the moderation effect of CEO-Separation on the 
negative relationship between Excess Control and Minority Shareholder Wealth (i.e. 
Tobin’s Q) using OLS regression with Huber-White robust errors; for sub-sample 
with strong legal institution 
 
 
 
 
Figure B.7: Interaction plot for the moderation effect of Managerial Ownership on 
the negative relationship between Excess Control and Minority Shareholder Wealth 
(i.e. Tobin’s Q) using OLS regression with Huber-White robust errors; for sub-
sample with strong legal institution 
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Figure B.8: Interaction plot for the moderation effect of Performance based Pay on 
the negative relationship between Excess Control and Minority Shareholder Wealth 
(i.e. Tobin’s Q) using OLS regression with Huber-White robust errors; for sub-
sample with strong legal institution 
 
 
 
 
Figure B.9: Interaction plot for the moderation effect of Board Independence on the 
negative relationship between Excess Control and Minority Shareholder Wealth (i.e. 
Tobin’s Q) using OLS regression with Huber-White robust errors; for sub-sample 
with weak disclosure standard 
 
	210	
 
 
Figure B.10: Interaction plot for the moderation effect of CEO-Separation on the 
negative relationship between Excess Control and Minority Shareholder Wealth (i.e. 
Tobin’s Q) using OLS regression with Huber-White robust errors; for sub-sample 
with weak disclosure standard 
 
 
 
 
Figure B.11: Interaction plot for the moderation effect of Managerial Ownership on 
the negative relationship between Excess Control and Minority Shareholder Wealth 
(i.e. Tobin’s Q) using OLS regression with Huber-White robust errors; for sub-
sample with weak disclosure standard 
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Figure B.12: Interaction plot for the moderation effect of Performance based Pay on 
the negative relationship between Excess Control and Minority Shareholder Wealth 
(i.e. Tobin’s Q) using OLS regression with Huber-White robust errors; for sub-
sample with weak disclosure standard 
 
 
 
 
Figure B.13: Interaction plot for the moderation effect of Board Independence on 
the negative relationship between Excess Control and Minority Shareholder Wealth 
(i.e. Tobin’s Q) using OLS regression with Huber-White robust errors; for sub-
sample with strong disclosure standard 
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Figure B.14: Interaction plot for the moderation effect of CEO-Separation on the 
negative relationship between Excess Control and Minority Shareholder Wealth (i.e. 
Tobin’s Q) using OLS regression with Huber-White robust errors; for sub-sample 
with strong disclosure standard 
 
 
 
 
Figure B.15: Interaction plot for the moderation effect of Managerial Ownership on 
the negative relationship between Excess Control and Minority Shareholder Wealth 
(i.e. Tobin’s Q) using OLS regression with Huber-White robust errors; for sub-
sample with strong disclosure standard 
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Figure B.16: Interaction plot for the moderation effect of Performance based Pay on 
the negative relationship between Excess Control and Minority Shareholder Wealth 
(i.e. Tobin’s Q) using OLS regression with Huber-White robust errors; for sub-
sample with strong disclosure standard 
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APPENDIX C: ADDITIONAL TABLES FOR ANALYSES 
  
 Table C.1 presents the OLS regression results of sub-sample with firms that are 
cross-listed in the Anglo-Saxon stock markets and Table C.2 presents the OLS regression 
results of sub-sample with firms that are owned by the Anglo-Saxon Foreign UCOs. 
Table C.3 and Table C.4 provide the ranking of countries based on the quality of Stock 
Market institution and Pro-Market Institution respectively. Table C.5 and Table C.6 
depict the ranking of countries based on the state of Corruption Perception index and 
Media/Press Freedom index respectively. Table C.7 splits the countries into developed 
and developing contexts and Table C.8 presents the OLS regression results for 
concentrated firms operating in the developing vs. developed contexts.      
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Table C.1: OLS Regression with Huber-White Robust Errors; Anglo-Saxon-Listing 
DV Tobin's Q Model 1 Model 2 Model 3c Model 4 Model 5
Excess Control (EC)a -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.006 -0.026*** -0.027***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.017) (0.008) (0.008)
Board Independencea 0.001
(0.003)
EC*Board Independence 0.000
(0.000)
CEO-Separation -0.064
(0.270)
EC*CEO-Separation -0.022
(0.019)
Managerial Ownershipa 0.002
(0.006)
EC*Managerial Ownership -0.000
(0.001)
Performance based Paya 0.009***
(0.003)
EC*Performance based Pay 0.000
(0.000)
Firm Age -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Firm Sizeb -0.277*** -0.277*** -0.277*** -0.274*** -0.348***
(0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.051) (0.063)
Firm Profit 1.110 1.116 1.126 1.102 1.268
(1.185) (1.190) (1.187) (1.178) (1.309)
Firm Growth -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
UCO Foreign 0.236 0.237 0.241 0.244 0.186
(0.178) (0.178) (0.176) (0.175) (0.190)
UCO Identity yes yes yes yes yes
Industry yes yes yes yes yes
Country yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 6.961*** 6.971*** 6.993*** 6.892*** 8.583***
(1.236) (1.240) (1.307) (1.171) (1.433)
Observations 413 413 413 413 355
R-squared 0.160 0.160 0.162 0.161 0.197  
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
a. Continuous variables of the interaction terms are mean-centered; b. measure is natural log transformed 
c. At CEO-Separation = 1, β3 = -0.029 with robust st. error = 0.008 and p<0.01
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Table C.2: OLS Regression with Huber-White Robust Errors; Anglo-Saxon-UCOs 
DV Tobin's Q Model 1 Model 2 Model 3c Model 4 Model 5
Excess Control (EC)a -0.054** -0.054** -0.033 -0.045* -0.048**
(0.023) (0.023) (0.036) (0.025) (0.022)
Board Independencea 0.003
(0.012)
EC*Board Independence 0.001
(0.001)
CEO-Separation 0.204
(1.046)
EC*CEO-Separation -0.024
(0.048)
Managerial Ownershipa -0.043**
(0.019)
EC*Managerial Ownership 0.004
(0.007)
Performance based Paya 0.047***
(0.015)
EC*Performance based Pay -0.001
(0.001)
Firm Age 0.012 0.013 0.011 0.013 0.004
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009)
Firm Sizeb -0.271* -0.263* -0.258 -0.314** -0.408**
(0.148) (0.154) (0.167) (0.154) (0.156)
Firm Profit 6.165** 6.056** 6.281** 6.179** 5.817**
(2.601) (2.622) (2.711) (2.558) (2.537)
Firm Growth 0.061*** 0.062*** 0.061*** 0.058*** 0.055***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011)
Crosslisting 0.924 0.889 0.952 0.740 -1.120
(0.574) (0.698) (0.580) (0.569) (1.010)
UCO Identity yes yes yes yes yes
Industry yes yes yes yes yes
Country yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 4.773 4.532 4.307 6.115* 10.913***
(3.089) (3.238) (3.900) (3.280) (3.278)
Observations 62 62 62 62 53
R-squared 0.384 0.389 0.385 0.405 0.535  
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
a. Continuous variables of the interaction terms are mean-centered; b. measure is natural log transformed 
c. At CEO-Separation = 1, β3 = -0.057 with robust st. error = 0.027 and p<0.05 
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Table C.3: Countries with Strong vs. Weak Stock Market Institution 
Countries in Strong Context Countries in Weak Context 
..1. Italy 21. Egypt 
..2. China 22. Greece 
..3. Turkey 23. Poland 
..4. South Korea 24. Austria 
..5. Japan 25. Singapore 
..6. Finland 26. Pakistan 
..7. Spain 27. Belgium 
..8. Portugal 28. Mexico 
..9. Thailand 29. Malaysia 
10. Czech Republic 30. Russia 
11. Germany 31. Israel 
12. Brazil 32. Indonesia 
13. Sweden 33. Philippines 
14. Switzerland 34. Colombia 
15. Netherlands 35. Chile 
16. France 36. Jordan 
17. India 37. Argentina 
18. Norway 38. Bangladesh 
19. Denmark 39. Bulgaria 
20. Hong Kong 40. Peru 
 
Source: World Bank Stocks Traded, Turnover Ratio of Domestic Shares (%), 2016 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.TRNR?view=chart 
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Table C.4: Countries with Strong vs. Weak Pro-Market Institution 
Countries in Strong Context Countries in Weak Context 
..1. Hong Kong 21. Italy 
..2. Switzerland 22. South Korea 
..3. Denmark 23. Bulgaria 
..4. Netherlands 24. Portugal 
..5. Singapore 25. Turkey 
..6. Finland 26. Japan 
..7. Sweden 27. Jordan 
..8. Austria 28. Philippines 
..9. Czech Republic 29. Thailand 
10. Chile 30. Malaysia 
11. Belgium 31. Argentina 
12. Spain 32. Egypt 
13. Germany 33. Indonesia 
14. Poland 34. Greece 
15. Colombia 35. Brazil 
16. Israel 36. Pakistan 
17. France 37. India 
18. Mexico 38. Bangladesh 
19. Norway 39. Russia 
20. Peru 40. China 
 
         Source: Heritage Foundation Index of Market Openness, 2016    
         https://www.heritage.org/index/open-markets 
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Table C.5: Countries with Low (Strong) vs. High (Weak) Corruption 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, 2016   
https://www.transparency.org/country 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Countries in Strong Context Countries in Weak Context 
..1. Denmark 21. Malaysia 
..2. Finland 22. Jordan 
..3. Sweden 23. Italy 
..4. Switzerland 24. Greece 
..5. Norway 25. Bulgaria 
..6. Singapore 26. Turkey 
..7. Netherlands 27. China 
..8. Germany 28. India 
..9. Hong Kong 29. Brazil 
10. Belgium 30. Colombia 
11. Austria 31. Indonesia 
12. Japan 32. Argentina 
13. France 33. Peru 
14. Chile 34. Thailand 
15. Israel 35. Philippines 
16. Portugal 36. Egypt 
17. Poland 37. Pakistan 
18. Spain 38. Mexico 
19. Czech Republic 39. Russia 
20. South Korea 40. Bangladesh 
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Table C.6: Countries with High (Strong) vs. Low (Weak) Media/Press Freedom 
Countries in Strong Context Countries in Weak Context 
..1. Norway 21. Bulgaria 
..2. Belgium 22. India 
..3. Finland 23. Philippines 
..4. Netherlands 24. Brazil 
..5. Sweden 25. Peru 
..6. Denmark 26. Greece 
..7. Switzerland 27. Indonesia 
..8. Portugal 28. Argentina 
..9. Germany 29. Colombia 
10. Czech Republic 30. Bangladesh 
11. Austria 31. Pakistan 
12. Japan 32. Mexico 
13. France 33. Jordan 
14. Poland 34. Malaysia 
15. Spain 35. Singapore 
16. Chile 36. Turkey 
17. Italy 37. Egypt 
18. Israel 38. Thailand 
19. South Korea 39. Russia 
20. Hong Kong 40. China 
 
                            Source: Freedom House Press Freedom Index    
                            https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-press 
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Table C.7: List of Developed & Transitioning/Developing Countries 
Developed Countries Developing Countries 
..1. Austria 19. Argentina 
..2. Belgium 20. Bangladesh 
..3. Bulgaria 21. Brazil 
..4. Czech Republic 22. Chile 
..5. Denmark 23. China 
..6. Finland 24. Colombia 
..7. France 25. Egypt 
..8. Germany 26. Hong Kong 
..9. Greece 27. India 
10. Italy 28. Indonesia 
11. Japan 29. Israel 
12. Netherlands 30. Jordan 
13. Norway 31. Malaysia 
14. Poland 32. Mexico 
15. Portugal 33. Pakistan 
16. Spain 34. Peru 
17. Sweden 35. Philippines 
18. Switzerland 36. Russia 
  37. Singapore 
  38. South Korea 
		 39. Thailand 
		 40. Turkey 
              
    Source: United Nations: World Economic Situation & Prospects, 2016 
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Table C.8: OLS Regression with Huber-White Robust Errors; Developing Countries vs. Developed Countries  
DV Tobin's Q Model 1 Model 2 Model 3c Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8d Model 9 Model 10
Excess Control (EC)a -0.026*** -0.027*** -0.007 -0.027*** -0.034*** -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.016 -0.023*** -0.025***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.012) (0.007) (0.008)
Board Independencea 0.003 0.000
(0.004) (0.003)
EC*Board Independence 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
CEO-Separation 0.328*** 0.003
(0.109) (0.189)
EC*CEO-Separation -0.024* -0.010
(0.014) (0.015)
Managerial Ownershipa -0.006* -0.001
(0.003) (0.004)
EC*Managerial Ownership 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Performance based Paya 0.011*** 0.009***
(0.003) (0.003)
EC*Performance based Pay -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Firm Age 0.006** 0.006** 0.006** 0.006** 0.010*** -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Developing Countries Developed Countries
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Firm Sizeb -0.119*** -0.118*** -0.122*** -0.130*** -0.182*** -0.233*** -0.233*** -0.233*** -0.234*** -0.306***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.031) (0.041) (0.044) (0.044) (0.043) (0.043) (0.060)
Firm Profit 1.259 1.281 1.250 1.265 0.719 -0.081 -0.082 -0.076 -0.080 -0.189
(1.799) (1.806) (1.761) (1.775) (1.732) (0.668) (0.670) (0.670) (0.670) (0.669)
Firm Growth 0.118 0.116 0.129 0.142 0.156 -0.000* -0.000* -0.000* -0.000* -0.000*
(0.108) (0.108) (0.101) (0.096) (0.147) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Crosslisting -0.083 -0.098 -0.121 -0.101 -0.225 0.819*** 0.816*** 0.813*** 0.820*** 0.654**
(0.145) (0.143) (0.144) (0.144) (0.213) (0.184) (0.188) (0.185) (0.187) (0.272)
UCO Foreign 0.569*** 0.564*** 0.532*** 0.546*** 0.696*** 0.160 0.162 0.164 0.152 0.225
(0.182) (0.182) (0.177) (0.185) (0.236) (0.169) (0.169) (0.169) (0.169) (0.220)
UCO Identity yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 2.466*** 2.449*** 2.337*** 2.824*** 3.493*** 5.068*** 5.066*** 5.065*** 5.094*** 6.682***
(0.632) (0.631) (0.629) (0.680) (0.835) (0.879) (0.884) (0.884) (0.849) (1.190)
Observations 531 531 531 531 310 578 578 578 578 440
R-squared 0.172 0.173 0.185 0.178 0.234 0.119 0.120 0.120 0.120 0.144  
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
a. Continuous variables of the interaction terms are mean-centered; b. measure is natural log transformed 
c. At CEO-Separation = 1, β3 = -0.031 with robust st. error = 0.008 and p<0.01 
d. At CEO-Separation = 1, β3 = -0.025 with robust st. error = 0.009 and p<0.01 
